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Abstract 
Mohdlsniail bin Raritli 
Disclosure in Annual Reports: An Agency Theoretic Perspective in an 
· International Setting 
Over the recent years 'transparency' or better infonnation disclosure has been the 
buzzword of various. corporate governance bodies· due to the failures of the 
system of corporate governance, which arise from an agency relationship. 
However, there are arguments by 'free market' advocates suggesting that 
infonnation is voluntarily disclosed. 
This study discusses and compares the disclosure of infonnation ·relating to 
directors' behaviour in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, France, 
Gennany and Sweden. These countries were selected because they represent the 
developed countries with different accounting systems. Furthennore, they are also 
the board member countries oflASC and OECD. 
'Transparency' relating to directors' behaviour for the SIX countries were 
measured using disclosure indices, i.e. the disclosure point average for 
dichotomous, modified dichotomous. weighted dichotomous and weighted 
modified dichotomous indices. These weighted .indices were established by 
analysing survey responses of investment analysts. 
The results show that there were significant differences in the disclosure of 
infonnation relating to directors' behaviour among the six countries. There is also 
a very low level of 'transparency' in all the countries except the United Kingdom. 
These results suggest that inforination relating to directors' behaviour is not 
voluntarily disclosed and therefore regulation is necessary in order for it to be 
more transparent as suggested by the various corporate governance bodies. 
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1.1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Company failures, business frauds, creative accounting, directors' pay, aitd the 
· crisis in East Asian economies are issues that arise from the failures of the 
system by which the companies are . directed and controlled, i.e. corporate 
governance. Even though there may be other reasons for the issues to arise (e.g. 
by the international currency speculators, as claimed by the Malaysian Prime 
Minister for the failure of the economies and companies in South East Asia 
(Berita Harian, 22 August 1999)), corporate governance is thought to be the main 
cause of the problem. These issues have generated a heated debate and given rise 
to great concern to the public and taken to the top of the policy agendas by policy 
makers and regulators/standard setters. 
It has been widely believed that problems concerning corporate governance arise 
from ·the so-called divorce between ownership and control (the agency 
relationship) within business organisations. An agency relationship is a 
relationship between two parties where one part)' agrees to function on behalf of 
the other (Radebaugh, 1987), i.e. the director (agent) is supposed to act on behalf 
of the shareholders (principals). However the failures of corporate governance 
have revealed the adverse consequences of conflicts of interests and asymmetries 
of information between the directors and the shareholders. Since. market forces 
and corporate governance monitoring/controlling mechanisms have failed to d~al 
with the fundamental agency problems, in this thesis it is a~gued that regulations 
on the disclosu~e of directors' atTairs are essential to remedy· information 
asymmetries and adverse actions by directors. 
In response to these problems, policy makers, stock exchanges and the 
accountancy professions, both at national and international level, formed various 
corporate governance committees. Interestingly, the common solution proposed 
by the various committees is 'transparency' or better information disclosure to 
the shareholders by companies. However, so far no research has been undertaken 
to measure the 'transparency' i.e. the disclosure of information relating to 
corporate governance or information relating to directors' behaviour. This is the 
focus of this study that is to measure the 'transparency' or adequacy of the 
provision of information on corporate governance or more specifically on 
information in the company's annual reports relating to directors' opportunistic 
behaviour. If the disclosure of such information is not transparent or inadequate 
and there is a significant difference between the practices internationally, then 
there i~ a case for policy action (in the form of regulation) to overcome corporate 
governance problems and directors' opportunistic behaviour. 
Section 1.2 of this chapter, 'background of the study,' discusses the framework 
and focus of the study. Section 1.3, 'area of research', incorporates the research 
2 
objectives, research approach, definition of directors' affairs and agency 
perspective, and research hypotheses. Section 1.4, 'organisation of the study' sets 
out the outline of this study and finally section 1.5 is the summary. 
1.2. Background to the study 
The number of high profile company failures (for example: Penn Central, Polly 
Peck, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Sock Shop, etc.); 
business frauds and the apparent ease of unscrupulous directors in expropriating 
other stakeholders' fund (for example: the Maxwell affair, the scandal of Nick 
Leeson with the Barings Bank, and the recent scandal by stockbroker, Martin 
Frankel); the very limited role of auditors (for example: the Caparo case); 
creative accounting; the rapid increase in directors' pay, the methods used to set 
directors' pay and other components of compensation (for example, in the United 
Kingdom the senior directors of listed companies received average increases of 
17.8% in their remuneration packages over one financial year (Financial Times, 6 
August, 1998)); and the recent crisis in East Asia about failed corporate 
governance practices relating to lending and borrowing are subjects that have 
generated heated debates (for further discussions see, Keasey and Wright, 1993; 
Whittington, 1993; Conyon et al, 1995; and OECD, 1998). These issues, which 
are related to the systems by which companies are directed and controlled, i.e. 
corporate governance, are the key issues of concern to the public and are 
therefore important policy items. Problems pertaining to corporate governance go 
3 
back at least as far as the separation of ownership from control (agency 
relationship) within business organisations (Keasey and Wright, 1993). This 
relationship was first foreseen by Berle and Means ( 1932) and developed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976} in the theory of agency. 
An agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p 308) as 'a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s) engages another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent'. According to agency 
theory, this relationship is weakened by a conflict of interest and information 
asymmetry that arises between principals and agents because of goal 
incongruencies. These incongruencies occur when the parties to the relationship 
attempt to maximise their own utilities. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the principal can control the actions of 
agents by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the opportunistic 
behaviour of the agent, by instituting contracts that bond the agent's performance 
with the principals' interests (bonding costs) or by using some combination of 
monitoring and bonding. They refer to monitoring as not only just measuring or 
observ\ng the behaviour of the agent, but also controlling the behaviour of the 
agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc. 
Bonding the agent's performance with the shareholder interests may be 
accomplished directly by suitable design of the compensation contract. 
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In the above situation, the principal might demand information relating to the 
agenfs behaviour t<{b~ disclosed in the annual reports of the company in order to 
-· ' . 
reduce the costs of monitoring the agent. The principal might also demand 
. -.. . . . 
information to show that the terms of the bonding contracts have been· adhered to 
(Watts, 1977). 
Even though. these problems have been a long-standing issue, they have been 
given high priorities only in the late 1970s after a number of company failures, 
business frauds, scandals, etc. In the USA, for example, the American Law 
Institute (ALl) in 1978 formally instituted the corporate governance project, and 
in 1982, proposed a fmal draft on the 'Principal of Corporate Governance: 
Analysis and Recommendations' (Koh, 1994 ). Other bodies, such as the Cohen 
Commission, the Financial Executives Institute, the General Accounting Office,· 
the Tradeway Commission, and the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations 
(COSO) of the Treadway, have all recommended· reporting on internal control 
(Vanasco et a!, 1995), which is a component of corporate governance. 
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock 
Exchange, and the accountancy profession sponsored the Cadbury Committee in 
1991 to look at these issues. The Cadbury Report (1992) noted the following two 
important statements: (i) 'It is, however, the continuing concern about standards 
of financial reporting and accountability, heightened by the BCCI, Maxwell and 
the controversy over director's pay, which has kept corporate governance in the 
public eye' (preface) and, (ii) 'Had a code such as ours been in existence in the 
5 
past, we believe that a number of the recent examples of unexpected company 
failures and cases of fraud would have received attention earlier' (paragraph 1.9). 
They were concerned at the perceived low level of confidence both- in financial 
reporting and the ability of auditors to -provide the safeguards which the users of 
company reports sought and expected, and referred to the underlying factors of 
the absence of a clear framework for ensuring that directors kept under review 
the controls in their business, together with the looseness of accounting standards 
(Clarke, 1993). The proposal of the Cad bury Committee ( 1992) focused 
primarily on the accountability aspects of corporate governance and it relied 
largely upon improved information to shareholders, continued self-regulation and 
a strengthening of auditor independence. 
The literature shows that the formation of various committees to look at the 
issues continues to expand world wide, both at national and international level. 
Examples of efforts to overcome the problems at national level, apart from the 
above, are: the Vienot Report in France, the Dey Report in Canada, the 
Greenbury and Hampel Report in the United Kingdom, the Peter Report in the 
Netherlands, the Bosch Report in Australia, and the Report of the National 
Association of Corporate Directors Commission on Director Professionalism, 
and the Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate Governance in the United 
States (OECD, 1998). Partial listing of corporate governance guidelines and 
codes of "best practice" of various countries are listed in Appendix 1. 
6 
Apart fron1 the initiative taken at the national level, the international bodies such 
. as the International Faculty for Corporate and Capital Market Law, . the 
Organisat.ion for· Economic Co-operation and. Development (OECD) and. the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) have also commenced 
studies in this area. The International Faculty for Corporate and Capital Market 
Law with the assistance of the Conservatoire National des Atrs et Meitiers, the 
/nstitut National des Techniques Economiques et Comptables and the Universite 
de Haute-Normandie organised the Paris Colloquium on Corporate Governance 
in 1983. The Paris Colloquium was set up to identify problem areas in corporate 
and capital market law and develop solutions through the exchange of knowledge 
and ideas within a comparative perspective (Paris Colloquium, 1984, p. 199) 
The Business Sector Advisory Group on corporate governance was established in 
1996 by the OECD to review and analyse international corporate governance 
issues and to suggest an agenda and priorities for further OECD initiatives 
(OECD, 1998). The OECD was also given a mandate by the OECD Council 
meeting at ministerial level in 1998 to develop a set of standards and guidelines 
on good corporate governance (OECD, 1999). In response to this, the 'OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance' were produced and endorsed by ministers at 
the OECD Council meeting at ministerial level on 26 -27 May 1999 (OECD, 
1999). 
The IASC, on the other hand, has adopted a different approach. It has issued 
standards concerning the presentation of financial statements by companies in 
7 
countries that adopt the International Accounting Standards. Examples ·of 
standards related to the above problems are: International Accounting S~ndard 
(IAS) 19 - Retirement· Benefit Costs; and IAS 24 - Related Party Disclosure 
(Cairns, 1995). 
There are various recommendations· put forward by these bodies/committees to 
overcome the problems (such as, ·strengthening the role of internal control, 
auditor independence, the chairman of board and the chief executive being a 
different person, appointment of non-executive directors, etc.). However, the 
common recommendation of these bodies/committees is 'transparency' or better 
information disclosure to the shareholders by companies. There is also a 
suggestion that financial reporting is an important element of the system of 
corporate governance, and some failures of corporate governance may therefore 
be due to inadequate financial reports (Whittington, 1993). This recommendation 
is consistent with the argument in agency theory that information is demanded by 
the principal in order to reduce the agency costs. However, since in an agency 
relationship there is a conflict of interest and information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent, information is not voluntarily disclosed by the agent to 
the principal. Therefore, in. order for the above recommendation to be followed, 
this study suggests that regulation on the disclosure of such information is 
required. 
This recommendation, however, contradicts the v1ew of the 'free market' 
advocates, or the anti-regulation group. It is argued by this group that 
8 
infonnation should be disclosed ·and produced without regulation. They argue 
that, since in an agency theoretic framework there is .. an asymmetry of 
. information and conflict of interest, which create the problem of'moral hazard', 
the principal may seek information in order to monitor the agent's behaviour. 
However, since the generation of the information is costly .and the agent has a 
comparative advantage in its production, he/she will have an interest in providing 
such information in order to reduce monitoring costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978). 
In addition this group claims that market forces and the current mechanisms for 
controlling the agents, such as a company's board of directors, non-executive 
directors, large shareholders, the threat of proxy fights, hostile takeovers, 
managerial labour markets, etc., are sufficient in monitoring and disciplining the 
agent, and suggests that additional regulation on the disclosure of such 
information is not required. 
However, smce the failures of corporate governance (discussed earlier) are 
continuing to the present date, it may be argued that market forces and other 
controlling mechanisms have failed to overcome the problem in an agency 
relationship, therefore in this study it is argued that regulation on the disclosure 
of information relating to directors' affairs is important. Apart from the failure of 
market forces and various controlling mechanisms to deal with the problems, 
there are also other explanations, for the need of regulation on the disclosure of 
information, such as, the belief that information markets will not function 
9 
effectively and fairly in the absence of government regulation (Cooper and Keim, 
. . . . . 
1983), the alleged 'public good' nature of such information (Gonedes and 
Dopuch, 1974 ), and litigation problems faced by the supplier of the information. 
These arguments are discussed later in the next chapter. 
However due to a variety of economic, social and political factors corporate 
accounting and information disclosure regulations are different from one country 
to another (Radebaugh and Gray, 1993). This will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
1.3. Area of Research. 
This study is focused upon the central concerns of agency problems and 
corporate governance, that is the 'transparency' or the disclosure of information 
relating to director's affairs in the annual reports of companies. 
Despite the amount of research m the area of information disclosure, no 
empirical studies have been made on information disclosure in relation to 
directors' affairs (information for monitoring). Prior research on information 
disclosure has been made on the extent, quality, costs, benefits and the 
consistency between the preparers arid users of information for investment 
decision-making. 
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This study examines the quality· of disclosure at an international level, i.e. in 
western developed countries with different accounting systems as developed by 
Nobes (1983) and which are also represented by being a member of the IASC 
and OECD. This area is chosen because international regulations are required due 
to the increasing globalisation of the capital markets. Furthermore, it is the 
objective of international bodies su~h as IASC, OECD and EU, to harmonise 
accounting regulations, standards among its members. 
This study also examines the degree of agreement (correlation) between 
preparers and users of the information. This is to determine the level of 
agreement between the shareholders and the preparers (companies) on the 
information relating to directors' behaviour. The finding of no correlation or 
negative correlation suggests that the companies are not disclosing the 
information demanded by the shareholders. No attempt will be made to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of information disclosure relating to directors' affairs. This 
is due to time and financial constraints on the part of the author. This may be a 
subject for future research. 
This study compares the actual disclosure of information relating to directors' 
affairs in the corporate annual reports, rather than the formal disclosure required 
by the legal and professional regulations. Both the voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure of information will be examined. 
11 
·t.3.1. Research objectives. 
Since there are various arguments put forward by free market advocates.( the anti-
regulation group) that information is disclosed in an unn:gulated environment 
based on market forces, it is the objective of this study to determine whether such 
arguments are true. The purpose of this is to make recommendations to the policy 
makers (regulators and standard setters), in particular to the international policy 
maker's, of whether regulation in this area is required in order to overcome the . 
agency/corporate governance problems. 
Due the increasing globalisation of the capital markets, there is also increasing 
demand for the harmonisation of regulations on the disclosure of such 
information by international policy makers. Taking this point into consideration, 
this study also seeks to determine whether the harmonisation of the regulations 
and standards on the disclosure of information relating to directors' behaviour by 
international policy makers has materialised. 
In addition to the above two purposes, this study also attempts to identify the 
association (correlation) between the disclosure items which are demanded by the 
users {shareholders) and the items which are disclosed by the suppliers of the 
information (companies/agents). This is to support or reject the argument made 
by the opponents of regulations that the compames voluntarily disclose 
information demanded by the shareholders. 
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1.3.2. Research approach. 
Various approaches have been taken in previous studies to measure the quality of 
the disclosure of infonnation. In this study the 'disclosure index' is used' to 
measure the quality of disclosure. A low disclosure score indicates poor quality· 
of disclosure, which suggests that regulation is required. In order to justify the. 
need for regulation statistically, in this study the Kruskal-Wall is one-way 
analysis of variance for three or more unrelated samples is used to test for a 
significant difference. Where there are significant differences between the sample 
countries, this will suggest the need for regulation in this area of disclosure. Any 
significant differences will also suggest there is no hannony between the sample 
countries in disclosing the infonnation relating to directors' affairs. 
In order to detennine the association between the disclosure items, which are 
demanded by the principals, and the items, which are disclosed by the agents, a 
Speannan rank correlation test is used. A low measure of correlation indicates 
that there is an infonnation asymmetry between the agent and the principal, i.e . 
. the agent is not disclosing the infonnation, which is demanded by the principal. 
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1.3.3. Definition of director's affairs and the agency perspccti\'C. 
· .· t:3.3.1. Director's affairs 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the main purpose of this study is to measure 
' . 
the quality of the disclosure of information relating to directors' affairs or 
behaviour. The term 'director' in this study refers to a member of the board of 
directors, and includes executive and non-executive directors. A senior manager 
who is not a member of the board of directors is excluded from the study. The 
senior manager is excluded because, in this study, the foclis is on the agency 
relationship between the shareholder and the directors and furthermore, the board 
of directors is monitonng the senior managers. This represents another level of 
agency relationship, i.e. between the directors and employees of the company. 
In countries with the two tier boards' systems, i.e: a supervisory board and an 
executive/management board such as in Germany and Sweden, only the members 
of the executive/management board are considered. This is to avoid 
complications when comparing information disclosure on directors' affairs in 
countries with a single tier board system with· those of the two tier boards. 
However, in this study, the terms 'director', 'agent', 'management', 'manager', 
and 'executive' are used interchangeably. 
'Directors' affairs' in this study refer to the matters concerning the directors 
directly or indirectly. They therefore include directors' remuneration, 
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... _ ., ··-
;.-':· ~. 
accountabilities, profiles, service contracts, experiences, transactions with the 
compames, responsibilities, board structure; internal control, and -corporate 
.. governance matters. 
1.3.3.2. Agency perspective 
An. agency perspective m the context of this study refers to the demand for 
information for monitoring purposes or stewardship purposes, as opposed to the 
well-developed demand for information for investment decision-making 
purposes. 
1.3.4. Hypotheses 
The existing literature shows that issues in agency theory or corporate 
governance have been taken by various bodies both at national and international 
levels. In agency theory, information relating to the directors' affairs is 
demanded by the shareholders in order to reduce the monitoring costs which is 
also the main recommendation of the various corporate governance bodies. These 
bodies have suggested 'transparency' or better disclosure of information relating 
to directors' affairs to be disclosed in the annual reports of companies. However, 
due to the different accounting systems and the . emphasis of the corporate 
governance practices adopted by the sample countries, there is a likelihood of 
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differences in the quality of disclosure of information relatingto directors' affairs 
in those countries. The literature also indicates that there is an information 
asymmetry between the shareholders and the directors, and the directors are 
reluctant to disclose such information because of 'free-riders' and litigation 
problems. 
From the above arguments, this study therefore tests the following two mam 
hypotheses: 
l. The overall disclosure quality of information relating to directors' affairs is 
different between the countries. 
2. There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of the 
disclosure items between each sample country and the investment analysts. 
1.4. Organisation of the study 
This study is divided into seven chapters. As presented above, chapter 1, 
'Introduction', incorporates the background of the study, the area of research, the 
organisation of the study and a summary. Chapter 2, 'Agency Theory and 
Regulations', presents the theoretical background of corporate governance and 
agency theory and their relationship. This chapter also describes the agency 
theory relationship and the implications for information disclosure. Second part 
16 
of this.chapter discusses the regulations on the disclosure of information and the 
•' . 
ar~uments for and against regulations. Finally this chapter presents the 
Classification of accounting systems. 
Chapter 3, 'Regulatory Requirements', describes the disclosure requirements and 
the level of enforcement of the regulations in the sample countries, i.e. United 
Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, France, Germany and Sweden. 
Chapter 4, 'Information Disclosure', begins with the definitions of'transparency 
... 
and disclosure. It then discusses disclosure quality and the -various methods of 
measuring disclosure quality. The method adopted in this study, i.e. the 
disclosure index, is explained in detail. 
Chapter 5, 'Data and Methodology', introduces the data and justifies the 
methodology used in this study. This chapter· also critically rev1ews the 
methodologies of previous disclosure studies. 
Based on the discussion of the earlier chapters, the results are presented and 
analy~cd in chapter 6, 'Results and Analysis'. The hypotheses of this study are 
tested in this chapter. 
Finally, chapter 7, 'Summary and Conclusion', summarises and presents the 
main conclusions of this study. The limitations and areas for future research are 
also set out and discussed in this final chapter. 
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l.S. Summary 
The author is aware of the problems in corporate governance and the agency 
relationship, and the need for regulating the disclosure of information relating to 
directors' behaviours (affairs). 
This study is set within the context of accounting systems operating m the 
western developed countries. This enables a companson to be made on the 
disclosure of information relating to directors' behaviours between countries with 
different accounting systems. The findings of a low level of disclosure quality in 
these countries and significant differences between the countries will provide 
justification for policy action and the need for the harmonisation of international 
accounting standards and disclosure practices in this area. This is the purpose of 
this study, i.e. to provide research results on the disclosure of information 
relating to corporate governance and directors' behaviour to the policy makers. 
It has been discussed earlier that company failures, business frauds, and creative 
accounting arise from the failure of corporate governance and the separation of 
ownership from control (agency theory). In order to understand these concepts 
more fully, and their relationship to information disclosure, corporate governance 
and agency theory are reviewed in the next chapter. 
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· :chapter2 
Agency Theory and Regulation·s 
2.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the problems associated with corporate governance and 
the separation of ownership from control (agency relationship) had been said to 
cause various bodies/committees to recommend greater 'transparency' or better 
information disclosure to the shareholders by companies. There have been 
various arguments by 'free market' advocates that information is voluntarily 
disclosed by companies in order to overcome the agency problems. However, 
due to failures of the system of corporate governance as reflected by company 
failures, business frauds, creative accounting, etc., this study suggests that 
regulation on the disclosure of information relating directors' affairs is necessary 
to ratify the problems. This chapter intends to explain corporate governance, 
agency theory and their relationship with information disclosure, and regulation 
on the disclosure. of information. Even though this study is not intended to 
evaluate corporate governance or to design an agency model on information 
disclosure, a review of corporate governance and agency theory is thought to be 
useful, in order to understand the concepts, forms, terms used, problems 
encountered, and solutions suggested before explaining their relationship with 
information disclosure and the need for regulation on the disclosure of 
information. 
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Corporate governance is described in section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses in general 
what are agency theory, the agency relationship, and agency costs. Section 2.4, 
presents the relationship between agency theory and infonnaticin disclosure. This 
section also includes the objective of infonnation disclosure in an agency 
perspective. Section 2.5, discusses in general the tenn regulation, the 
· international regulating bodies, the regulatory arguments. The classification of 
accounting systems is presented in section 2.6. Section 2. 7, draws the chapter to a 
close. 
2.2. Corporate governance 
2.2.1. What is corporate governance? 
In the earlier chapter, issues relating to corporate governance have been said to 
generate a heated debate. The business world, including company directors and 
investors, government agencies, academics and the media has all become very 
interested in the concept of corporate governance (Clarke, 1993). This section 
considers, in more detail, what corporate governance is and its relationship to 
agency theory. There is a wide divergence of views on the nature of, and what 
actually constitutes, corporate governance. For example, .from the survey by Bain 
and Band, ( 1996, p. 2), governance is seen by some of their respondents in the 
following ways: 
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- 'Having an appropriate pay_ policy for senior people in industry.' 
- 'Providing checks and balances to avoid the excesses of top bosses.' 
-'A set of procedures to protect the organisation from fraud or loss due to poor 
practice.' 
- 'Providing checks on the management thus protecting shareholders.' 
- 'Curbing the worst excess of a greedy managing class.' 
- 'Providing a control climate suitable to the organisation.' 
The Financial Times (6 April, 1992) sees corporate governance in the following 
way: 'corporate governance is all about finding ways to make companies run 
better.' The Cadbury Report (1992, Para 2.5) and Conyon et al (1995, p. 710) 
defmed corporate governance as the systems by which companies are directed 
and controlled. Clarke (1993) views corporate governance as the operation of the 
system of government of companies. 
Tricker (1984, p. 7) views governance in the following way: 'If management is 
about running business, governance is about seeing that it is run properly.' 
According to Tricker (1984, p. 8), 'corporate governance is concerned with the 
process by which corporate entities, particularly limited liability companies, are 
governed, i.e. with the exercise of power over the direction of the enterprise, the 
supervision and control of executive actions, the concern for the effect of the 
entity on other parties, the acceptance of a duty to be accountable and the 
regulation of the corporation within the jurisdiction of the states in which it 
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operates.' Tricker, (1984, p. 7) summarised the corporate governance process 
into four principal activities: 
- Direction: formulating the strategic direction for the future of the enterprise· in 
the long term, 
- Executive action: involvement in crucial executive decisions, 
-Supervision: monitoring and oversight of management performance, and 
-Accountability: recognising responsibilities to those making a legitimate 
demand for accountability. 
The first two activities described management functions (how companies are 
directed) whereas the latter two are controlling functions (how companies are 
controlled). These activities fulfil the definition of an agency relationship 
discussed earlier in Chapter 1, which is the same as the definition used by the 
Cadbury Report and Conyon discussed above. In this study this definition is used 
to describe corporate governance, i.e. how companies are directed and controlled, 
·because it is more related to the agency relationship, which is the focus of the 
study. 
2.2.2. Relationship between corporate governance and agency theory 
Even though there are vanous definitions, views, and debates about what is 
corporate governance, the key elements are concerned with the enhancement of 
corporate performance via the supervision, or monitoring, of management 
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performance and ensuring the accountability ofmanagement to shareholdersand 
. -
other stakeholders because of the confliCtofinterest and information asymmetry 
. ,• . . . . . . 
. ' . . 
between the agent and the principal. These aspects of governance and 
accountability are closely interrelated and · have introduced a stewardship 
dimension to corporate governance (Keasey and Wright, 1997). Stewardship is 
the narrow scope of agency theory (discussed in the section below). The need for 
the supervision and accountability of directors arises because Of the so-called 
divorce between ownership and control in large enterprises with diffused 
ownership (Hart, 1995). The divorce, or separation, of ownership from control in 
the modem diffuse ownership corporation is the characteristic of an agency 
relationship. 
Since the key elements of corporate governance are concerned with supervision, 
or monitoring, of management performance and ensuring the accountability of 
management to shareholders (Keasey and Wright, 1997), and arise whep there is 
an agency problem, or conflict of interest (Hart, 1995), it should be no surprise to 
discover that the issues associated with corporate governance are intimately 
associated with the general problem of agency. Addressing agency problems, 
therefore, will cover the issues of corporate governance. In this study, the failure 
of corporate governance systems is assumed to arise from the inability to curb the 
agency problems. 
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2.3. Agency theory 
The development of accounting records from the time of Heroninos (AD 249 to 
268), who was the manager of the unit of the Appianus estate centred on the 
village of Theadelphia, shows that the owner of the business was separated from 
the manager (see Rathbone, 1994). In the modem corporations, the separation of 
the owner and the manager was first highlighted by Adam Smith in 1776, 
followed by Berle and Means in 1932 and Jensen and Meckling in 1976. The 
separation of ownership from the manager, who clearly manages the business, is 
the general characteristic of an agency relationship. 
In the above situation, the manager is required to produce accounting information 
to the owner, to show that the accountability responsibilities have been 
satisfactorily discharged. The whole purpose of accounting here is not to measure 
the rate of profit or loss but to keep accurate records of acquisitions and 
outgoings, in money and kind, and to expose any losses due to dishonesty or 
negligence (Higson and Tayles, 1998). In this case, the manager is said to have 
fulfilled the stewardship demand (Gjesdal, 1981) or is accountable to the owner. 
This is, however, a narrow scope of agency theory. On a wider scope, agency 
theory .(also referred to as contracting cost theory), that derives from the financial 
economics literature (Adams, 1994) consists of a complex set of contracts 
between the owner and the manager (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and involves 
very complex mathematical formulations (Bromwich, 1992). These contracts 
specify the rights of the manager in the organisation, performance criteria on 
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·which managers are evaluated, and the payoff functions they face (Fama and 
Jensen, l983a). Furthermore according to Walker ( \989), agency theory 1s 
primarily concemedwith these contractual relationships under uncertainty. 
Even though the issues of agency theory were first raised by Adam Smith in 
1776, this idea was not much developed until about 200 years later when Jensen 
and Meckling ( 1976) wrote one of the most influential papers in the area of 
agency theory (Hunt Ill and Hogler, 1990). Since then, several agency models 
have appeared in the literature, such as the principal-agent model, the transaction 
cost model, and the Rochester model based on the work of Jensen and Meckling 
(Baiman, 1990). 
The key aspect of these various agency models, which is also the main focus of 
this thesis, centres on the problems associated with an agency relationship, that 
is, agency problems that arise from the conflict of interest and information 
asymmetry between the agent and the principal. For example, Jensen (1983), in 
discussing a different branch of the agency literature, points out that all the 
agency literature addresses the contracting problem between self-interested 
maximising parties and use the same agency cost minimising tautology. Baiman 
( 1990), noted that all branches of agency literature provide similar frameworks 
for: analysing the interaction of self-interested individuals within an economic 
context, understanding the determinants and causes of the loss in efficiency 
created by the divergence between co-operative and self-interested behaviour 
(i.e., the loss from agency problem), and analysing and understanding the 
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implications of different control processes (e.g., budgeting systems, employment 
. . . . . . . . 
contracts,. monitoring systems, etc.) for mitigating. the efficiency loss froiTI 
agency problems. 
The conflict of interest is based on the assumption that individuals act self-
interestedly and the principal and agent have different goals and attitudes toward 
risk. The principal and agent are assumed to seek to maximise their own best 
interest subject to the limitations set by the agency structure. Different goals and 
attitudes toward risk between the principal and the agent arise either because of 
differences in taste or because action by the agent yields disutility to the agent 
(Bromwich, 1992). 
Information asymmetry, that is the agent has more information than the principal, 
has resulted in the moral hazard and adverse selection problems. A moral hazard 
problem arises when the principal cannot observe the agent's action selection and 
when the preference rankings of the principal and the agent over the set of 
alternative actions diverge (Walker, 1989). An adverse selection problem arises 
when an agent has access to information prior to his or her action choice, which 
cannot be observed by the principal (Walker, 1989). 
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2.3.1. Agency relationship 
As mentioned in the above section, the key issue in all agency models centres on 
the problems associated with an agency relationship. An agency relationship is 
defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976; p. 307) as 'a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent'. An example of the agency relationship in the modem 
corporation is the relationship between equity holders in the corporation 
(principal) and the management (agent). There are also other agency 
relationships in a modem corporation, such as the stakeholders-agents relation, 
employees-management relation etc. 
This study discusses that the agency relationship as involving a single agent, 
even though in modem corporations it may actually involve many agents and 
principals. This assumption is made in order to ease the presentation of this 
thesis. This study is also limited to the relationship between equity holders in the 
corporation (principal) and the director/management (agent). 
In an agency relationship, the delegation of the decision-making authority to the 
agent or the separation of ownership and control causes the agency problems. 
The decision taken by the agent will affect both the principal and the agent and 
will usually favour the agent. This happens because the decision process is in the 
hands of a professional manager whose interests are not identical to those of the 
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shareholder (Fama and Jensen, 1983b) or in another words it arises from the 
conflicting goals and differi~g attitudes toward risk on the part of agent and the 
principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Nilakant and Rao, 1994). According to Kosnik 
(1987), since the agent does not oWn a substantial part of the corporation equity, 
he or she will not bear the full wealth effects of his or her own decisions .. Under 
·these conditions, the agent is likely to engage in behaviour that benefits his/her 
personal wealth or power, but this is opportunistic and inefficient from the 
principal's point of view (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Examples of such 
inefficient managerial behaviour are the excessive use of company resources for 
managerial 'perks', which may range from free lunches to private jets (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), the adoption of a short-term, risk-aversive attitude m 
strategic investment decisions for the sake of stability and the protection of 
management's own control position (Lambert and Larcker, 1985), or the 
excessive pursuit of diversification as a strategy to increase the firm's size and 
managers' associated prestige and status (Amihud and Lev, 1981 ). 
The .Problem is worsened due to the difficulty/expense involved in verifying the 
agent's behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989; Nilakant and Rao, 1994) because of 
information asymmetry discus~ed earlier. The principal is unable to observe the 
action ·of the agent because it is not being made transparent to the principal by the 
agent, i.e. the moral hazard or hidden action problem (Walker, 1989; Bromwich, 
1992). Apart from this, the agent also has access to information prior to his or her 
action choice which cannot be observed by the principal, that is, any private 
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information of"the agent is not being made visible to the principal - the adverse 
selection or hidden information problem (Walker, 1989, Bromwich, 1992). 
' . . . . 
The agency problem therefore occurs when the desires of the principal and the 
agent diverge and it·is difficult for the principal to verify the agent's behaviour 
because the principal has limited observational powers. The agency problem also 
occurs when the principal. and agent have different attitudes toward risk. Due to 
the divergence of interest, different attitudes toward risk and the difficulty on the 
part of the principal to verify the agent behaviour, the agent is assumed to make 
decisions which will maximise his or her own utility instead of that of his or her 
principal. As a result of this the principal will fmd ways to overcome the 
problem, such as by demanding information on the agent's behaviour. 
2.3.2. Agency Costs 
The agency problem discussed above is called agency loss or agency costs (Pratt 
and Zeckhauser, 1984 ). Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs a!> the 
sum of three components: 
1. monitoring expenditure by the principal 
2. bonding expenditure by the agent, and 
3. the residual loss. 
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According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency problem can be overcome 
by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring. 
. . 
'costs designed to limit' the aberrant activities of the agent. For example, the 
principal will incur expenses (monitoring costs) to monitor the agent's behaviour 
in managing the firm through budget restrictions, compensation policies, and 
operating rules. The principal will also be willing to provide certain incentives 
for the agent so as to narrow the divergence of interest between the principal and 
agent. In addition in some situations it will pay the agent to expand resources 
(bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions, which would 
harm the principals, or to ensure that the principals will be compensated if he 
does take such actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Bonding the agent's 
performance with the shareholder interest may b~ accomplished directly by 
suitable design of the compensation contract. Despite the costs incurred by both 
the principal and the agent, that is monitoring and bonding costs, to overcome the 
conflict of interest, there will be still some divergence between the agent's 
decision and those decisions, which would maximise the welfare of the principal. 
This divergence is also a cost to the principal, which Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
refer to as a residual loss. 
In these instances, information relating to the agent's behaviour is demanded by 
the principal to be disclosed in the annual report of the company in order to 
reduce the agency costs (Watts, 1977). This is supported by Walker (1989). 
Walker (1989) argues that since the agency problem stems from some form of 
information asymmetry, it can be overcome by the provision of improved public 
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information. However, in an unregulated environment, this suggestion cannot' be 
achieved. This is because the distribution of the information is disproportionate 
and inequitable; thus it will increase the information asymmetry between a 
relatively well-informed agent and a relatively badly. informed principal, rather 
than overcome the agency problem. Information asymmetries can be expected to 
. remain since it is difficult for shareholders to obtain unbiased information at low 
cost due to executives' control over the reporting of internal information and 
their possession of firm and industry~specific knowledge/skills not shared by the 
owner or external markets analysts (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). Therefore, in 
order to overcome these problems, regulations on the disclosure of information 
on the agent's behaviour are needed. This is the focus of this thesis. 
However, the anti-regulation group and supporters of 'market forces' oppose this 
suggestion. They argue that the agent voluntarily discloses information and there 
are sufficient controlling mechanisms and 'market forces' to monitor and 
discipline the agent. These arguments are discussed later in this chapter. 
2.4.The relationship between agency theory and information disclosure 
In the above section it has been argued that, in an agency relationship 
information is demanded by the principal in order to monitor an agent's 
behaviour. Historically, disclosure of information is for an agency or stewardship 
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purpose~ For example, the whole purpose of accounting records in ancient Egypt 
was not to mea~ure the rate· of profit or loss but simply to prevent theft, 
embezzlement, ·fraudulent conversion and other avoidable losses due to 
carelessness and the iike (de Ste. Croix, 1956). 
Stewardship as the objective of accounting records (financial statements) 
continues through the time of Norman England (in the very early part of the 
thirteenth century) until the nineteenth century when the emphasis on 
stewardship had started to change. This is because of the business corporation 
growing bigger, the number of shareholders increasing in size and the concern 
for profit by the dispersed owners (Higson and Tayles, 1998). Since then there 
are various arguments of whether the objective of financial statements is for 
stewardship or for decision making. The debates on stewardship as an objective 
of financial statements have been summarised before (e.g. Higson and Tayles, 
1998) and are briefly presented below. 
Some arguments against stewardship as the objective of financial statements are 
essentially based on the meaning of the word stewardship. According to 
Rosenfield (1974, p.l33), 'confused terminology and the absence of analysis 
have deterred accountants from discovering just where it [stewardship] leads'. 
For example the views of the American Accounting Association committees 
(AAA, 1966, p. 22) on various dimensions of stewardship, which range from the 
most elemental level of custodianship to responsibility for acquisition, utilisation 
and disposition of resources embracing the whole scope of management 
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functions in a business entity, have been argued by Carsberg et al (1974) to be 
inappropriate. Carsberg et al, (1974, p. 166) felt that 'it may be useful for the 
sake of clarity, to avoid the use of the word stewardship'. Devine ( 1985, p. 28) 
pointed out 'the concept of S!ewardship is difficult to define, but one of its 
characteristics is certainly responsible for accomplishing objectives'. 
Even though there was· support for stewardship as an objective of financial 
statements with a broader notion (e.g. Ross (1973), Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986)) the predominantly stated objective of financial statements and fmancial 
reporting (as set out in the conceptual framework projects) has been to enable 
users to take economic decisions (e.g. AAA (1966), AICPA (1973), ASSC 
(1975), FASB (1978), IASC (1989), ASB (1991)). However stewardship is not 
totally ignored. It is often used to try and illustrate the sorts of decisions that may 
be taken. For example the UK's Accounting Standards Board's (ASB) first draft 
Statement of Principles (1991, p. 100, Para. 12) stated that: 'The objective of 
fmancial statements is to provide information about the financial position, 
performance and fmancial adaptability of an enterprise that is useful to a wide 
range of users in making economic decisions' and continued (Para. 14): 
'Financial statements also show the results of the stewardship of m:magement, 
that is, the accountability of management for the resources entrusted to it. Those 
users who wish to assess the stewardship of management do so in order that they 
may make economic decisions;· these decisions may include, for example,· 
whether to hold or sell their investment in the enterprise or whether to re-appoint 
or replace the management'. 
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The stance by the ASB has been criticised. For example, Page ( 1991) argued that 
stewardship should be the main objective of financial reporting. As a result ofthe 
criticisms and an attempt to encapsulate corporate governance in the conceptual 
framework, in -the revised exposure draft (ASB, 1995, p. 35, Para. 1.1 ), the 
objective had been altered to specifically include stewardship: 'The objective of 
financial statements is to provide information about the financial position, 
performance and financial adaptability of an enterprise that is useful to a wide 
range of users for assessing the stewardship of management and for making 
economic decisions'. However this revised exposure draft was now withdrawn. 
In the decision-making model, users traditionally use financial statements for 
making decisions whether to buy/sell/hold their investments. This suggests that 
investors require information to form their own views of the 'true' values of 
shares, which they then compare with the current market values to form the basis 
of an investment strategy with an eye to maximising personal gains (Bartlett and 
Chandler, 1997). Beaver ( 1981) earlier argued that shareholder interest in 
corporate information is related to the individual's portfolio diversification and 
activity on the stock market, thus, active traders continually seek information that 
will permit the detection of mispriced securities. In these situations only 
information relating to the future value of the firm is relevant to the investors. 
Furthermore, in an efficient capital market, security prices reflect all publicly 
available information, and an investor will not be able to achieve abnormal 
returns through analysis of data contained in the annual report. 
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From the above arguments, explanations other than. for decision-making have 
been put forward to justify shareholder interest in the annual report, such as for 
stewardship purposes, which is the focus of this study. Amold (1977) highlights 
accounting inforrriation as being generally historical by nature, and therefore of 
limited relevance in assessing future worth. However, such information may still 
have a control value in enabling investors to monitor companies' performance. 
This view was· supported by Gjesdal (1981 ), who suggested that stewardship 
objectives imply a preference for historical cost over current value alternatives. 
However, for decision-making purposes, the current value or the future-oriented 
information is preferred to the historical cost information. The ASC ( 1986, p. 11) 
pointed out ' ... while historical .cost information may appear adequate for 
stewardship purposes, it may provide unsatisfactory indicators for decision 
making'. Since fmancial reports are currently being prepared based on historical 
cost, it may be suggested that the main objective of financial statements and 
reports is for stewardship. Judicial support for this view may be found in the 
Caparo case, where it was decided that the function of audited accounting 
information was to enable shareholders as a body to exercise control over 
management, i.e. for stewardship rather than inve~tment decision-making 
purposes (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997). 
It is the author's view that although decision-making is regarded as an important 
objective for financial reporting, stewardship is a significant issue for many 
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users. Indeed the focus ofattention in thi_s thesis is on stewardship, rather that 
decision~making. 
2.5. Regulations 
In accounting, disclosure of information is normally referred to as part of 
corporate financial reporting. It is the reporting of the company's fmancial 
position and activities, continuing and contemplated, produced by that company. 
It may consist of fmancial quantitative data or financial qualitative data or non-
fmancial data. This information is usually prepared by companies in their annual 
reports, which are the important sources of information to the shareholders and 
other users. It is therefore subject to various types of regulation. 
Previously, regulation had focused on the specific parts of the annual reports, 
such as the balance sheet and the profit and loss account. Little emphasis was 
being given to the information relating to directors' behaviour, except 
information relating to the directors' remuneration. However, due the increasing 
number of company failures, business frauds, etc. over the recent years, there has 
been a greater demand for regulation on the disclosure of information relating to 
directors' behaviour. For example, as discussed earlier, there are demands for 
transparency by various corporate governance committees. 
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Regulation has been defined by Taylor and Turley ( 1986, p.l) as 'the imposition · 
of constrai~ts upon the preparation, content ~nd form of external financial reports· 
by· bodies other than the preparers ·of the reports, or the organisations and 
individuals for which the reports are prepared'. Imposing regulation does not 
necessarily mean an increase in the disclosure of information. Companies were 
known to provide audited financial information prior to the imposition of 
regulation. This can be seen when all companies' (listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange) financial reports were audited by CP A firms back in 193 3, i.e. before 
regulations were imposed (Benston, 1973 ). Imposing regulation is, however, 
based on the assumption that companies will not voluntarily provide the amount 
and type, i.e. the quality of information required by the shareholders and other 
users. Furthermore, information that is provided voluntarily will vary among 
companies, thus making inter-company comparisons difficult. The distribution of 
the voluntarily disclosed information is also asymmetrical, i.e. certain groups will 
get more information than others. The central concern of regulation is thus to 
improve the quality, comparability, and distribution of the information, rather 
than simply to increase the disclosure of information. 
There are various systems or forms of regulation to regulate the standard set of 
information, both at national and international level. At the national level it can 
be set out by professional bodies (private sector) or by government legislation 
(public sector) or a mixture of both the professional bodies and government 
legislation. 
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At an international 'level, due to the globalisation of the ~apital markets, several 
organisations have attempted to develop an international regulation of corporate 
reporting. This is the objective of this study, i.e. to recommend to the 
international organisations whether there should be a regulation on the disclosure 
of information relating to directors' affairs .. The international· organisations in 
which this study attempts to make recommendation are: the International· 
Accounting Standard Conunittee (IASC), the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Union (EU). 
The IASC was formed in 1973 with the objectives: (i) to formulate and publish in 
the public interest, accounting standards to be observed in the presentation of 
financial statements and to promote their wide acceptance and observance; and 
(ii) to work generally for the improvement and harmonisation of regulations, 
accounting standards and procedures relating to the presentation of fmancial 
statements (IASC constitution). The IASC also provides a private professional 
counterpart to the activities of intergovernmental organisations, such as the 
United Nations (UN), the OECD, and the EU (Radebaugh and Gray, 1993). 
The OECD is involved in the development of international business on a global 
scale. It focuses mainly on the development .of industrialised countries of the 
world. The major objective of OECD is to foster international economic and 
social development and to this end to provide a 'Code of Conduct', including 
information disclosure guidelines (OECD, 1979). 
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. . 
On a· less global scale, the EU, formerly known as the European Community 
' . . . 
(EC), ·has been a major influence in promoting economic i~tegration through the 
free movement of goods, people, and capital between countries. In order to 
achieve these goals, it has embarked on a major programme of harmonisation, 
including measures to co-ordinate the company law, accounting, taxation, capital 
market and monetary systems in the EU(Radebaugh and Gray, 1993). 
The regulatory systems devised by the· IASC and the EU are · more 
comprehensive than those developed by the OECD. The OECD is mainly 
concerned with the disclosure of information. in industrialised countries or by 
multinational companies. The IASC and EU systems deal with measurement as 
well as disclosure issues, relate to more areas of accounting, and affect more 
types of companies. However, these two systems are implemented in different 
ways. The IASC is an international private organisation, whose members are 
professional accountancy bodies from various .countries. Since IASC is an 
international private organisation, it has no disciplinary power over its worldwide 
members to comply with the International Accounting Standards (lASs), unlike 
the national professional bodies, which may enforce compliance with the national 
standards. The EU, on the other hand, has no problems of enforcement, because 
the requirements of the EU are inserted into the national legislation of member 
states. 
Given the differences in their objectives, regulatory system, coverage; and the 
degree of compliance it would be important to recommend to these three 
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organisations, regulation on the disclosure of information relating to directors' 
behaviour. This is in order to provide a wider coverage of companies and 
countries with the recommended regulation/standard. 
There were many studies on accounting regulation carried out previously, 
drawing on many different theories and hypotheses to argue the case for and 
against regulation. However, little academic research has been carried out to 
provide research results on accounting regulation to help policy makers or 
standard setters. One reason for this perhaps is the fear that the policy makers-or 
standard setters in their process of promulgating regulations or standards do not 
use the academic research results. This fear is however reduced following the 
suggestion made by Swieringa (1998) that research results are important in 
providing general background, specific alternatives, and justification for choices 
for the policy makers in promulgating regulations or standards. According to 
Swieringa ( 1998, p. 34), 'policy makers are consumers of research information. 
They are incredible information processing machines. They process information 
about what is happening, what was done before and how it worked, analyses of 
alternative courses of action, and ideas about what might be done. Research 
information alters or confirms their beliefs and helps them accomplish. their 
mission and follow their precepts. Research information can help shape 
perceptions, examine assertions, assess consequences, and determine the extent 
of agreement about existing and proposed accounting policies'. 
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However, Swieringa (1998, p. 34) reminds us that 'in a world of influence 
attempts and opportunism, research information ·competes for attentiot:t with 
. ' 
other information and vested interests'.. Another problem Swieringa ( 1998) raised 
is concerned with the view that the policy makers and· researchers need to. 
·understand better each other's perspective about the role of accounting 
information. According to Swieringa (I 998, p. 45) 'policy makers tend to 
approach the usefulness of accounting information by adopting a measurement 
perspective that focuses on the primary characteristics of relevance and 
reliability, the qualities of comparability and consistency, the elements of 
fmancial statements, and concepts of recognition and measurement. Researchers, 
on the other hand, increasingly approach the usefulness of accounting 
information by adopting an information perspective (e.g., the relation between 
accounting information and stock prices) or a valuation perspective (e.g., models 
specifying how accounting information should be translated into securities' 
prices)'. Due to these differences, Swieringa (1998) suggests that more needs to 
be done by accounting researchers to educate the policy makers about the 
information and valuation perspectives, the research questions addressed, and the 
methods used. 
2.5.1. Regulatory arguments 
As discussed in the earlier section, the principal demands information on the 
agent's behaviour and there are various debates on whether there should be a 
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regulation on the disclosure of such information. The assumption made by Jensen 
and Meckling ( 1976) that· the agent has incentives to incirr expenditure to 
guarantee that he or she will not take· certain actions to harm the principal's 
interest or that he or she will compensate the principal if he or she does, i.e. the 
bonding costs, is the main point to various debates betWeen pro-regulation and 
anti-regulation groups. The anti-regulation group and the supporters of 'market 
forces' agree (e.g. Watts, 1977, Watts and Zirnmerman, 1978; Leftwich, 1983) 
with Jensen and Meckling's view. They argue that information is disclosed in 
order to show the terms of the bonding contracts have been adhered to, or more 
directly, it is a requirement of such contracts (Watts, 1977). 
However, they point out that in an agency theoretic relationship the agent 
possesses superior information concerning the company, and the principal cannot 
directly observe management behaviour (information asymmetry), which creates 
the problem of 'moral hazard' (discussed earlier). In order to overcome this 
problem, the principal may seek to ensure that the agent's objectives are 
congruent with those of the principal by devising incentive schemes. The 
opponents of regulations argued that the agent might provide information 
voluntarily in order to reduce the principal's reliance on incentive schemes, 
which may involve the agent in undesirable risk taking (Taylor and Turley, 
1986). In addition, they argue in order to monitor the agent's behaviour the 
principal may demand information from the agent. However, since the generation 
of information is a costly exercise and the agent has a comparative advantage in 
its production, the agent will have an interest in providing such information 
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voluntarily m order to reduce the cost of monitoring the _ agent~principal 
relationship (Watts and Zi~merman, 1978), Based on similar reasons, Watts, 
( 1977) argues ~t the agent will favour an external independent audit. The audit 
. of an agent's financial report to principals provides a signal to principals on the 
. quality of the agent's services, and thereby helps to distinguish the superior agent 
from the inferior. In the absence of such audited information, it is likely that the 
quality of service by inferior agents would be exaggerated (Akerlof, 1970). This 
is supported by Ross ( 1979) in terms of signalling theory where information is 
disclosed voluntarily because of the management desire to highlight or signal 
. . 
their s!-lperior performance. The reason for this is that good performance will be 
... 
revealed to the market reflecting their reputation and quality of management 
services. Good information disclosure may be one aspect of good performance. 
The proponents of regulation, to which the author advocates, however have 
disputed these arguments. The proponents of regulation argue that information 
would not be voluntarily disclosed, as this contradicts the assumption in agency 
theory that there is a conflict of interest and information asymmetry between the 
agent and the principal. According to the agency theoretic view, as discussed 
earlier, information relating to directors' behaviour is demanded by the principal, 
but since in an agency relationship there is a conflict of interest and information 
asymmetry between agent and the principal, the agent therefore wishes not to 
disclose information sought by the principal. To overcome the information 
asymmetry problem, Walker (1989) suggests the provision of improved public 
information. However, in an unregulated eiwironment, that is where information 
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.·is only voluntarily disclosed, this suggestion cannot be achieved. This is because 
the distribution of the information is disproportionate and inequitable, thus it will 
. . 
. . . 
. increase the information asymmetry between a relatively. well-informed agent 
. . 
and a relatively badly informed principal, rather than overcome the agericy 
problem. Information asymmetries can be expected to remain since it is difficult 
for shareholders to obtain unbiased information at low cost due to executives' 
control over the reporting of internal information and their possession of firm and· 
industry-specific knowledge/skills not shared by the owners or extemai market 
analysts (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). A requirement to make such disclosure, 
either by law or by the standards, may be the effective solution to force the agent 
to disclose such information. Regulation will also increase the credibility of 
information disclosed and the confidence of the users (Cooper and Keim, 1983). 
Apart from the above arguments, the opponents of regulation also argued that 
information is voluntary disclosed based on the belief that if a shareholder knows 
that the managers possess information, and then they will release it (Dye, 1985). 
Dye ( 1985) called this the 'disclosure principle' and is based on the adverse 
selection problem as discussed earlier. This principle assumes that shareholders 
prefer a manager who adopts policies designed tCJ increase the market value of 
their shares. Since the market value of the firm before and after each 
management disclosure is publicly observable, in principle, a shareholder could 
design incentive contracts, which encourage the manager to release information, 
which increases the price of the firm. If the manager withholds information and 
the shareholder knows that the manager has the information, the shareholder will 
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assume that the current market price of the firm overstates the firm's value. This 
would result in the shareholders revising downward their demands for the firm's 
share, which in ·the end would push down the p.rice of the firm until the manager . 
releases the information. M;anagers would disclose all information, good or bad, 
in order to prevent the price of their firms' shares from falling (Dye, 1985). 
Alternatively, they argue that information is disclosed by companies to compete 
for scarce risk capital in the market (Choi, l973a). Disclosure of company 
information to the capital market would enhance a company's competitive 
position. Such disclosure would lower the perceived risk associated with 
investment in the company and thus lower its cost of capital and/or increase its 
market valuation. Acting in the company or shareholders' interests, management 
would disclose information to the point where the marginal cost of disclosure 
equals the marginal benefit. The opponents of regulation also argue that 
companies would not be able to raise capital, or would have to do so on 
extremely unfavourable terms, if they did not offer contractual terms (such as the 
provision of the supply of financial information and its audit) which would 
enable providers of fmance to monitor performance to insure against 
incompetence or dishonesty by directors (Whittington, 1993). 
Another argument for the voluntary disclosure of information, presented by the 
anti-regulation group, is based on the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979; Harris 
and Townsend,. 1981; and Dye, 1985). According to Dye ( 1985) this principle 
assume that any contracts can be rewritten in a way which induces full revelation 
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. ofall private information held by the parties io it without affecting the payments 
they receive. 
;·~ .. :"'··"'!'·<•" 
A sceptic ·may criticise the imposition of regulation on the disclosure of 
information on the grounds that such uniformity will impair shareholder welfare. 
This is because all companies are different, and some of the required disclosure 
will be useless and/or irrelevant or dyfunctional (Benston, 1982). 
The proponents of regulation, however, argue thin the disclosure of information 
without the intervention of government regulation is inefficient and unfair 
(Cooper and Keim, 1983). They argue that regulations take up almost every 
aspect of our life. For example, a government imposes laws and statutes on its 
citizens, affecting how they conduct their businesses, pay their taxes, buy their 
houses, report the births of their children, etc. According to Taylor and Turley 
(1986, p. 6) 'a market system can only operate where there is a set of clearly 
defmed rules to govern the way in which market transactions take place'. 
Without clearly defined rules or in an unregulated market system, insufficient 
information is produced. This is because an unregulated market system will not 
be able to achieve competitive price equilibrium for accounting information. The 
information, which is produced, may be false or misleading and heterogeneous. 
The provision of voluntary heterogeneous information will be sub-optimal for 
investors who carmot share information, or are unable to process the information, 
which they receive (Aivazian and Call en, 1983 ). Furthermore they argue that, in 
the past, the production of audited financial information in the absence of 
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regulation did not prevent corporate frauds or indicate con1pany failures. They 
also argue that previous studies on voluntary disclosure have mixed results. For 
example, Dye (1983}, Jung and Kwong (1988) and Verrecchia (1990) 
demonstrate that information is voluntarily disclosed, whereas Penno (1997) . 
found that voluntary disclosure of information is not generally true. · 
The proponents of regulation pointed out that insufficient information being 
produced could result from several factors. The company may be a monopoly 
supplier of information about itself. Therefore, it can restrict the disclosure of 
accounting information about itself, without unduly affecting its competitive 
position for risk capital with another company or it can charge a high price for 
such information (Cooper and Keim, 1983). 
Another important factor for the information not being sufficiently produced is 
because of the alleged 'public good' nature of the information (Gonedes and 
Dupuch, 1974). The availability of a public good to one person will result in 
others getting the same good equally without incurring any costs. The producers 
of the goods are unable to eliminate consumption of the goods without payment. 
Even though the goods are consumed for free, the amount and quality are the 
same for those who pay for them. Therefore, the goods are not produced because 
the producers cannot charge all consumers for their consumption and those who 
do not pay (free riders) will not demand the goods because they know that they 
can enjoy the benefits without incurring any costs. 
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Another reason put forward by the pro-regulation group for the insufficient 
. . . . . 
production of information is to avoid lengthy litigation by the users to enforce 
their rights. To avoid the underproduction of information many countries have 
refined regulations to protect against litigation abuse ·in the form of 'safe 
. . 
harbours' for management and directors' actions, as well as safe harbours "for the 
disclosure of information (OECD, 1998). Briefly, safe harbour provisions offer 
protection from legal liability for specified management/directors' actions and 
voluntary information that is made. The safe harbour operates by requiring 
plaintiffs to show that the actions and information lacked a reasonable basis in 
fact and were not made in good faith (Skinner, 1995). 
The costs and competitive disadvantage of information disclosure are also factors 
that hinder the disclosure of information (Radebaugh and Gray, 1993). There are 
costs directly associated with voluntary disclosure such as data collection, 
processing, production and auditing costs (Gray and Roberts, 1986). Companies 
might produce uniform accounting information if the benefits of doing so, e.g. a 
reduction in the cost of capital, out-weighted the costs. However, there may be 
no allocation of gains among firms resulting from the overall uniform accounting 
system that satisfies both individual and group mtionality (Aivazian and Callen, 
1983). This problem is intensified by the existence of transaction costs. 
Moreover, if firms outside the coalition benefit from the uniform system without 
participation, there is no incentive for them to produce the information 
voluntarily. 
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Competitive disadvantage, that. is the use of additional information by 
. . . . . . ' 
competitors to the detriment of the corporation disclosing the information, is the 
most frequently cited objection to increasing disclosure requirements 
(Radebaugh and Gray, 1993). Competitive disadvantage is an indirect cost, that 
is disclosure could encourage competitors and reduces the company's ability to 
generate cash flows expected from inventive and innovative activities (Gray and 
Roberts, 1986). Therefore the producers of information would object to the 
disclosure of information unless law or standards impose it on them. 
On a different stance the opponents of regulation argue that the vanous 
controlling mechanisms are sufficient to monitor and discipline the agent, and 
align the agent's interest with those of the principal, and therefore additional 
regulation on the disclosure of information on the agent's behaviour is not 
important. Examples of controlling mechanisms suggested by this group that can 
monitor, discipline and align the agent's interest with those of the principal are: a 
flllTl 's board of directors, large shareholders, compensation contracts, regulatory 
agencies, proxy fights and hostile takeovers. 
The anti-regulation group argue that the board of directors, which is elected by 
the shareholders, can monitor management at a closer level than the dispersed 
shareholders can achieve. By monitoring management, the board guards against 
fraud, waste of assets, under-performance and, more generally, the agency 
problem (OECD, 1998). The pro-regulation group criticised this argument. They 
argue that monitoring the agent internally by the board of directors will result in 
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. another agency conflict, i.e., between the shareholders and the board of directors. 
·This conflict arises because the directors· on .the board are agents of the 
shareholders; furthermore the directors' independence is questionable. This is 
. . 
· because the chief executive officer (CEO) and other senior officers of the firm 
usually sit on the board and often the CEO is the chairman of the board. Specific 
. . 
board structures and practices may assist in promoting independence, such as 
having a quantitative majority of directors who are not affiliated with 
management (outside directors), and appointing a non-executive director as board 
chairman (OECD, 1998). However, the unscrupulous dominant personalities 
among executive directors could still choose non-executive directors who were 
not fully independent (Collier, 1997). To minimise the agency problem between 
the shareholders and the board of directors and to ensure that the independence of 
the directors are in place, information on the board structures, composition of the 
board, company transactions with the directors, etc., should ·be disclosed to the 
shareholders. 
Large shareholders, the opponents of regulation argue, can monitor the agent by 
exercising their voting rights and participating in the annual general meetings. 
The large size shareholdings may justify a more assertive use of the voting rights, 
as the break-even point of fixed-cost/variable-benefit trade-offs will shift 
(OECD, 1998). The anti-regulation group argues that large shareholders can 
monitor the directors by exercising their voting rights and participating in annual 
general meetings. In criticising this, the pro-regulation group pointed out that 
many shareholders do not make use of their voting rights. For example, Mallin 
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( 1997) in a survey of the top 250 companies, finds that, on average, institutional 
shareholders'· voting ·tevel is only 35%. This ·is partly because the costs. of 
monitoring corporate performance accrue only to the shareholders who are 
engaged · in the monitori~g, ·while the benefits are shared by the entire 
shareholders' base, that is, the 'free-riders' problem (Grossman and Hart, 1980). 
The Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance Report to the 
OECD (1998) suggests that the large size shareholdings may justify a more 
assertive use of the voting rights (as the break-even point of fixed-cost/variable-
benefit trade-offs will shift). However, many large shareholders or fund 
managers still have strong incentives to avoid the costs related to more active 
participation. To encourage shareholders to vote, and participate in annual 
meetings, detailed information of the directors' activities, in addition to the 
normal financial information, should be disclosed to the shareholders. 
Information, such as the directors' profile, qualifications, experiences, ages, other 
directorships, a committee responsible for nominating the directors, etc., will 
inform.the shareholders of the kind of persons to whom they have entrusted their 
funds. 
A suitably designed compensation contract is claimed to be able to reduce the 
conflict of interest between the agent and the principal, since it is tied to 
performance measures of the firm (Lippert and Moore, 1995). Compensation in 
terms of ordinary shares will increase the equity ownership of the agent in the 
company. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that as. the agent's ownership claim 
falls, his or her fractional claim on the outcomes falls, which will tend to 
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encourage him or her to appropriate larger amounts of the corj:Jorate resources in 
. . 
the form of perquisites and his or her incentive to devote a significant effort to 
creative activities such as searching out new protitable ventures falls. Therefore, 
the establishment of incentive compensation such as share options schemes, 
which will increase the ownership of the agent, would align the agent's interest 
with those of the principal. This point is being criticised by the proponents of 
regulation by arguing that, since the compensation contracts of the directors are 
determined by a board committee (remuneration committee), usually comprising 
of executive and non-executive directors, their independence is questionable. 
This is because this committee is setting the compensations of their colleagues. 
Even though there are non-executive directors in the committee, they are usually 
selected from the executive directors of other organisations. Possibly as a result 
of this the Greenbury Report ( 1995) recommended the full disclosure of 
directors' emoluments and a remuneration committee report in the companies 
annual reports. 
The anti-regulation group also suggests that the regulatory agencies, such as the 
Stock Exchange can monitor the agent's behaviour, and hence the reliance on 
information disclosure to monitor the agent is reduced. For example, Lippert and 
Moo re ( 1995) and Crawford et al ( 1995) suggest that the regulatory agency is 
able to monitor the agent's performance; therefore the need for bonding is 
reduced. In attacking this, the proponents of regulation argue that not all 
companies are listed; therefore not all companies can be monitored by the Stock 
Exchange. Furthermore the Stock Exchanges have their Listing Rules, which 
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· inClude the disclosure requirement of certain items. For example, the London 
Stock Exchange incorporated in their Listing Rules the Cad bury and ·Greenbury' s 
recommendations on the disclosure of information (Hampel Report, 1998). 
The proxy fights and hostile takeovers are said to be able to discipline the agent. 
Hence, the actual monitoring by the principal is reduced and so there is less 
demand for information by the principal on the agent's behaviour. Proxy fights 
are a process whereby the under-performing board of directors is replaced. The 
standard way proxy fights are conducted is when a dissident shareholder puts up 
a list of candidates to stand against the directors' list, and tries to persuade other 
shareholders to support his or her candidates (Hart, 1995). Hostile takeovers can 
discipline directors, when the 'raider' buys all the shares of the not-properly-
managed company and installs new management (Hart, 1995). 
Both proxy fights and hostile takeovers as a controlling mechanism were 
criticised by the pro-regulation group. They argue proxy fights are not a powerful 
tool to monitor directors for several reasons, such as free-rider problems 
(discussed above) and also the shareholders may have little incentive to think 
much about whom to vote for, since their vote is unlikely to make a difference. 
Usually the shareholder will vote for the incumbent directors on the grounds that 
'the devil you know is better than the devil you don't' and company law often 
allows the incumbent directors to use company funds· to promote themselves 
(Hart, 1995). 
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They also argue that hostile takeovers are not without their drawbacks. Firstly, 
there are free-rider problems, i.e. the minority shareholders who believe that their 
decisions are unlikely to affect the success of the bid and have an incentive not to 
tender to the raider, since they may be able to obtain a pro-rata fraction of the 
capital gain by holding on themselves (Hart, 1995). A second drawback with a 
takeover as a monitoring device is that the raider may face competition from 
other bidders as well as from minority shareholders to take over the company, 
whereby it may increase the price of the company. This will reduce the raider's 
profit or even create a loss, which will discourage the takeover process. 
At the extreme end, the anti-regulation group argues that information on the 
agent's behaviour is not necessary, as agency costs are driven to zero by market 
forces within and external to the firm (Fama, 1980). Fama (1980) suggests that a 
form of full ex-post settling up occurs which penalises the agent who deviates 
from maximising the principal's wealth, and thus the agent is motivated to act in 
the interest of the principal. Fama ( 1980) further argues that according to 
portfolio theory the principal has no special interest in personally overseeing the 
detailed activities of any firm, since his or her optimal portfolio is likely to be 
diversified across the shares of many firms. 
/ 
The pro-regulation group argues that, if the market forces can resolve the agency 
issues, why have they not done so? Why were there so many company failures, 
business frauds, creative accounting, and the rapid increase in directors' pay, 
etc.? They also argue that the debate on market forces, such as that concerning 
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the capital market and the managerial labour markets, to monitor the directors is 
inconclusive. This is illustrated by the formation of various corporate governance 
committees at national and international level (discussed earlier) to overcome the 
agency problems. In most cases 'transparency' is the buzzword of the reports, 
guidelines, codes of "best practice" and standards of the various national and 
international bodies. Barely a section or chapter goes without reference to it. For 
example, the report to the OECD by the Business Sector Advisory Group on 
Corporate Governance has allocated a chapter, (i.e., chapter 4 of the report), to 
discuss the disclosure of information in protecting shareholder rights. The report 
of the Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance to the OECD 
(1998) suggests that for the private sector, and specifically the public traded 
corporations to flourish, policy makers and regulators need to shape a corporate 
governance environment, which involves protecting the integrity and efficiency 
of capital markets (thus promoting confidence), by protecting shareholder rights 
and providing for the disclosure of information. Disclosure is an especially 
important and efficient means of protecting shareholders. Adequate and timely 
information enables the shareholders to make a considered judgement about the 
quality of management and whether or not to use their ownership influence to 
seek a change in management behaviour (OECD, 1998). 
Even though Fama ( 1980) suggests that in portfolio theory the principal has no 
special interest in personally overseeing the detailed activities of any firm, the 
proponents of regulation suggest that disclosure of information can deter the 
agent from pursuing activities that are not desired by the principals. Quoting the 
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remarks made by Dean Mundheim at the opemng session of the Paris 
Colloquium on Corporate Governance (Paris Colloq~ium; 1984, p, 205): 
. . . 
'Disclosure, however, also has a very direct impact on corporate conduct. Many 
years ago Justice Brandeis characterised sunlight as the best disinfectant: people 
.are often prepared to forgo certain activities if they must disclose those activities 
to the public. I imagine that all of us who have counselled corporate· clients that a 
particular transaction must be disclosed have gotten the reaction: "Well, in that 
case, let us not do the transaction.' 
From the above arguments the author supports the views of the proponents of 
regulation, and suggests there should be regulations or standards on the 
disclosure of information relating to directors' behaviour. However in an 
international setting, which is the focus of this study, the regulations and 
standards differ from one country to another. This is due to the differences in 
fmancial reporting systems in which they operate. The classification of the 
fmancial reporting systems is presented in the section below. 
2.6. Classification of financial reporting systems 
Research on classification of fmancial reporting systems has been voluminous 
and varied, drawing on many "different theories and hypotheses to· group 
countries according to the common elements and distinctive characteristics of 
their financial reporting systems. Groups are identified either on the basis of 
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judgement (Muller, 1967), or by the use of statistical techniques such as factor 
·-;;. 
analysis (Da Costa et al, 1978; Frank, 1979; Nair and Frank, 1980), or by a 
mixture of judgement and statistics (Nobes, 1983; Doupnik and Salter, 1993). 
The most common approach of financial reporting systems classification is either 
based on measuring characteristics other than accounting practices or based. on 
measurements of the accounting practices themselves. According to Nobes 
(2000) the first approach of classification may be called 'extrinsic' (Muller, 
1967; AAA, 1977; Puxty et al, 1987;Gray, 1988; Shoenthal, 1989) and the 
second may be called 'intrinsic' (Da Costa et al, 1978; Frank, 1979; Nair and 
Frank, 1980; Nobes 1983, Doupnik and Salter, 1993). 
In this study the classification by Nobes (1983) is taken as the framework to 
determine the differences on the disclosure of information relating to directors' 
behaviour in different countries. Nobes's classification is adopted in this study 
because the classifications by the other researchers were 'extrinsic' in nature 
and/or did not fulfil the properties necessary in classification. According to AAA 
(1977, p 77- 78) there are four properties necessary in a classification. Firstly, the 
characteristics of classification should be adhered to consistently. Secondly, a 
good classification will potentially contain sufficient subsets to exhaust a given 
universe. Thirdly, all subsets will be mutually exclusive in such a way that no 
element may fall into more than one of them. Lastly, hierarchical integrity should 
be observed. 
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· Another problem ·with the other researchers' classifications ts the lack of 
' . . .. 
reliability and relevance of the data for the research problem. under investigation 
(~adebaugh and Gray, 1993). For example, Da Costa et al ( 1978) and Frank 
( 1979) produced a classification directly based on accounting practices, using the 
Price Waterhouse (1973) survey. Nair and Frank (1980) extended the. work of 
Frank ( 1979) by using the 1973 and 1975 Price Waterhouse surveys. Doubts 
however· have been expressed on the use of Price Waterhouse data for the 
purpose of classification. As pointed out by Nobes (1981), there were problems 
relating to the Price Waterhouse surveys with respect to (l) data errors, (2) 
misleading answers, (3) swamping of important questions by trivial ones, and 
exaggeration of differences between the United States and United Kingdom. 
Perhaps the fundamental weakness of the surveys was that there was some 
confusion between the rules (mandatory and non-mandatory) and actual 
practices, which are often different (Radebaugh and Gray, 1993). 
As a result of the above problems, the classifications by other researchers have 
been criticised for (I) lack of precision in the definition of what is to be 
classified, (2) lack of a model with which to compare the statistical results, (3) 
lack of a hierarchy that would add more subtlety to the portrayal of the size of 
differences between countries, and (4) lack of judgement in the choice of 
'important discriminating features' (Nobes, 2000). 
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2.6.1. · Nobes's classification 
In an attempt .to overcome the above problems and to fulfil the properties 
necessary in.classifications, in 1983, Nobes suggested a classification system as 
shown in Figure 2.1. Nobes (1983) defined the purpose of his research as the 
classification of countries by the financial reporting practises of their' public 
companies. The countries chosen were those of the 'developed westem world' 
and the reporting practices were those concerned with measurement ·and 
valuation. Public companies were chosen by Nobes (1983) because it is the 
public companies whose financial statements are generally available and whose 
practices can be most easily discovered. Nobes (1983) argued that, it is the 
international differences in reporting between such companies that are of interest 
to shareholders, creditors, auditing firms, taxation authorities, management and 
harmonising agencies (such as the IASC or the EC Commission). Nobes (1983) 
chose measurement and valuation practices because these determine the size of 
the figures for profit, capital, total assets, liquidity and so on. Furthermore, Nair 
and Frank ( 1980) point out that is useful to separate measurement from 
disclosure practices. 
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Class Sub-class Family Species 
Government, 
Economics 
Macro-un i for Law-based 
Continental: 
government, 
tax, legal 
Tax-base 
Developed 
Western 
Countries 
u.s. 
influence 
Business 
practice, 
pragmatic, 
British origin 
Micro-based U. K. 
influence 
Business 
economics, 
theory 
Figure 2. 1 
A Hypothetical Classification of Financial Reporting Measurement 
Practices in Developed Western Countries. 
(Source: Nobes (1983), A Judgmental International Classification of Financial 
Reporting Practices, Journal of Business. Finance and Accounting, Spring, p. 7). 
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Tlie Nobes's classification system shown in Figure 2.1 was tested by means ofa 
' . . . . -
judgemental analysis of measurement and valuation-reporting practices in 14 
developed countries. A structimil approach ·to accounting practices was used 
whereby major features were assessed such as the importance oftax rules, the I.!Se 
of prudent/conservative valuation· procedure, the making of replacement cost 
adjustments, and so on (see Exhibit 2.1). Nine factors were identified as likely to 
predict which countries would be grouped together. Nobes then scored these 
factors based on questionnaires and personal judgement. Apart from personal 
judgement, Nobes also used statistical analysis to support his classification. 
1. Type of users of the published accounts of the listed companies 
2. Degree to which law or standards prescribe in detail and exclude judgement 
3. Importance of tax rules in measurement 
4. Conservatism/prudence (e.g., valuation of buildings, stock, debtors) 
5. Strictness of application of historic cost (in the historic cost accounts) 
6. Susceptibility to replacement cost adjustments in main or supplementary 
accounts 
7. Consolidation practices 
8. Ability to be generous with provisions (as opposed to reserves) and to smooth 
income 
9. Uniformity between companies in application of rules 
Exhibit 2.1 
Factors for Differentiation of Accounting Systems 
(Source: Nobes ( 1983), A Judgmental International Classification of Financial 
Reporting Practices, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Spring, p. 8). 
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Nobes's classification in Figure 2.1 contains a hierarchy that borrows its label 
from biology. The classification not oi11y shows which countries are in different 
categories, but also how close or distant these categories are. For example, 
Australian accounting, as a member of the UK 'family', is closer to UK 
accounting than it is to either Canadian or US accounting. However, it is closer 
to these two than it is to Dutch accounting, by the 'subclasses' involved; but 
closer to Dutch accounting than French and German accounting, which are 
entirely different 'classes'. 
The micro-based and macro-uniform 'classes' in the Nobes's classification 
roughly correspond to the two types of legal systems, i.e., common and code law 
(Choi et al, 1999). Accounting in common law countries is sometimes called 
non-legalistic or Anglo-Saxon and accounting in code law countries is commonly 
referred to as legalistic (Choi et al, 1999). According to Choi et al ( 1999), 
common law develops on a case-by-case basis with no preconceived design and 
no attempt to cover all cases in an all-encompassing code. The origin of common 
law is English case law. In common law countries, accounting rules are not 
incorporated into statute law; instead, they are established by professional 
organisations working in the private sector. This pemits them to be more 
adaptive and innovative. On the other hand, the code law is based primarily on 
Roman law and, subsequently, the Code Napoleon (Choi et al, 1999). In code law 
countries, compliance with the letter of the law is expected. Codification of 
accounting standards and procedures appears natural and appropriate in these 
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countries. Thus, accounting rules are incorporated into national laws and they 
· · terld to be highly prescriptive and procedural. 
Although the methodology used by Nobes fulfilled the necessary properties of 
.classification, his classification is now historical. Part of.the problem here is that 
the date of Nobes's classification was 1980, before the enactment in EU 
countries of the fourth Directive on Company Law. Directives, which must be 
incorporated into the laws of the EU member states, are the instruments used to 
harmonise company law and accounting (Nobes, 2000). The company law 
Directives of most relevance to accounting is the fourth Directive (i.e. formats 
and rules of accounting) (Nobes, 2000). Since 9 out of 14 countries classified by 
Nobes are member of EU, there is a tendency that there is no difference in the 
fmancial reporting practices in those countries after the implementation of 
accounting Directives as laws. 
Despite being historical, research studies carried out by Doupnik and Salter 
(1993, 1995) to test the Nobes's classification provide a large degree of support 
for the classification, particularly for the initial two-class split. 
Another criticism with Nobes' classification is that it is not really evolutionary, 
although its analogies with biology and use of labels such as 'species' suggest 
this, and also the objects being Classified appear to be. countries, which seems 
misleading (Roberts, 1995). 
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,ln order to reduce this problem, in this study the countries selected. were based on 
the 'farriily' and 'sub-class'. and not the ~species' of the Nobes's classification. 
. . 
The selection of countries is discussed in Chapter 5. 
2.7. Summary 
There are wide divergent views on the nature of and the constitution-of corporate 
governance, but the key elements are concerned with supervision or monitoring 
and accountability. The need for supervision and accountability arises because of 
the separation of ownership from control, which is the main characteristic of an 
agency relationship. Addressing problems in agency theory will therefore 
directly address the issues of corporate governance. 
Agency theory is concerned with the relationship between the agent and the 
principal. The problems in an agency relationship arise because of conflict of 
interest and information asymmetry between the agent and the principal. To 
overcome these problems the opponents of regulation argue that one party to the 
conflict is willing to incur monitoring and bonding costs (agency costs). They 
argue that the agents are willing to provide information about them voluntarily. 
There are also other controlling mechanisms and market forces suggested by the 
opponents of regulation that can overcome these agency problems, and as such 
they argue that regulation on the disclosure of information is unnecessary. 
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However, the proponents of regulation argue that information would not--be· 
voluntarily disclosed, as this contradicts the.main argwnent in agency-~ 
They... argue that the information markets will not function efficiently and .fairly 
without regulation. Several factors have been presented by the pro regulation 
group to provide support for regulation on the disclosure of information, such as 
the alleged 'public good' nature of the information. They also criticise the · 
controlling mechanisms and market forces as tools to monitor the directors' 
behaviour, by arguing the various drawbacks of the mechanisms and the market 
forces. 
After analysing the debates between the opponents and proponents of regulation, 
the author agrees and supports the argwnents of the proponents of regulation, and 
therefore suggests that there should be a regulation on the disclosure of 
information relating to directors' behaviour in the annual reports of companies. 
However, accounting regulations and standards differ from country to country 
due to the differences in the financial reporting systems in which they operate. 
There are many research studies on classification of financial reporting systems. 
However, due to several weaknesses of the classification's methodology adopted 
by the other researchers, in this study the classification by Nobes is taken as the 
framework. 
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Since the focus ·of this stu:dy is on the disclosure of infonnation · m an 
international setting, the regulatory requirements of each of the countries used in 
. . . 
this study is set out and discussed in the next chapter. 
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. . 
-'Chapter~;3 . 
Regulatory Requirements 
3.1. Introduction 
Agency theory and regulations have been reviewed in the previous chapter. It has 
also been proposed in the previous chapter that the Nobes's classification is taken 
as the framework of this study. This chapter thus, discusses the regulatory 
requirements of'the sample countries selected from the Nobes's classification. 
The selection of the sample countries is discussed in Chapter 5. 
In section 3.2, the regulatory requirements of the United Kingdom are discussed, 
followed by the Netherlands, Canada, France, Germany, and Sweden in section 
3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6,. and 3. 7 respectively. Finally, section 3.8 summarised the 
chapter. 
3.2. The United Kingdom 
The regulatory requirements of the United Kingdom have been summarised 
before (e.g. Coopers and Lybrand, (1993); Radebaugh and Gray, (1993); Gordon 
and Gray, (1994); Mumford, (1995); Chooi et al (1999); Hopwood and Vieten 
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(1999); Parker, (2000a)). The discussion m this section draws from these 
references. 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is comprised of four · 
. . . 
countries of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Even though the 
United Kingdom has an integrated system of laws, monetary and fiscal policies, 
and social rules and regulations, important individual. differences remain among 
the four countries. The term Britain is often used for United Kingdom. 'British', 
'Anglo', and 'Anglo-Saxon' are often used interchangeably to describe 
accounting in the United Kingdom. 
Accounting in the United Kingdom developed as an independent discipline, 
pragmatically responding to the needs and practices of business. The major direct 
influences on UK corporate financial reporting are the company law and 
professional accountants. The stock exchanges do have a significant influence on 
accounting practices, but they do not dominate the process of accounting 
regulation. 
3.2.1. Company Law 
Britain has no written constitution. The· law itself comprises three elements, i.e., 
(1) those statutes that have been passed by govenunent, (2) the decisions of the 
courts, either specifically on the matter decided or, with lesser authority, as a 
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matter merely discussed by the court by way ofobiter di~ta not involving a final 
decision, and (3) a body of 'common law', which is deemed to exist and to be 
capable of recognition by the courts, even though it has not yet been stated orally 
or in writing. The regulations governing registered companies in the UK are· 
largely found in the Companies Acts. 
United Kingdom was the first country in the world to have Companies Acts 
containing accounting provisions. Company law has always been 'the most direct 
and unequivocal influence on fmancial reporting' in the UK. The Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1844 was the first company legislation passed. The UK 
Companies Act 1985, which consolidated all previous extant Companies Acts 
(i.e. Companies Acts 1948, 1967, 1976, 1980 and 1981) and is amended by the 
latest Companies Act, passed· in 1989 to recognise the EU Seventh Directive. The 
requirements of the UK Act apply to all British limited companies, except those 
few incorporated by royal charter or special Act of Parliament. There are, 
however, important exemptions for small and medium-sized companies. 
The basic requirements of the Act are that all companies shall prepared a balance 
sheet and a profit and loss account that each comply with the detailed 
requirements of Schedule(s) 4 and, if appropriate, 4A (the latter applying only to 
group accounts). While company law did in fact incorporate specific 
requirements, these were mainly concerned with disclosure, thus leaving matters 
of accounting treatment to the judgement of the profession. This flexible 
approach is still preserved in the legal requirement that company accounts must 
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show a 'true arid fair view' of a company's results and financial position. This is 
a principle that overrides the detailed requirement of_ the law, and accou~ti11g 
·-' ' .. 
standards for that matter, to the extent that additional or, in exceptional 
circumstances, alternative information should be provided. 
Even though the Company Act incorporate specific requirements, the existence 
of accounting standards (discussed below) in the UK is recognised in Section 256 
of the 1985 Act, as amended by Section 19 of the 1989 Act. This Section also 
empowers the relevant minister to prescribe regulations to recognise standard-
setting bodies. 
3.2.2. Accounting Profession and Standards 
Britain was the first country in the world to develop an accountancy profession, 
as that would now be recognised. The first professional body was established in 
Scotland in 1854. Currently there are six major professional bodies of 
accountants, with a total membership of over 200,000 (this total includes some 
double counting, as individuals maybelong to more than one body). The bodies 
are: the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Ireland (ICAI), the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA), the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
(CIMA), and the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and AccoUntancy 
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.. 
(CIPF A). The SIX accountancy bodies are linked thrOI.!gh the Consultative 
Committee of Accountancy Bodies (CCAB), fom1ed in 1974. The CCAB was 
. formed after an attempt to unite the different bodie~ failed in 1971. 
The ICAEW, I CAS, ICAI and ACCA have members engaged in. all principal 
areas of accounting in the private sector. A significant proportion of members are 
in public practice, either as principals or staff cif accountmg firms, but many 
members are employed in commerce and industry. The members of the other two 
bodies i.e. the CIMA and CIPF A cannot act as audi~ors: The CIMA particularly 
caters for accountants engaged in management accounting in commerce and 
industry, whereas, meinbers of CIPFA are predominantly employed in local and 
central government. 
The influence of accounting profession on the accounting regulation is of long 
standing. Professional accountants were influential members of various company 
law amendment committees. For example, the concept of 'true and fair view' 
discussed earlier, was first suggested by representative of the ICAEW. The 
standard setting m UK were also originated from the ICAEW's 
Recommendations on Accounting Principles, which were issued front 1942 to 
1969. In 1970, as a results of criticisms of the accounting standards used in the 
preparation of company accounts and governmental pressures, the ICAEW set up 
its own self-regulatory organization; the Accounting Standards Steering 
Committee (ASSC). This committee was subsequently renamed as the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC), and joined by other five professional 
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accountancy bodies. The ASC pron1ulgated what were called the Statements of 
'.,_· 
Sta~dard Accounting Practice (Ss_APs) .. The. role of the ASC was· confined to 
developing SSAPs with adoption and enforcement remaining the responsibility 
of the six professional bodies. 
However, due to dissatisfaction with the standard-setting arrangement of the 
ASC and the preference to the US-style SEC as reported by the Dearing 
Committee, in 1990, an independent Accounting Standards Board (ASB) was set 
up. Unlike the ASC, the ASB has power to issue accounting standards on its own 
authority. The ASB 's standards are termed Financial Reporting Standards 
(FRSs). The ASB also adopted the existing SSAPs of the ASC and remain in 
force until replaced by FRS. 
Apart from ASB, two new bodies were set up in 1990, i.e., the Financial 
Reporting Review Panel and the Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF). The task of 
the Financial Review Panel is to examine material departures by companies from 
a true and fair view that are brought to its attention. The role of the UITF, on the 
other hand, is to assist the ASB in areas where an accounting standard or 
Companies Act provision exists, but where unsatisfactory or conflicting 
interpretations have developed or seem likely to develop. 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) created by the 1989. Act, independent of the 
profession, supervises the ASB, Financial Reporting Review Panel and the UITF. 
Its responsibilities include the general promotion of good financial reporting, 
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guidance on policies and ensuring the-adequate funding of ASB. The FRC is also 
intended to. act as a forum for the public advocacy of accounting standards. In 
this capacity it has jointly initiated and sponsored investigations of the financial 
aspects of corporate governance (i.e. the Cadbury Committee): 
3.2.3. Stock Exchange 
As mentioned earlier, the stock exchanges in the UK do have a significant 
influence on accounting practices, but they do not dominate the process of 
accounting regulation. The London Stock Exchange (renamed the International 
Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland in 1987) 
dates back to the second half of the seventeenth century, when fmancial 
intermediaries (brokers) began to meet, first at the Royal Exchange and then in 
the coffee houses in order to deal in stocks and shares. The present site of the 
Stock Exchange dates from 180 l. 
Unlike the macro-uniform class of countries (discuss in the previous chapter) that 
rely on banks for their financing, the UK companic:s rely heavily on the stock 
market for their long-term finance. This has resulted in a strong emphasis on 
published information for the use of investors. Despite this, it is not the prime 
responsibility of the stock market in the UK to protect the interests of the 
investors. The financial markets in UK are largely self-regulating. The London 
Stock Exchange, like most of the other markets, is constituted as a private body 
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. run by its own membership. The government on the other. hand takes a close 
interest in the operations{)[ financial markets; this is mainly channelled through 
the Bank Of England, which· as the government's banker has a special 
responsibility for financial affairs, playing an important role informally in 
overseeing self-regulation. 
The Stock Exchange itself takes responsibility in the UK for supervising the rules 
for listing securities, which include the procedures for admission to listing and 
continuing obligation to regulate the conduct of companies after listing. The 
Stock Exchange is also concerned to ensure that price-sensitive information 
about listed securities is made publicly available to all parties promptly, fairly 
and accurately. Because this clearly includes accounting information, in the case 
of listed companies, Stock Exchange requirements must be heeded alongside 
statute law and FRC regulations. Stock Exchange requirements often go beyond 
the others, for example, requiring corporate governance disclosure in the annual 
reports of listed companies relating to directors' remuneration, audit committees 
and internal controls, and a statement that the company is a going concern. 
Although the Stock Exchange plays an important role in the regulation of listed 
compames, it has acquired a reputation for inactivity in enforcing accounting 
standards. Non-compliance with the Stock Exchange's requirement is 
reprimanded, and may be threatened with the withdrawal of permission to trade 
in the company's securities. This threat provides a strong incentive to listed 
companies to comply. 
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3.3. Canada 
Unlike the UK, there are only a few summaries on regulatory requirements in 
Canada. This may be arises because Canada is not regarded as a vital country for 
harrrionisation purposes (Mason 1978). Although it is not regarded as vital 
country, it is selected as the sample country in this study because of the reasons 
discussed later in Chapter 5. Among the few summaries are Coopers and 
Lybrand (1993); Beechy {1995); Baylin et a! (1996); and Nobes and Parker 
(2000). The discussion in this section draws from these references. 
Canada covers the largest landmass of any country in the world. Although the 
geography is vast, the population of around 30 million is smaller than that of 
many European countries. Canada is divided into ten provinces. The provinces 
are quite powerful relative to the national government. The national legislature is 
made up of bicameral federal parliament, i.e., the House of Commons of 301 
members elected from individual constituencies, and the Senate of 112 members 
appointed by the prime minister (Financial Times, 12 May 1998). The provincial 
legislatures are the unicameral legislative assembly of varying size in each of the 
ten provinces (Financial Times, 12 May 1998). 
The criminal legal code is federal jurisdiction, but civil code is provincial. Each 
province has its own civil legal code, including laws governing business 
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· activities· within the province. The Civil legal codes include Corporation Acts that 
govern the formation and reporting of corporations within the province, and also 
' . .. 
include securities acts that govern the trading of s~cui-ities within the province. 
Canada's regulatory framework resembles both that of the United Kingdom (in 
the importance of company law) and that of the United States (in the importance· 
of a securities commission). Although the importance of a securit.ies commission · 
. . 
is recognised, the division of powers under the Canadian Constitution is that 
there. are provincial commissions rather than a federal Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) like in the United States. Even though the provinces 
governed the formation and reporting of corporations (discussed above), there is 
also federal company legislation~ 
According to Bay! in et a! ( 1996) the development of accounting rules in Canada 
developed through six phases. The first phase (1864 to 1946), the main 
influences were the market and traditions inherited from the United Kingdom. 
The second phase (1946 to 1967) saw the rise of technical expertise, while the 
third phase ( 1967 to 1973 ), the codification and the establishment of a permanent 
bureaucracy. The fourth phase (1973 to 1981 ), a transition from private standard 
setting by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) to more 
public rule making. The fifth phase ( 1981 to 1990), the opening-up of an 
expectations gap, and the sixth phase (1990 onwards) an improvement of the 
response time of the standard-setters. 
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· 3.3.1. Company Law 
The earlier Companies Acts in Canada were in the British form. These Acts had 
little effect on disclosure by commercial and industrial corporations until the 
1907 Ontario Business Corporations Act It was this Act ·that the. federal 
requirements for fmancia1 statement disclosure were based. 
Corporations can be chartered under federal law or under any of the individual . 
provincial laws. The laws governing incorporation are called Corporation Acts 
(Manitoba and Newfoundland), Business Corporation Acts (Canada, Ontario, 
SaskatChewan, and New Brunswick), or Company Acts (British Columbia, 
Alberta, Quebec and Nova Scotia). Most Acts require a business corporation to 
include one of the words 'corporation', 'incorporated', or 'limited' (or an 
abbreviation thereof) in its name. 
The above Acts and Securities Commissions recognised the recommendations 
containing in the CICA handbook (discussed below). The Canadian Securities 
Administrators National Policy was the first to recognise the recommendations in 
1972. This was followed a few years later by the Canada Business Corporation 
Act 1975, which transferred the requirements relating to financial statements 
from the body of the Act to a rriore easily altered Regulations Section, which 
requires the statements to conform to generally accepted accounting principles as 
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set out in the CICA Handbook. These n!quirements were later followed· by the 
Ontario Securities Acts 1978 and other provincial legislations. 
According to Drummond and Mason (1992), in general, the Canadian legislation 
·requires financial statements to be prepared in· accordance with the standards of 
the CICA Handbook, which is, therefore, the major source of generally accepted 
accounting principles. Thus, the adoption of CICA recommendations by various 
legislations has granted the CICA monopoly in setting accounting standards in 
Canada. 
3.3.2. Accounting Profession and Standards 
The earliest professional accountancy bodies were formed in the provinces of 
Ontario and Quebec in the 1880s, followed by other provinces at the latter dates. 
The CICA was formed in 1902 with the role to coordinate the autonomous 
provincial institutes. Thus, no Chartered Accountants qualify with CICA as such. 
The Chartered Accountants in Canada qualify from one of the provincial 
institutes. Apart from the Chartered Accountant (CA), Certified General 
Accountant (CGA), and Certified Management Accountant (CMA) are the 
professional accounting designations in Canada. The CGA and CMA qualify 
from the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada {CGAAC) and 
the Society of Management Accountants in Canada respectively (SMAC). 
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The ten ·provinces m Canada regulate their own practices of accounting. In 
general, there are few or no restrictions on the delivery of accounting services by 
any accounting designations, but there are limits on the ability of the holders of 
certain designations to perform the attest function and sign audit opinions. For 
example in the province of Ontario and Quebec only the Chartered Accountants 
are permitted to· sign audit opinions, whereas, in British Columbia and several 
other provinces, a holder of any of the professional designations may sign audit 
opinions. However, the CA firms are considered equivalent to CA or CPA firms 
in other countries and that have the international partnerships and linkages. 
In Canada the main responsibility of accounting standard setting is in the hand of 
the CICA. The CGAAC and SMAC, however, have a smaller role in accounting 
standard setting. The CICA began issuing recommendations for good accounting 
practices in 1946. These recommendations were organised and codified into the 
CICA Handbook in 1968. 
Accounting Standards Board (AcSB), a committee of the CICA, set accounting 
standards in Canada. AcSB was created in 1991 as the successor to the 
Accounting Standards Committee. The Board consists of thirteen part-time 
volunteer voting members who are appointed for three years each. Standards are 
set through a process that begins with the formation of a task force to examine a 
particular reporting issue. The ·task force discusses . the basic issue under 
consideration and prepares a statement of principles, The statement of principles 
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is submitted to the full AcSB for approval. A two-thirds vote 1s required for 
approval 
After the statement of principles has been approved, the task· force develops 
.specific recommendations in the fonn of an exposure draft, which again are 
submitted to the AcSB for approval. After receiving two-thirds approval, the 
exposure draft is issued for public comment. Following the exposure period 
(usually about six months), the comments received are evaluated and changes 
may be made to the proposed recommendations. The proposed recommendations 
are then submitted to the AcSB for final approval. Usually the revisions are 
relatively small and the proposed recommendations are submitted to the AcSB 
for final approval. Upon receiving the necessary two-thirds affinnative vote, the 
new standard is issued for insertion in the CICA Handbook. 
There is no government participation in the standard-setting process, and there is 
rarely any political pressure. Any expressed views of the securities commissions 
are taken into account in setting the standards, but the standards are not subject to 
approval by any government or regulatory agency. 
The accounting standards are issued as 'recommendations', but it is important to 
recognise that the recommendations are really intended as requirements. Any 
departure from the recommendations must be justified. Within the text of the 
Handbook, there are italicised and non-italicised paragraphs. The italicised 
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paragraphs are the recommendations, while; the non-italicised are explanations, 
-elaboratioris, or. suggestions. 
3.3.3. Stock Exchange 
Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Alberta, and Winnipeg Stock Exchange are the 
five stock exchanges in Canada. Among these, Toronto Stock Exchange caters 
about 75 percent of the trading volume (by value), followed by Montreal another 
20 percent. While Vancouver and Alberta Stock Exchange account for almost all 
the rest. The last stock exchange, Winnipeg, is very small and has a volume of 
only about 2 million Canadian dollar per year. 
As mentioned in the earlier section, the securities commissions in the individual 
provinces govern the financial reporting requirements of public companies. 
Among the securities commissions in Canada, the Ontario Securities 
Commission is the most aggressive regulator, followed by Quebec Securities 
Commission. Regulation of the Vancouver Stock Exchange is more relax, and 
compa."'1ies sometimes choose to list on the Vancouver Exchange for this reason. 
The Securities commissions specify the nature of financial reporting, such as the 
types of financial statements to be issued, the frequency of interim reports, and 
the content of the Management Description and Analysis report (required by 
Ontario and QuebecSecurities Commission). As discussed earlier, the securities 
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comm1ss1ons do not promulgate specific accounting standards, but they do 
enforce the CICA accounting standards. 
3.4~ The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is a small Nordic country. The modern Netherlands is the 
northern part of what used to be called the Low Countries, the southern part of 
which comprises the modem Belgium. Although small as it is, there are many 
swnmaries on regulatory requirements in the Netherlands in international 
accounting literatures (e.g. Radebaugh and Gray, 1993; Hoogendoorn, 1995; 
Buijink and Eken, 1999; Choi et al, 1999; Parker, 2000b). This may be aroused 
because Netherlands is regarded as one of the six 'vital' countries for the 
purpose of harmonisation identified by Mason ( 1978). The discussion in this 
section draws from the above references. 
There are a number of unique features of accounting practice in the Netherlands. 
Firstly, in the Netherlands accounting theory has strongly influence accounting 
practice. Accounting theorists there (especially Professor Theodore Lirnperg of 
the University of Amsterdam) had advanced the case that the users of fmancial 
statements would be given the fairest view of the performance and state of affairs 
of an individual company by allowing accountants to use judgement to select and 
present accounting figures. As a result of this, replacement value accounting is 
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being used m· the Netherlands, in· order to measure ·the maintenance of the 
physical capital of the company, which is necessary for its continuity. 
Another unique feature of accounting practices in the Nethei-lands is that the co-
operation in the standard-setting process betWeen auditors, companies and users 
. of accounting information. In o'ther countries accounting standard ·setting is the 
responsibility of the accounting profession or of government agencies. In the 
Netherlands, all the three groups must agree with a new standard before it can be 
published. 
The existence of an accounting court is another unique feature of accounting 
practice in the Netherlands. An accounting court, Ondernemingskamer (the 
Enterprise Chamber), is a division of the High Court of Justice created. by the 
Parliament. The Enterprise Chamber is responsible for administering justice in 
cases involving financial reporting, as well as other matters relating to the 
governance of companies in the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands financial reporting regulation consists of three elements, i.e. 
the civil code, the decisions of the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court 
of Justice, and the Guidelines issued by the Council for Annual Reporting. 
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3A.L Company Law 
Financial reporting regulation in the Netherlands is part of the company law. 
Unlike the UK, company law in the Netherlands is incorporated in the Civil 
Code, i.e. the Codified Roman Law system or Jus Civi/le. This is similar to other 
continental European countries, except that the Civil Code traditionally has riot 
provided· a detailed framework. For example, the first statutory accounting rule 
that was published in 1928 (Article 42 of the· Civil Code) contained only some 
requirements for limited liability companies for preparing the asset side of the 
balance sheet but there were no requirements for the liabilities side, or for the 
income statement. This situation lasted for more than 40 years, until a radical 
change took place in 1970. In that year, the first Act on Financial Reporting was 
published and becoming effective on May 1, 1971. 
The Act embodied some general rules for preparing financial statements. -The 
main consideration that governed accounting policies in the formulation of the 
Act was that they should be generally acceptable (not accepted), and that 
financial statements should give a true and fair view. It applied to limited liability 
companies (naanloze venootschap, NV), private compantes (besloten 
vennotschap, BY), cooperative associations (cooperatie), and mutual guarantee 
associations (onderlinge waarborgmaatschappij). 
The Act was incorporated in the Dutch Civil Code in 1976 (Book 2, Title 6) with 
only minor changes in the requirements and was substantially amended because 
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of the adaptation of the Dutch. accounting requirements to the EU fourth and 
seventh Directives. The·reli:want legislation is now contained in Title 9, Book 2 
of the Dutch Civil Code. 
3.4.2. Accounting Profession and Standards 
The Netherlands was one of the earliest countries to have a professional institute, 
i.e. in 1895. The registeraccountants (RA), accountants-administratieconsulent 
(AA) and controllers dominated the Dutch accounting and auditing profession. 
The RA (chartered accountant, certified public accountant, accountant who is 
enrolled in a professional register) is qualified to audit financial statements. RAs 
are not necessarily in public practice, but can also act as internal or governmental 
auditors or work in industry or education. The RA is automatically a member of 
the public professional body, called the · Neder/ands lnstituut van 
Registeraccountants (Dutch Institute of Chartered Accountants). 
The AA is not authorised to certify accounts, but provides other services, such as 
set-up and maintaining accounting records, preparing financial statements, etc. 
The AA is automatically a member of the Netherlands Organisation of 
accountants-administratieconsulent (NO V AA). 
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The Controller is a new profession. Although it is new, the function of controller 
. . 
actUally has .existed since the inception of company; it is only recently that a 
. . . . . 
specific qualification as a chartered controller (RC) has been introduced. 
The company. Iaw in the Nethedands (as mentioned above) demands that 
financial statements provide insight into. the company's financial position and 
performance, in accordance with norms that are 'acceptable economically'. 
Guidance as to what are generally acceptable accounting principles is provided 
by the guidelines (richtlijnen; formerly beshouwingen, opinions) published by 
the Council for Annual Reporting (Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving (RJ), 
formerly Tripartiete Overleg). 
The professional institute in the Netherlands has never held sole or dominance 
responsibility for the financial accounting standard-setting process (discussed 
earlier). Thus as its former name, Tripartiete Overleg (Three Party Accounting 
Standard Committee), indicates, the Council is composed of representative of 
employers (Council of the Dutch Employers Federation), investment analysts and 
·employees, and accountants (Koninklijk Nederlands lnstituut van 
Registeraccountants (Royal Dutch Institute of Registered Accountants)). 
The RJ is financed two-thirds by Sociaal-Economische Raad (Social and 
Economic Council, the main governmental advisory body in the Netherlands on 
social and economic matters) and one-third by Koninklijk Nederlands lnstituut 
van Registeraccountants (Royal Dutch Institute of Registered Accountants). The 
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authority of.theCouncil is however less than that of the ASB in the United 
·Kingdom. 
. . . 
the guidelines developed and published by the Council have a more formal 
character and should be regarded as authoritative pronouncements to be taken 
into consideration· by producers of financial statements in choosing generally· 
acceptable accounting policies and in presenting a true and fair view. The 
guidelines have no legislative status, i.e. companies are not obliged to follow the 
guidelines, nor need they state that they have been followed. Departures from the· 
guidelines are not referred to in the auditor's report. However the guidelines 
may be consider as an important frame of reference by the auditor in evaluating 
financial statements and by the Company Division of the Court of Appeal in 
arriving at its decisions. 
The guidelines incorporate as far as possible the· accounting standards of the 
International Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) and those opinions of the 
Company Division of the Court of Appeal (and the Supreme Court) that have a 
general application. In many respect the Dutch accounting guidelines are of an 
Anglo-Saxon nature, i.e. emphasising the true and fair view, and with a dominant 
emphasis on 'economic substance' rather than 'legal form'. Although of an 
Anglo-Saxon nature, they have generally developed independently of accounting 
standards in the US and the UK. 
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3.4~3. Stock Exchange 
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange (ASE) is the only stock exchange m the 
Netherlands. There are over 200 companies listed in the ASE,but the four major 
multinational companies, i.e. · Akzo/Nobel, Philips, Royal Dutch Shell and 
Unilever, dominate dealings. These four companies account for about fifty per 
cent of the market capitalisation and turnover. Dutch companies raise capital 
both by share and loan issues on the ASE and from the commercial banks in the 
form of short and medium term loans. 
The ASE is run by the Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel (Stock Exchange 
Association). This Association is responsible for the general policy and takes 
care of the interests of its members. The Ministry of Finance supervises the rule 
making and the performance of the Association. 
Companies listed in ASE are required to disclose information in accordance with 
the Fondsenreglement (Stock Exchange Regulations) imposed by the Vereniging 
voor de Effectenhandel. These regulations go beyond Title 9 of the Civil Code 
(di$::ussed earlier). For example, listed companies must published interim 
fmancial statements although these need not be audited .. Companies are also 
required to inform the public of the developments that could have a significant 
influence on the prices of their stocks. Ih addition, companies issuing shares must 
publish a prospectus, which gives a getrouw beeld (faithful picture) of the 
position of the issuing company on the balance sheet date of the last financial 
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year for which financial statements were published. The prospectus sho~ld also 
contain infmmation on events of spec!al signi~cance that has taken place after 
the balance sheet date. The prospectus should specify which financial 
information in the prospectus has been audited and, if the auditor's report was 
qualified, the qualification should be included. 
In relation to the contents of annual financial statements, the Vereniging voor de 
Effectenhandet does not impose any regulations in addition to Title 9 of the Civil 
Code. The Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel also does not participate in the R1 
in drafting the Guidelines for Annual Reporting, except as an observer. 
3.5. France 
France is a republic situated on the west of the continental Europe. Like many 
other continental European countries, France's legal system is based on the 
Codified Roman Law system with a constitution, i.e. it is based on statutes rather 
than cases, in the legal texts and in contracts. As in the Codified Roman Law 
countries, company law seems to be the predominant influence on accounting in 
France. Based on Nobes's classification (discussed in the previous chapter), 
France is under the macro-uniform, goveniment-driven, and tax~dominated 
class's accounting system. As the name, macro~uniform; indicates, France is the 
world's leading advocate of national uniform accounting or plan based 
accounting (standardise accounting). 
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As it is the world's -leading advocate of national unifonn accounting and a 'vital' 
country identified by Mason (1978), there are many literatures on French 
accounting regulatory requirements (e.g. Coopers and Lybrand, (1993); 
Radebaugh and Gray, (1993); Scheid and Walton, (1994); Scheid and Walton, 
( 1995); Chooi et al (1999); Lande and Scheid (1999); Stand ish, (2000)). The 
discussion in the section below draws from these references. 
3.5.1. Company Law 
The law relating to accounting in France can be traced back to the Savary Law in 
1673, during the reign of Louis XIV, that required traders to maintain daybooks 
of their business transactions and prepare an annual list of assets, as well as to 
keep copies of all letters. The Savary Law was incorporated into the Code de 
Commerce (Commercial Code) in 1807, as the French law was reorganised into 
the Code Napoleon (Napoleonic Code). The next major reform of company law 
was in 1867, when the Societe Anonyme (share-issuing company) was introduced 
and with it the Commissaire aux Comptes (profession of auditor). Various minor 
changes occurred to the law from this time until 1947, when the emphasis on 
uniformity strengthens in France. As a result of this, the standardised national 
code of accounting, the Plan Comptable General, was introduced. 
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This code, which was based on Germa~ ideas and developed. during the German 
occupation of 1940c 1945, was implemented in 194 7. The Plan Comptable 
General was formulated by the Commission de Normalisation des 
Comptabilitles, a government appointed body. The code is the responsibility of 
the Conseil Superieur de la Comptabilite, the French National Accounting 
Council. The Plan Comptable General was intended to promote more effective 
national economic planning and the contents are extensive, which include a 
. . 
detailed Chart of Accounts, with numeric coding for all of the accounts, rules 
relating to valuation and profit measurement, model for financial statement 
presentation, and so on. 
Although optional, the 1947 Plan Comptable General was implemented by 
French companies. In 1965 the tax system stipulated that companies should 
adhere to the Plan Comptable General when compiling annual tax returns. 
However the lack of detail in the Plan Comptable General presented problems in 
determining the figures to be reported. In respond to this, the Conseil National de 
la Comptabilite, the successor of the Conseil Superieur de la Comptabilite, in 
1965 issued opinions to supplement the 1947 Plan Comptable General. 
The Plan Comptable General was scheduled for revision in 1971but it was held 
up by discussions on the Fourth European Directive. As a result of this a new 
Plan Comptable General in keeping with the Directive was issued in 1982 and 
. ' 
implemented on l January 1984. A law reproducing the essentials of the 
Directive was adopted on 30 April 1983, for implementation on I January 1984. 
91 
Further laws were passed in 1985 and 1986. to implement the Seventh European 
. . . 
Directive ~~ consolidated accounts. This marked a change iri ·the nature of . 
. ' 
' . . . 
accounting standardisation in France, i.e.· an issue, which had previously been 
optional, now became mandatory. 
The acceptance of the European Directives into the French Company Law has 
resulted in the fact that the Plan Comptable General is no longer in the forefront 
of French accounting standardisation. Accounting laws and decrees no longer 
makes cross-reference to the. Plan Comptable General and its reputation is 
diminishing. Because it is not mandatory, and as it has not been updated since 
1982, the Plan Comptable General now plays only a minor role in accounting 
standardisations. 
As mentioned above, tax system stipulated that companies should adhere to the 
Plan Comptable General when compiling annual tax returns. Thus, apart from 
company law and Plan Comptable General, taxation is a major influence on 
French accounting. The tax laws tend to override the accounting rules to the 
extent that charges deductible for tax purposes must be recorded in the accounts 
if the tax benefit is to be claimed. 
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3:5.2. Accounting Profession and Standards 
The accounting profession in France is relatively small on a per capita 
population basis and Jacking in status compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
This is because, until the Second World War, companies in France were having 
closely controlled ownership, often within families. Furthermore, the stock 
exchange was less important as the channel for mobilising risk capital, with far 
fewer listed companies and a relatively small aggregate market capitalisation 
compared with the UK. The separation of the role of statutory auditor from 
public accounting practice also contributes to the small accounting profession in 
France. 
The establistunent of a national French accounting profession, the Ordre des 
experts comptables, took place after the Second World War, as France 
recognised a need for larger-scale commercial and industrial reorganisation. The 
formation took place the same time as the state was learning how to standardise 
fmancial accounting and reporting, as well as how to regulate auditing. 
The practice of public accou.'l.ting in France is reserved to members of Ordre des 
experts comptables, who might be called 'registered public accountants'. As 
mentioned earlier, public accountant does not embrace the role of the statutory 
auditor, which is controlled through ·a separate professional institution, the 
Compagnie nationale des commissaries aux comptes, (discussed below). The 
Ordre des experts comptables has no authority in the matter of accounting 
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standardisation, even over its own members, the French registered· public 
. . . 
accountants. Although it has no authority, the Ordre des experts comptables is 
. . 
involved il) the Conseil National de la Comptabilite in revising the · Plan 
Comptable General (discussed earlier). Thus, it should not need to have its own 
separate set of statements· on accounting issues. However, the Ordre des experts 
comptables has been issuing its own Recommandations since it set up a special 
committee in 1965 to advice its own members, having failed in its various 
requests to the Conseil National de la Comptabilite to take a position on several 
points not dealt with in the Plan Comptable General. The Ordre des experts 
comptables recommendations closely follow lASs as the Ordre des experts 
comptables is a member of the IASC whereas the Conseil National de la 
Comptabilite is not. 
As discussed earlier the role of the statutory auditor is controlled through a 
separate professional institution, the Compagnie ndtionale des commissaries aux 
comptes. The Compagnie nationale des commissaries· aux comptes was 
established by decree in 1969; to which registered public accountants (as well as 
those who were previously practising as auditors) could belong. The membership 
of Compagnie nationale des commissaries aux comptes is similar to·that of the 
Ordre des experts comptables, since the conditions of enrolment are identicaL 
Throughout its existence, the Compagnie nationale des commissaries aux 
comptes has developed a comprehensive set of auditing standards, which are 
closely modelled on those in the USA. Apart from developing auditing standards, 
Compagnie nationale des commissaries aux comptes participate indirectly in 
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accounting ~tandardisation by having a numbe~· of its .members on the Conseil 
Naiional de la Corrlptabilite. 
Unlike the UK, where there are standards sets up by the professional bodies, in · 
France there is no comparable accounting standard. This arises because the detail 
accounting requirements are provided in the Plan Comptable General and later 
by the law that incorporates the European .Union Directives (discussed earlier): 
Furthermore, although the Plan Comptable General fits in a precise way into the 
structure of. French company law, the document itself represents the core 
statement of French accounting standards. 
3.5.3. Stock Exchange 
The stock market in France is also relatively small compared to the stock markets 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This reflects the fact that the major sources of 
fmance for the French companies are banks, the government, and family interest. 
However, more emphasis on investor interests has been given following the 
establishment of the Commission des Operations de Bourse in 1967. This is 
effectively the French equivalent to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The Commission des Operations de Bourse is responsible for 
supervision of the principal stock exchange, the Paris Bourse, provincial stock 
exchanges and the Second Market. 
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The Commission des Operations de Bourse takes an active interest in financial 
. .-
. . ' . 
accounting and reporting. from the viewpoint of French public companies and in 
the acceptability of French annual accounts to the international capital markets. 
Unlike the US Securities and Exchange Commission, it has promoted 
. . 
developments in financial reporting by seeking the cooperation of corporations 
rather than through the enforcement of regulations. 
3."6. Germany 
The regulatory requirements in Germany have been summarised by many authors 
(e.g. Coopers and Lybrand, (1993); Radebaugh and Gray, (1993); Ordelheide and 
Pfaff, (1994); Ballwieser, (1995); Seckler, (1995); Chooi et a!, (!999); 
Ordelheide, ( 1999); Macharzina and Langer (2000)). The discussion in this 
section draws from these references. 
German accounting regulations and especially, German company/accounting law 
have only a relative brief history compared with those of other European 
countries. This is because Germany has seen many changes in the form of the 
state, ranging from centralised government to fragmentation into numerous small 
states. 
Germany is a social democratic federal state, which, since reunification, consists 
of sixteen states or Lander. The sixteen states are Baden-Wurrtemburg, Bayem 
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(Bavari~), Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen; Hamburg, Hessen (Hesse), 
Meckienburg-Vorpommem, Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), Nordrhein-
Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia), Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland Pa:latinate), 
Saarland, Sachsen (Saxony), Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringen 
(Thuringia). The States are not simply administrative units; they have their own 
constitution, territory and state powers (legislative, executive and judicial). 
The legal system in Germany is highly codified and prescriptive, being based on 
the Roman law system in contrast to the common law system in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Based on Nobes's classification Germany is under the macro-uniform, 
government-driven, and tax-denominated class's accounting system. And similar 
to France, Germany is another country, which advocates uniform accounting. 
There are various features of financial reporting in Germany. Firstly, under the 
German legal system, financial accounting and reporting are subject to 
detailed regulation. Another feature peculiar to German accounting is the 
conservative reckoning of profit in individual accounts, intended to guard against 
too rosy a view of net assets or net wealth. The strong influence of the prudence 
principle looks to the interests of creditors by minimising profits rather than 
making good information available. 
The prudence principle and other principles of proper bookkeeping (Grundsatze 
ordnungsmabiger Buchfuhrung, GoB) that dominate German law tend to 
encourage a predisposition towards self-financing. Thus, most companies m 
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Germany regard self-financing and debt financing as more important than adding 
to the equity by increasing share capitaL 
Lastly, it should be reckoned that in Germany there is . a close connection 
between commercial accounting and tax accounting. The profit stated in 
commercial accounts is usually the same as profit for tax purposes. 
3.6.1. Company/Accounting Law 
Accounting requirements were first codified comprehensively in the Preubisches 
Allgemeines Landrecht (Prussian Civil Code) of 1794, and were based on the 
French Code Savary. In 1861, as part of the process of political integration of the 
German states, the Allgemeines deutsches Handi!lsgesetzbuch or ADHGB 
(General German Commercial Code) was introduced. Under this Code every 
business in Germany was obliged to provide an annual inventory and balance 
sheet in accordance with the bookkeeping rules. 
In 1870, the first Aktiengesetz, (AktG) (Stock Corporation Act) introduced the 
disclosure rules for the financial statements of that type of corporation. The Act 
made no attempt to set out the formats to be used for the financial statements. 
Since its establishment, the Act has been reformed several times between 1884 
and 1897, i.e. the learning phase. In 1884, the Act was amended as the result of 
various bankruptcies caused by excessive dividend distributions based on 
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overvaluation. The new Act set down the foundation~ of a valuation system 
. . 
based on prudence, in which capital maintenance became mand~tory. Various 
legai provisions were als~ es~blished. It became obligatory to publish accounts, 
and failure to comply would ~esult in sanctions against the management ~d the 
supervisory board. 
In 1892, the Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Hafiung (GmbH) (Limited Liability 
Company Act was established. Some of the obligatory rules of the Stock 
Corporation Act were taken over but the historical cost prinCiple was restricted to 
fixed assets. The 1892 Act included specific rules for accounting and for the 
determination and appropriation of profit but no disclosure requirements. 
The last piece of legislation during the learning phase (discussed above) was the 
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) (Commercial Code) of 1897. This Code drew up 
regulations for non-corporations, obliging them to follow principles of proper 
bookkeeping and to provide an annual inventory and balance sheet. 
The last piece of legislation (Code of 1897) of the learning phase lasted for 
almost 40 years, without any amendments or new legislations, until the 1930s. 
However, as the result of failure of a number of large stock corporations in 1930s 
a major reform to the Stock Corporation Acts was carried out, and was enacted in 
1937. The new rules of the Act included a general nol"111 for the preparation of 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, an option to apply either the cost or 
the attributable value principle for fixed assets, whichever was lower, a definition 
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of production costs, a separate special lower of cost or market principle for 
' . 
. ' ' . . . 
. . ' . . .· ., . 
_securities,, the historical cost principle also for current assets, and an obligatory 
lower of cost or market value principle for current assets. ih! 1937 Act also set 
down the basic format for the balance sheet and for the profit and loss account.· 
The German government was authorised to prescribe, without parliamentary 
approval, other formats for the balance sheet and for the profit and loss accou~t. 
as we!I as to prescribe special rules both for the individual accounts of companies 
belonging to a group and for the group accounts. The 193 7 Act also introduced 
a deadline for the presentation of accounts to the supervisory board and to the 
general assembly by the managing board. It was during this time the mandatory 
audit of fmancial statements was established. 
Minor changes to the 1937 Act occurred in 1959, which dealt with the format of 
the accounts. Another extensive reform of the Act took place in 1965. The Act of 
1965 altered the rights of determination and distribution of profits, set down new 
formats for the balance sheet and the profit and loss account, set down new 
formats for the balance sheet and the profit and loss account and for the first time 
established the obligation to prepare, audit and published group accounts as we!I 
as the individual accounts vf a!I companies belonging to a group. 
It can be seen from the above that a!I reforms after the learning phase, i.e. after 
1897,concentrated on the stock corporation and, to some extent, on the limited 
liability company. But other forms of business, the sole proprietors and 
commercial partnerships, stili based on the Commercial Code of 1897. It was not 
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· .· until 1969 that the stock corporation law was extended to large cornpanies of 
other legal forms with the en·actment of the Publizitatsgesetz (PubiC) (Disclosure 
Act). The introduction of this Act resulted from the tailure of group of large 
companiesled by the commercial partnership. 
Another change to. the German accounting regulation occurred with the 
introduction of European Union Directives into German Law beginning in 1985. 
Many new rules were established, especially concerning group accounts and the 
notes to the accounts. However, according to Ballwieser (1995) the disclosure 
requirements of the Directives have been totally ignored by some 85-90 per cent 
of limited liability companies. 
The latest accounting legislation m Germany, the Kapitalaufnah-
meerleichterungsgesetz (KAEG). was enacted m 1998. The purpose of this 
legislation was to make easier for German companies to raise capital in 
international capital markets. Under this law, German listed stock corporations 
have the choice of applying internationally accepted accounting rules (especially 
IAS and US-GAAP) in their group accounts. This option is available until 31 
December 2004, the German Standards Committee being mandated to adapt 
German accounting principles to international accounting practice by this date. 
I 0 I 
3.6;2. Acco1Jnting Profession and Standards. 
In Germany, professional accounting as in the UK or USA sense does not exist. 
Professional organisations and activities are primarily auditing oriented. Certified 
accountants in Germany are called vereidigte Buchprufer (vBP), and certified 
auditors are called Wirtschaftsprufer (WP). However both the vBP and WP are 
members of the Wirtschaftspruferkammer (Chamber of Auditors). The difference 
between the two types is that, vBPs benefit from simplified admission and 
examination procedures. They are however allowed to penorm only voluntary 
audits, as well as statutory audits of medium-sized limited liability companies. 
The WP must perform all other statutory audit. 
Germany does not have financial accounting standard setting, as it is understood 
in Anglo-Saxon countries. Financial accounting and reporting standards in 
Germany are set by the legislature as a consequence of the statute law. However, 
as mentioned in the above section, the German Accounting Standard Committee 
was formed in 1998 to produce accounting standards for Germany. It is expected 
by the year 2004, Germany will have their standards prepared by the Committee 
and not by the legis!ature as currently being practiced. 
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3.6.3. Stock Exchange 
The stock market is relatively small in Germany, reflecting the fact that the major 
. . 
so~rces -of finance. are banks together with government and family interests. 
Those corporations that are listed tend to be quite closely held by these interested 
parties. Thus, the methods of financing of German companies have resulted in a 
relatively low number of companies traded on the stock exchange, a relatively 
low equity ratio, and typically high financing via pension accruals. 
Since the legal requirements are absolutely supreme in Gennany, the stock 
exchange authorities provide only consultation in vanous processes of 
lawmaking that affect accounting and financial reporting. However, unlike the 
SEC in the USA, these authorities have only a modest influence on accounting 
lawmaking. 
3.7. Sweden 
The official name of Sweden is Kingdom of Swederi and it covers an area of 
449,964 sq km (Financial times, 14 April 1998). It is a constitutional monarchy 
state with the King Car I XVI Gustaf as the head of state. However, the king plays 
no role in government. The legal system is based on the constitution of 1975. 
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Similar to Canada, there .are only a few summaries on . the regulatory 
requirements in Sweden (e.g. Coopers and Lybrand,. (1993); Radebaugh and 
Gray, (1993); Heur~in and Peterssohn (l995); Nobes and Parker," (200())). The 
discussion below draws from these references. 
Based on the Nobes:s classification of accounting system, discussed in the 
previous chapter, Sweden falls under· the macro-unifonn, government-driven, 
and tax-dominated class and within the economic control family. 
Since it falls under the micro-t.inifonn, government-driven, and tax-dominated 
class, similar to France and Germany, the development of accounting in Sweden 
has been subject to strong legal and taxation influences. However, unlike France 
and Gennany, in Sweden there is also a tradition of involvement by the 
accounting profession in the standard-setting process. The influence of the stock 
exchange is also important in respect to accounting and disclosure by large 
corporation in Sweden. But in contrast to the Netherlands, the overriding 
influence in Sweden has been the state and committed to the use of accounting 
infonnation for the purpose of macroeconomic planning and policymaking. 
There:fore, the tax system has beenused aggressively to promote macroeconomic 
objectives and as such has encouraged a more conservative approach to income 
measurement. 
In tenn of legal systems, Sweden does not quite fit into either the 'Roman' or the 
common law systems. Sweden might be said to have 'civil law', which bears a 
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resemblance to· Roman law but does not involve such extensive codification. 
Thus, there are no detailed· accounting rules in the commercial codes or 
accounting plans, like in Germany or. France. 
3. 7 .I. Company/ Accounting Law 
The first law on limited companies m Sweden was the Royal Ordinance on 
limited companies of October 6, 1848. The 1848 Ordinance. was clearly and 
strongly influence by the French Code de Commerce. The ordinance was quite 
brief, containing only fifteen clauses. 
The 1848 Ordinance was replaced by the Companies Act 1895. The 1895 Act 
included a number of rules concerning the payment, increase and reduction of the 
share capital, legal reserves, distribution of profits, annual returns, audit, 
discharge from liability, liquidation, and damages payable by directors. 
Regarding its content and system, the 1895 Act seems to have been influence by 
German rather than French legislation. 
However, the 1895 Act was not long-lived. Due to various criticisms, such as, 
the insufficient protection it afforded against unsound corporate activities, a new 
Act was enacted in 1910, which· contained several new features. Similar to the 
1895 Act, the German law also influenced the 1910 Act. The impact of German 
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legislation is evidence by the preparatory work, where an account of the Gennan 
law was given by far the most space. 
As the result of the shortcomings in the earlier Act and the fall of the Kreuger 
Group in the 1930s, Sweden issued a new Company Act in 1944. In the Act, the 
rules regarding the fonns of incorporation and publicity on incorporation were 
. made more stringent. In addition, rules on the limitation of distribution of 
dividends were introduced to protect creditors. The obligation of the board of 
directors and managing director to submit annual reports was significantly 
enhanced. The board's duty of disclosure at general meetings was also enlarged. 
The 1944 Act lasted for 30 years with only a few amendments. For example, new 
rules were introduced through an amendment to the law in 1950, in response to 
demands by the trade unions. However, the present Companies Act of 1975 
replaced the Act 1944 because of the need of close cooperation with the other 
Nordic countries (Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Finland). This resulted in 
largely unifonn companies acts in these countries during the 1970s. 
Sweden joined the EU in 1995, and implemented the fourth and seventh 
Directives (accounting) of the EU as laws in the same year. As in the UK and 
Netherlands, the implementation of the Directives has seen a substantial increase 
in the legal coverage of accounting.· For example, the obstacle to foreign 
acquisitions of shares in Swedish companies have been removed, the 
requirements of a minimum share capital has been changed to 100,000 Swedish 
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krona, and there will be two types of limited companies in Sweden, the private 
' . . . . . 
limited companies and public limited companies, with different requirements 
regarding the disclosure of financial·information. 
Apart from the Companies Act, the law governing accounting matters in Sweden 
is also embodied in the Accounting Act. The first Accounting Act was in 1855, 
followed by in 1929 and the present in 1976. Similar to the Companies Acts, 
every new Accounting Acts add more stringent rules. For example, the new· 
feature of the 1976 Accounting Act is the demand for increased disclosure in the 
case of understatement of assets in relation to the rules of the law. 
The Accounting Act reqmres generally accepted accounting principles to be 
followed, but these principles are not defined. Thus the law provides a 
framework rather than detailed requirements. 
In summary, the Accounting Act contains general rules on the preparation of 
annual accounts, whereas the Companies Act contains special rules, thereby 
fulfilling a supplementary function in respect of accounting legislation. 
3. 7.2. Accounting Profession and Standards 
The age and size of the professional accountancy body in Sweden are lower than 
those of the equivalent body in the relatively young country like Canada. This is 
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to be expected for countries that had a Germanic tradition. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the professional bodies in Sweden have in recent years 
become involved in formal standard setting. 
·The Foren/ngen Auktoriserade Revisorer (FAR) IS the Swedish Institute of 
Authorised Public Accountants. The FAR· was founded m 1923 with the 
objective to make recommendations on accounting matters. However, when the 
Accounting Act 1976 was introduced, a body of experts' known as 
Bokforingsnamuden, BFN{Swedish ·Accounting Board) was founded for the 
purpose of developing generally accepted accounting principles. The BFN, which 
is a state body, has been working along side the FAR, focusing on accounting 
issues. The standard setting role of the FAR was taken over by the 
Redovisningsradet, RR (Swedish Financial Accounting . Standards Council), 
which was established in 1989. The BFN. FAR and the Sveriges Industriforbund, 
SI together formed the RR. The RR is· independent· of the accounting profession, 
similar to the F ASB in the United States. The function of the RR is to develop 
and issue recommendations on financial reporting of public companies. 
It is noteworthy that the recommendations issued by the BFN and RR is not · 
mandatory but advisory in the context of company law. In practice, therefore, the · 
approach to accounting standard setting in Sweden seems to be very much 
consensus-oriented and somewhat flexible despite the legalistic and taxation 
influences at work. 
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3. 7 .3; Stocl' Exchange 
Sweden now has fairly large equity markets, given the size of the population or 
economy. As at 31 December 1997, there were 245 domestic companies listed in 
the stock exchange with the market value of domestic equity of 160 billion 
pounds. 
The Stockholm Stock Exchange is the only authorised sock exchange for shares 
in Sweden. Public companies must apply to the exchange if they wish to be listed 
there. The Finansinspektionen (Financial Supervisory Authority) stipulate the 
registration requirements of companies to be listed. The Lag 1992:543 om bors-
och clearingverksamhet (Act governing stock exchange) requires listed 
companies to provide published information on the company's activities to 
enable the public to assess the price of the company's shares and information that 
the stock exchange considers necessary to carry out its obligations under the Act 
or other ordinances. 
According to the rules of the listing contract entered into by all companies listed 
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, the company undertakes to publish and also 
to send to the Stockholm Stock Exchange promptly an approved year-end release 
setting out all significant fact to be contained in the annual accounts. 
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3.8. Summary 
The review of the regulatory requirements of the sample countries showed that 
there are differences between them. These differences also support the 
classification of financial reporting measurement practices by Nobes in 1983. 
There are two types of legal systems being followed by the sample countries, the 
common law system (in UK and Canada) and the codified Roman law system (in 
Netherlands, France, Germany, and Sweden). In the common law system, the 
company law were only concerned with disclosure, and leaving other matters to 
the judgement of the profession. This flexibility is preserved in the law when 
company accounts were only required to show a 'true and fair view' of a 
company's results and fmancial position. The definition of 'true and fair view', 
however, is not given in the law. 
In the codified Roman law countries, company law or commercial codes need to 
establish rules for accounting and financial reporting. For example, in Germany, 
company accounting is to a large extent a branch of company law. Both the 
nature of regulation and the type of detailed rules to be found in a country are 
affected. In some codified Roman law countries, dirigisme (centralisation and a 
desire to control the economy) results iri the existence of an accounting plan. For 
example in France, the needs of the Economics Ministry, in its role as controller 
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of the French economy, were seen to be well served by the use of accounting 
plans. 
However, not all the codified Roman law countries have detailed accounting 
plan. The Netherlands, for example, does not have detail accounting plan or 
uniform accounting as in France and Germany. In the Netherlands accounting 
theory has strongly influence accounting practice. The accountants are allowed to 
use judgement to select and present accounting figures so as to give the fairest 
view of the performance and state of affairs of an individual company. Thus, the 
accounting practices are based on the generally acceptable accounting principles. 
Although Sweden is under the codified Roman law system, there is no 
accounting plan or code. The laws relating to company and accounting are 
prescribed in the company act and accounting act. 
One difference between codified Roman law and common law countries is that 
company in the former countries tend to restrict their disclosure to legal 
requirements. In the common-law countries, the basic disclosures required by 
law are substantial and lead to considerable uniformity. However, other 
disclosure required by or recommended by standards are common. This leads to 
a certain degree of variation. 
The strength of the accounting professions and the accounting standards also 
differ between the sample countries. The United Kingdom, the first country to 
I I I 
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intro!iu~ed professional aq:ountaricy body, lead the other sample countries with 
. six accountancy bOdies. The professional bodies of.eachcountry, without state 
intervention, set the accounting standards in .. the UK, Canada, Netherlands and 
Sweden. Germany and France do not have accounting standards, as it Is 
understood in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Stock exchanges do have do have a·significant influence on accounting practices, 
but they do not dominate the process of accounting regulation. In the UK and the 
Netherlands; the stock exchange itself takes responsibility in supervising ihe 
listed companies in the respective country, whereas in Canada, the securities 
commissions in the individual provinces govern the financial reporting 
requirements of listed companies. In France, the Commission des operations de 
Bourse is responsible for the supervision of all companies listed in their stock 
exchanges. In Germany, since the legal requirements are absolutely supreme, the 
stock exchange authorities provide only consultation in various processes of 
lawmaking that affect accounting and financial reporting. In Sweden, listed 
companies are governed by Lag 1992:543 om bars- och clearingverksamhet (Act 
governing stock exchange). 
Since this study is on the disclosure, m the next chapter the literatures on 
information disclosure will be reviewed. 
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4.1. Introduction 
·Chapter 4 
Information Disclosure 
In the previous chapter regulatory requirements of the sample countries were 
reviewed. It has been proposed in chapter 1 that problems associated with 
corporate governance/agency theory demand greater transparency or better 
information disclosure to the shareholder by the company and this is the focus of 
this study. Since transparency or the quality of disclosure of information relating 
to directors' opportunistic behaviours is the concern of this study, this chapter is 
intended to critically review these topics and previous disclosure studies before 
discussing the methodology adopted in this study in the next chapter. 
The terms 'transparency', 'disclosure', and 'disclosure quality' are discussed in 
section 4.2. Section 4.3 reviews the works of previous researchers on information 
disclosure. In this section, the measurement of disclosure quality, the 
construction of a disclosure index, and the problems and we:.knesses associated 
with the use of a disclosure index are discussed. Section 4.4, summarises the 
chapter. 
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. 4.2 .. Transparency, disclosure, and disclosure quality. 
4.2.l."Transpareney 
According to the Oxford dictionary (1983), 'transparency' means 'being 
transparent', and transparent mean 'easily understood, of such a kind that the 
truth behind it is easily perceived'. To be. easily understood depends on the 
disclosure of relevant, reliable, significant, clear and practical information about 
a fact or condition. 
Transparency is a significant accounting value dimension that stems as much 
from management as it does from the accountant owing to the influence of 
management on the quality and quality of information disclosed to outsiders 
(Jaggi, 1976). 
According to Radebaugh and Gray (1993) transparency is opposite of secrecy. 
They further added, secrecy or corifidentiality in business relationships is 
nevertheless a fundamental accounting attitude and appears to be closely related 
to conservatism. Both secrecy and conservatism imply a cautious approach to 
corporate financial reporting. 
The OECD ( !998) in discussing transparency suggests that, investor confidence 
and market efficiency depend on the disclosure of accurate, timely information 
about corporate performance. The disclosed information should be clear, 
consistent and comparable to enables investors to make educated decisions. 
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The extent of transpar~ncy/secrecy appears to vary acr~ss countries with lower 
levels of disclosure evident in Japan and.continental European countries such as 
France, Germany, and Switzerland, compared to the United States and United 
Kingdom (Barret, 1976). The differences between the countries in the level of 
disclosure also seem· to be reinforced by the differential development of capital · 
markets and· the public ownership of shares (Watts, 1977). 
Whatever definitions and explanations about transparency it comes out to mean 
'better information disclosure' to the users. In the context of this study, 
transparency means· better or quality information disclosure of directors' 
opportunistic behaviour. 
4.2.2. Disclosure 
Disclosure is the process through which an entity communicates with the outside 
world (Chandra, 1974). Disclosure has been defined by Kohler (1957) as 'a clear 
showing of a fact or condition on a balance sheet or other financial statement, in 
footnotes thereto, or in the audit report'. According to Choi, (1973b), these facts 
or conditions are 'economic information relating to a business· enterprise, 
quantitative or otherwise, which facilitates the making of investment decisions'. 
However, in the context of this study, the 'facts or conditions' mentioned in the 
defmition are information relating to directors' behaviour, . quantitative or 
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otherwise, which facilitate the monitoring or controlling .of directors' actions 
(agency perspective). Disclosure therefore, in this study refers to the qualitative 
information which does not directly have any impact on the figures. included in 
the annual reports (financial statements) but may affect the monitoring of 
directors' actions (for ·example, remuneration committee's report) and 
quantitative information which affects the results ofthe annual reports (fmancial 
statements) and the monitoring of directors' actions (for example, the amount of 
directors' remuneration). 
In practice, disclosure of information by companies can take several forms. 
Normally disclosure is considered in relation to the annual reports, even though 
there are other forms of disclosure, such as, interim reports, 10-K reports, proxy 
statements, prospectuses, letters to shareholders, employee reports, summary 
reports and other printed material. However, only the annual report is required to 
be published by companies in most countries over the world. Other forms of 
disclosure might be compulsory in one country but not others and, as a result, 
most of the disclosure studies use only the annual report. The annual report is a 
useful source of information for decision-making and an important instrument of 
accountability (Muda, 1991 ), Md controlling managers' actions (stewardship 
demand) (Gjesdal, 1981). 
Many different criteria are available for evaluating information disclosure, such 
as relevance, reliability, significance, understandability and practicality of the 
information, but these are really just part and parcel of one overall criterion, that 
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is, usefulness (Snavely, 1967). If information. is n'ot useful to someone, we can 
have little faith in its. usefulness (Peasnell, 1973):. 
The q~estion of what is useful is subjective· and may vary with the composition 
and needs of the users. According to Peasnell (1973), 'usefulness to investors' is 
an often-quoted criterion for evaluating financial accounting reports. 
Shareholders are viewed as the legitimate 'public' of financi<il statements 
(Peasnell, 1973). Buzby ( 1974a) suggests that the selection of audience and 
purpose of evaluating the quality of disclosure should consider which groups and 
purposes exhibit the greatest use of, and dependency on, financial statements, as 
well as the homogeneity and information processing capabilities of competing 
groups. He concludes that professional financial analysts represent the best 
compromise. This is supported by research findings, which show that individual 
investors rely most heavily upon information from stockbrokers when making 
investment decisions (Baker and Haslem ( 1973) and Baker et at, ( 1977)). 
However as pointed out earlier, the focus of this study is not on information for 
decision making purposes, but information for monitoring the management of 
firms by the shareholders (agency perspective). Therefore, in the context of this 
study the usefulness of ·the information refers to the usefulness to ihe 
shareholders. However, due to the difficulty in identifying the shareholders, this 
study uses investment analysts as surrogates for shareholders. The reason for this 
. . 
is discussed in the data and methodology chapter. 
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To be useful, the information must have the component of quality. The quality of 
accounting information depends on several criteria. Choi ( 1981) suggests that, 
the disclosure of information, the choice of accounting method and the 
interpretation. of the information are the criteria needed to be considered in 
determining the quality. 
4.2.3. Disclosure quality 
According to Verrecchia (1990, p. 365), 'disclosure quality involves the 
distributional characteristics of an uncertain event'. In the context of this study, 
'the event' refers to the directors' affair or behaviour. Deciding on the quality of 
the disclosure of directors' affairs allows management to influence the level of 
uncertainty faced by shareholders in monitoring the directors. Disclosure 
policies, which reduce the quality of information, increase the scope for 
opportunistic behaviour (Forker, 1992). The quality of disclosure therefore 
influences the quality of monitoring directors' opportunistic behaviour. Less 
disclosure impairs control and provides scope for opportunism (Forker, 1992). 
Opportunism according tc Williamson (1985) refers 'to the incomplete or 
distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, 
distort, obfuscate or otherwise confuse'. 
In order for the information to have the component of quality, firstly the 
information must be available in the annual reports, secondly the available 
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information must be adequately disclosed and thirdly the available and 
adeqUa.tely disclosed information must be important or superior to the ~sers for 
their intended purposes in the accounting systems from where they came from. 
Thus the quality of information comprises the elements of availability, adequacy 
and superiority. The availability of the particular item of information in the 
annual reports does not necessarily mean that the item is adequately disclosed 
and the adequately disclosed .information does not necessarily imply superiority. 
For example, the information on directors' remuneration can be disClosed as the 
total remuneration of all the directors in the annual report (availability) or the 
detailed remuneration of each individual director together with the comparative 
figures (adequacy), but this information not necessarily important to the users 
(superiority). 
The characteristics associated with disclosure quality have been discussed by 
Singhvi and Desai (1971), Moore and Buzby (1972), Buzby (1974a) and Kahl 
and Belkaoui (1981). It is a relative matter (Singhvi and Desai, 1971) and an 
abstract concept that cannot be measured directly (Cooke and Wallace, 1989). 
Most of the previous studies measure quality in term of availability and adequacy 
of information produced. However there is some confusion with the adequacy 
element of quality in the previous studies, which used the weights assigned by 
the users to determine the adequacy of the information. The use of weights 
assigned by the users in fact detetinines· the superiority of the information not the 
adequacy. In this· study, the availability, adequacy and superiority of the 
information are considered. The methods used to measure the availability, 
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adequacy and superiority are discussed in the section below and the methods 
adopted for this study are discussed in detail in the data and methodology 
chapter. 
4.3. Disclosure studies 
Sfudies on disclosure of information have been voluminous and varied,. drawing 
on many different theories, hypotheses and methodologies to argue the reasons 
for disclosure, the case for or against mandatory/voluntary disclosure (discussed 
in the previous chapter), and to measure the disclosure levels in annual reports of 
companies. The latter is the focus of this study, i.e. to measure the extent and 
quality of information relating to the directors' affairs disclosed in the annual 
reports of companies in an international setting. 
Most of the studies that measure disclosure levels attempt to investigate the 
association between corporate characteristics (e.g. size, leverage, profit, audit 
firm, liquidity, etc.) with the disclosure levels (e.g., Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1993; Wallace et a1, 1994, and 
Wallace and Naser, 1995) and only a relatively small number attempt to compare 
the disclosure levels in different countries (cross national) (e.g., Barret, 1976; and 
Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981 ). Some measure the evolution of disclosure levels over 
a period (e.g. Barret, 1976; Amemic and Maiocco, 1981; and Mars ton and 
Robson, 1997), while others measure disclosure levels in a single period (cross-
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sectional). Insome studies, oniy voluntary information is considered (e.g., Firth, 
1979; Chow andWong-Boren, 1987; Raffournier, 1991; Hossain, et al, 1994; and 
Botosan; 1997), while the others include both voluntary and· mandatory 
information (e.g. Singvi and Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973b; Barret, 1976; Cooke, 
1989a, and Marston and Robson, 1997). 
All the previous studies that attempt to measure the disclosure levels use the 
approach that the information is for an investment decision-making purpose, and 
not for monitoring or an agency/stewardship purpose. Although some have used 
agency theory in their studies (e.g., Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Ness and 
Mirza, 1991; and Hossain et al, 1994 ), this is limited to explaining (the reasons) 
why a company discloses information for decision making purposes more than 
that mandated or to see if selected company characteristics are able to explain the· 
differences in disclosure scores. No research that measures disclosure levels so 
far has attempted to explain why a company discloses information for monitoring 
or an agency/stewardship purpose more than that mandated or to compare the 
disclosure levels of information for monitoring purposes in different countries. 
In this study, the differences in disclosure levels of information relating to 
directors' behaviour (for monitoring purposes or from an agency ·perspective), 
both voluntary and mandatory, are compared between six western developed 
countries in a single period (cross~sectional). 
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4~3.1. Measurement of disclosure levels 
Various methods of disclosure studies .have been carried out previously. The 
most common methods used were: (1) to rank various items of information in 
order of their perceived importance to the producers and different users of 
financial statements (e.g. Baker and Haslem, 1973; Chandra, 1974; Belkaoui et 
al, 1977; Benjamin and Stanga, 1977; Chenhall and Juchau; 1977; Firth, 1978; 
Gray and Roberts, 1986; and Courtis, 1992). This method of disClosure studies 
simply ranks the perceptions of the users and the preparers of the fmancial 
statements, so there is no element of the extent and quality of disclosure being 
measured, (2) to evaluate the extent and/or quality of disclosure in the armual 
reports by comparing the observed disclosure with a checklist of desired 
information (e.g. Cerf, 1961; Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Choi 
1973a; Buzby, 1974b and 1975; Barret, 1975 and 1976; Stanga 1976; Kahl and 
Belkaoui, 1981; McNally et al, 1982; Robbins and Austin, 1986; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, 1988; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1993; Ness and 
Mirza, 1991; Hossain et al, 1994; Raffoumier, 1995; Ahmed, 1996; Inchausti, 
(1997); Patton and Zelenka, 1997; and Botosan, 1997). Such a list is usually 
referred to as a 'disclosure index' and has been carded out on armual reports in a 
single country or in an international setting. 
Other methods of disclosure studies used count all the data items (e.g., Brermam, 
1995), that is the number of words and numbers shown in the armual reports. 
This method is more objective than the disclosure index method, which may 
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grades disclosure as excellent, average or poor (Mars ton and Shrives, 1991 ). 
However, measuring ·information disclosure by counting data items . is not 
satisfactory because there are repetitions of certain numbers and words in aimual 
reports. Moreover, numbers ·cannot be viewed in isolation as having any 
information content; they need to be accompanied· by explanatory words 
(Mars ton and Shrives, 1991 ). Another method that deviates from the method of 
counting the words and numbers is to classify the information according to their 
fmeness (e.g Forker, 1992). Forker (1992) did not count the words and numbers, 
but instead, classified the disclosure quality of share options according to the 
fmeness of the information provided for the number of options granted, the 
exercise prices and the dates during which they can be exercised. 
In this study the method using the disclosure index is used. This is because the 
method (1) does not measure the extent and quality of disclosure, which is the 
main objective of this study, and the method of cotinting all the data items is not 
satisfactory (as discussed above). 
4.3.2. Disclosure index 
Disclosure index requires the preparation of extensive lists of selected items, 
which may be disclosed in company reports (Marston and Shrives, 1991). It can 
be used to measure the extent and quality of disclosure of a company's annual 
reports. Items chosen for the index are likely to be a fairly small sub-set of the 
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population of all the items that could be disclosed in the annual reports (Marston 
arid.Shrives, 1991). 
The disclosure index is the most widely used method to m~asure the dis~losure 
levels in the previous studies. From the review of the disclosure studies literature, 
Marston and Shrives· (1995) identified 32 studies using a disclosure index, 13 of 
which had been published in the 1990s. 
Previous researchers. that have attempted to test theories of disclosure have often 
used a disclosure index. A disclosure index is used to explain the differences in 
the level of disclosure. Hypotheses are formulated and various tests (such as 
univariate and/or multivariate) are used to see if selected company characteristics 
are successful in explaining different disclosure scores. The selection of 
explanatory variables can be theory driven, in which case one or more relevant 
theories are identified and the model follows from .the theory (Marston and 
Robson, 1997). The most frequently used theory in the modelling of the level of 
disclosure is agency theory, either alone, or in conjunction with other theories 
(Marston and Robson, 1997). However, not all models are explicitly theory 
driven, some studies use intuitive reasoning, perhaps involving an ad hoc mixture 
of theories, a review of the literature and common sense in order to construct 
their model (Marston and Robson, 1997). 
In order to construct a disclosure index, that is selecting a list of items most. 
appropriate for disclosure, most researchers have resorted to a review of the 
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investment, financial and accounting literature or they adopt the iteins selected by 
other researchers. In addition, some other items have been included on the basis 
. . 
of the researchers' perceptions of information relevant to the shareholders (Kahl 
and Belkaoui, 1981 ). The resulting indices have contained anywhere between· 17 
(Barret, 1976 and 1977) to 224 items (Cooke, 1989a) covering financial report 
items and accounting methods (qualitative and quantitative information). 
However, the items by Cooke ( 1989a) were grouped into six main groups. 
There are two ways in which index items were usually scored in the previous 
studies; an unweighted index and a weighted index. In an unweighted index 
(dichotomous scoring), disclosed items are scored as I, and non-disclosed items 
are scored 0 (e.g. Wallace, 1988; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, and 1991; Secord and 
Purwokusurno, 1993; Ahrned and Nicolls, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 
1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; and Botosan, 1997; etc.). In a weighted index, 
non-disclosed items are scored 0, while disclosed items carry different scores, 
based on their relative importance (e.g. Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Choi, 1973b; Buzby, 1974b and 1975; Barret, 1976 and 1977; Kahl and 
Belkaoui, 1981; Robbins and Austin, 1986; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; and 
Malone et al, 1993). Weights were assigned to each of the disclosure item of 
information in order to recognise the differences in the importance of their 
disclosure to the users ofthat information (Buzby, 1975). 
Choi (1973b) used both unweighted and weighted versions of the same index to 
compare disclosure in two different years. Choi (1973b) found that the use of 
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weights changed the ranking, and even the signs, of the differences in disclosure 
scores, but inade n~ significant differences to his re~ults. Robbins and Austin 
(1986) also showed there were no important differences in .their empirical results 
.if a simple disclosure index (unweighted) has been used instead of a compound 
_index (weighted); This perspective is also supported by Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1987, p. 536), who have shoWn that the Pearson correlation was 0.98 (p<O.OOO l) 
between the unweighted and weighted index, which in a statistical. sense 
indicates that almost identical results were obtained by using either an 
unweighted or a weighted index. 
In the previous studies, both an unweighted and a weighted index are assumed to 
assess the availability of information produced, and the second (weighted index) 
is assumed to incorporate some measure of adequacy and superiority of 
information. Here is where the confusion mentioned earlier in the above section 
arises, that is the use of an unweighted index (dichotomous scoring) to determine 
the availability of the information and a weighted to determine the adequacy and 
superiority of the information. In fact, the dichotomous index can be modified 
(modified dichotomous index) to measure the adequacy as well as the 
availability,. i.e. non-disclosed items are scored 0, while disclosed items carry 
different scores depending on how detailed the disclosure or the fineness of the 
disclosure is, similar to that adopted by Forker, ( 1992), but all disclosure items 
have the same maximum possible score (e.g. I 0 points, and it should be- noted 
that this point is not the weight). However, previous studies that have used 
weights, assigned a weight derived from the survey of users of information as the 
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maximum possible score, which means that the maximum possible score_ for each 
disClosure item is not the same. In order to measure the superiority of the 
information disclosed, the dichotomous index and modified dichotomous index 
could further be weighted, i.e. by multiplying the dichotomous scores and 
modified diChotomous scores by the weights (based on the importance of the 
items to the users of the information) to arrive at a weighted dichotomous index 
and a weighted modified dichotomous index. This approach is similar to that 
adopted by Rob bins and Austin ( 1986), which they termed the modified 
dichotomous index as a unidimensional (simple) index and the weighted 
modified diChotomous index as a compound index. However, Robbins and 
Austin, ( 1986) did not compute the dichotomous and weighted dichotomous 
indices 
The weighted dichotomous index assesses the availability and the superiority of 
the disclosed information, whereas, the weighted modified dichotomous index 
assesses the availability, adequacy and superiority of the disclosed information. 
These approaches are used in this study to measure the disclosure quality, i.e. the 
dichotomous index, modified dichotomous index, weighted dichotomous index 
and weighted modified dichotomous index. This approach is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5. 
In attempting to assign a weight to each item, most researchers have resorted to 
ask financial analysts to evaluate the importance of each item. This procedure 
was deemed impractical in an international setting because of the difficulty of 
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identifyingsuch analysts (Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981 ). Instead, Kahl and Belkaoui 
( 1981) asked fifteen business administration professors of the Faculty of 
Administration of the University of Ottawa, knowledgeable in international 
financial reporting, to rank each 'item on a ~cale of zero to fo"ur, with higher 
scores indicating greater importance. In view of the possibility that the sample of 
professors might not be an adequate proxy for users of bank annual reports, they 
. sent the same questionnaire to bank financial analysts. The ranking of items by. 
bank fmancial analysts was identical to that of the professors with slight but not . 
statistically significant differences in the weights (Kahl and Belkaoui, I 98 I). In 
certain cases, researchers adopted disclosure items and weights of the earlier 
researchers (with modification) (e.g. Choi, I973b; and Barret, 1976, I977). In 
this study the senior investment analysts were used to weigh the disclosure items, 
which is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
In the previous studies, the disclosure score derived from the disclosure index has 
been presented in several different ways. The most popular is by totalling the 
number of disclosure made by different groups, which can be either an 
unweighted or weighted measurement, and the mean weighted scores of different 
gro:.;ps. The highest and lowest individual company scores and the percentage of 
companies with zero and maximum scores were also presented. McNally et al 
(I 982) and Wallace ( 1988) presented the 'consistency rating' which relates the 
average score for an item to its weighting. 
I28 
In this study, the .construction of the disclosure index is discussed in the data and 
. . 
methodology chapter after considering the problems and . weakness of the 
method. 
4.3.3. Problems and weaknesses of disClosure index 
Even though the disclosure index has been widely used to measure the disclosure 
quality, it is not without it problems or weaknesses. The problems and 
weaknesses with a disclosure index have been thoroughly reviewed by Marston 
and Shrives ( 1991) and ( 1995) and by other researchers. 
The common problem experienced by previous researchers using a disclosure 
index is with the problem in awarding scores, that is problems with a partial 
score and decisions as to whether a non-disclosed item was, in fact, applicable to 
a particular company. Various methods have been utilised to overcome these 
problems. For example, to overcome the problem of partial scores, Buzby 
(1974b, 1975) classified the disclosure items into three groups: (1) contained 
items which were self contained, (2) consisted of items which could be disclosed 
in varying degrees of specificity, and (3) items that could be expressed in terms 
of sub-elements of information. Group (I) items are items that could either be 
disclosed or not, that is, 1 poirit- for disclosure and a 0 point for a non-disclosure. 
For group (2) items, the points are awarded based on the detail of the information 
given. In the case of earnings per shares for the next year, for example, half a 
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point was given if the financial statements provided only a general comment and 
a full point for a detailed or specific comment. In granting a partial score for 
group (3) items, Buzby (I 974b, 1975) distributed the maximum possible score 
(mean score used for weighting) among the sub-elements. Although the 
classification of the items into· various groups seems to overcome the problem of 
a partial score, it is still subjective. For example, a half point granted for a 
general comment in the case of earnings per share for the next year, does not 
necessarily mean that the disclosure is half as good as the detailed or specific 
comment. 
In the case of whether certain items may not be applicable to a particular 
company, Buzby (1974b and 1975) overcame this by selecting the items of 
disclosure that were relevant to all companies in the sample. However, if this is 
not possible, or desirable, index scores can be converted into relative scores by 
dividing the actual score by the maximum score possible for that company 
(Buzby, 1975). Since in the cases of non-disclosure it is not always clear whether 
the item is relevant or not, Cooke (1989) decided to read the whole of the annual 
report and make a suitable judgement as to whether an item was either not 
disclosed or not relevant to the company. 
Another problem with the disclosure index concerns the selection of the items of 
information. Mars ton and Shrives (1991) point out that, since the number of 
items that could possibly be disclosed is very large, practical reasons dictate 
taking a selection of items. In selecting the items, most researchers have resorted 
to a review of the investment, financial and accounting literature. They argue that 
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different user groups may view different items as being important. For example, 
Cooke (1989, p. 115) suites that: 'clearly one class of user will attach.diffen!nt 
. . . 
weights to an item than another class of user'. According to Marston and Shrives 
(1991,p. 201): 'information needs of different groups are likely to overlap even· 
though the main focus may differ; For example, financial analysts will be more 
interested in disclosure relating to financial performance_ and earnings potential 
whereas employee groups will be more interested in disclosures relating . to 
employment conditions, remuneration and job prospects'. It is therefore 
suggested that in selecting the items, the user group must be identified. Dhaliwal 
(1980) however argued that the items, which comprise the index, might not be 
correctly specified, even in the context of the investor user group, as they are 
based to a large extent on the perceptions of the financial analysts. Another 
criterion that should be considered in selecting the items is the purpose of the 
information. As discussed earlier, information can be used for decision-making, 
or for an agency/stewardship or monitoring purpose. Different purposes could 
lead to the selection of a different set of items. 
Another problem occurs when the selection of the items is carried out cross-
nationally. For example, Cooke and Wall ace ( 1989) have criticised the use of a 
disclosure index in a world survey of accounts by Tonkin (1989). The criticism is 
based on the argument that since there is no theory of financial reporting for the 
international capital operator, it is, therefore, difficult to assess the relevance, to 
the users, of the information items evaluated in the disclosure index. Cooke and 
Wallace (1989) point out that Linless one is aware of the needs of such a user, it 
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would be difficult to measure the quality of information found in the annual 
report of any company. 
Apart from the problems mentioned above there are also weaknesses of using a 
disclosure index. Firstly, it concerns the level of measurement that is whether it is 
the nominal scale, ordinal scale, the interval scale or the ratio scale. Seigel ( 1956) 
notes that in social sciences only the nominal and ordinal scale measurements are 
commonly achieved and suggests the use of non-parametric statistical tests. Since 
in the construction of a disclosure index, as mentioned earlier, it is subjective and 
based on the perception of certain user groups, and so it can only achieve an 
ordinal scale measurement. Therefore as suggested by Seigel ( 1956), only the 
non-parametric statistical tests can be used for the disclosure index measurement. 
Seigel ( 1956) also notes that the non-parametric statistical tests are less powerful 
than the parametric statistical tests. Therefore the statistical analysis derived from 
the results of a disclosure index measurement is less powerful. 
Secondly, the weakness of a disclosure index is associated with the use of 
weights. Previous researchers assigned weights to their items of disclosure by 
revi.;:wing the literature and surveying the relevant user group (see for example, 
Cerf, 1961, Buzby, 1974 and 1975). Cerf (1961) used integers (most probably the 
median) as the fmal weighting, whereas Buzby (1974 and 1975) used the means 
of the weights as the final weighting. Marston and Shrives (1991) notes that, if 
there is a large number of items in the index one might expect that the weighted 
and unweighted scores would give the same result. Ashton (1974) indicates that 
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individuals (even experts) have poor insight into their own judgement_process 
. . - . . ' . 
and therefore subjective weights are much more evenly distributed across the 
items than are. statistically derived weights. Due to this weakness of the · 
·disclosure index, many researchers have restricted their analysis to the 
unweighted scores (e.g. Cooke, 1989a, 1991,1993; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; 
and Botosan, 1997). The use of unweighted scores, as suggested earlier in the 
chapter, will only measure -the availability and the adequacy but not the 
superiority of the disclosure. Marston and Shrives ( 1991) conclude that, if a 
weighted index is used, then it is probably advisable to calculate unweighted 
scores as well to see the effect of the weighting on the ranking of companies. 
Even though var10us problems and weaknesses have been highlighted, many 
disclosure studies have made use of a disclosure index as a research tool. 
Marston and Shrives (1991 ,p. 207) argue that: 'one test of the usefulness of a 
research tool is the extent to which it is used. In this case it has persisted over 
time, from 1960s to the present, and has been used by many different researchers. 
A research tool will not continue to be used if it produced poor results.' This 
argument is supported by Botosan (1997, p. 335), 'prior studies that use 
disclosure indices to investigate the determinants of corporate disclosure levels 
have documented consistently strong and corroborative results. This prior work 
demonstrates that disclosure indices are a useful research tool.' However, this 
may be counter argued on the grolind that, researchers in their attempt to compete 
to publish their findings will used what ever methods available, without 
considering the problems and weaknesses of the method. From the review of 
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disclosure studies. literature, many researchers also did not provide evidence 
supporting its validity and reliability on the use of disclosu·re index. This can be 
seen, as discussed earlier, on the misconception on the use of weighted disclosure 
index by previous researchers. 
Although the methodology of disclosure index has been criticised, in this study 
the method is used. This is because there is no other best suitable method to 
measure disclosure quality. However, various modifications and improvements 
on the construction of the disclosure index to overcome the problems are made 
and it is discussed in the next chapter. The author is aware that, although various 
modifications and improvements are made, the problems and weaknesses cannot 
be eliminated completely. Therefore the ·author would like to remind, care should 
be taken in using the results of this study. 
4.4. Summary 
'Transparency', which is the buzzword of the committees and bodies formed to 
leak at the issues of corporate governance, means better information disclosure. 
Disclosure is a clear showing of a fact or condition on a balance sheet or other 
financial statement, in footnotes or in the audit report and is the process through 
which an entity communicates ·with ·the outside world. To be useful, the 
information disclosed must be of quality. Availability, adequacy and superiority 
are the components of disclosure quality. 
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·· The disclosure index is the most widely used method to measure disclosure 
quality. It is an extensive list o{ selected items, which may be disClosed in 
company annual reports or other. sources of information. In selecting the 
disclosure items, most researchers have resorted to a review of investment, 
financial, and accounting literature or sometimes relied on their own perception. 
There are two ways in which index items are scored, i.e. unweighted and 
weighted. However,· there is some confUsion in the use of weights in previous 
studies. The unweighted (dichotomous) index measures the availability of the 
inforlnation, whereas, the modified dichotomous index measures the adequacy of 
the information disclosed. The dichotomous index and the modified dichotomous 
index can further be weighted to measure the superiority of the information 
disclosed. However in the previous studies the modified dichotomous index is 
termed as a weighted index and is used to measure both the adequacy and 
superiority of information disclosed. 
Even though a disclosure index has been widely used to measure disclosure 
quality, it is not without its problems and weaknesses. The common problem 
experienced by previous researchers using a disclosure index is concerns the 
awarding of scores, that is problems with a partial score and the decision as to 
whether a non-disclosed item was, in fact, applicable to a particular company. 
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The construction of the disclosure index used in this :study is discussed in the 
next chapter; Apart from the con~truction of a disclosuie index, the data and 
methodology used in this study are also presented in the next chapter. 
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Cha,pter 5 
Data and Methodology 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on disclosure studies. This chapter 
introduces the data and discusses the methodology used in this study. It justifies 
the selection of countries, companies, and the accounting period. This chapter 
also discusses the methodological issues in the construction of a disclosure index, 
a questionnaire survey to weight the index, the reliability and validity of the 
disclosure index and the statistical analysis used in this study. 
In section 5.2, the selection of countries, companies and accounting period are 
presented and justified. The construction of the disclosure index is discussed in 
section 5.3. This section describes the selection of disclosure items, the 
measurement of disclosure quality and the development of a questionnaire to 
weight the disclosure items. Section 5.4 discusses the reliability and validity of 
the disclosure index as a measurement tool. The statistical analyses used in this 
study are presented in section 5.5 and the summary of the chapter is in section 
5.6. 
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5.2. Selection of Countries, Companies and Accounting Period 
s~2.1. Selection of Countries 
Countries covered in this study were chosen. on several criteria. Firstly, each 
country selected had to be from a 'developed' country as classified by Nobes 
(1983) (see Figure 2.1). The reasons for selecting Nobes's classification in this 
study are discussed in Chapter 2. Secondly, within the developed countries in the 
Nobes' classification, it had to be from a different family or sub-class. Thirdly, 
the countries must be the current board member countries of the IASC and 
OECD. An additional criterion, for the selection of the countries, is that the 
countries had to have many large companies listed on their stock exchanges. 
These criteria were based on the concept of 'vital countries' proposed by Ma5on 
(1978). Mason ( 1978) suggested that the harmonisation of financial reporting 
could only be achieved with the support of certain countries. Since this study 
attempts to recommend a regulation or standard on the disclosure of information 
relating to directors' behaviour based on the current practices of various 
countries, it is important to choose the countries that can harmonise the financial 
reporting as suggested by Mason (1978). 
Parker (2000) translated the concept of 'vital countries' as countries with 
economic significance and accounting significance. They suggest that economic 
significance can best be judged by listing the home countries of the world's 
largest companies and the world's largest stock exchanges, whereas accounting 
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. significance cari be measured by the size of a country's accountancy profession, 
whether or not its· accountancy firms have. grown into international firms, are 
founder membership of the IASC and. are acting as host to an international 
congress of accountants: 
However, in this study, an economically significance country is defined as a 
developed country. This is because developed countries are the home of world's 
largest companies and the world's largest stock exchanges. In this study the 
accounting significance country is based on the membership (board member 
countries) of the IASC (Exhibit 5.1) and OECD (Exhibit 5.2). The membership 
of the IASC and OECD are set as criteria in selecting the countries in this study 
because of their objectives to work generally for the improvement and 
harmonisation of regulations, accounting standards and procedures relating to the 
presentation of financial statements (Nobes, 2000), which is the focus of this 
study. Other criteria such as the size of a country's accountancy profession, 
whether or not its accountancy firms have grown into international fllTils, as 
suggested by Parker (2000), are not considered in this study because these 
criteria are interdependent. For example, a strong accountancy profession ts 
unlikely to grow up in a country of little economic importance (Parker, 2000). 
Apart from the weaknesses of the classification by other researchers (discussed 
earlier in Chapter 2), the 'developed' countries as classified by Nobes were taken 
as the sampling frame in this study because they are the ancestors for most of the 
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Australia. 
Canada. 
France. 
Germany. 
India and Sri Lanka. 
Japan. 
Malaysia. 
Mexico. 
Netherlands. 
Nordic Federation (includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
United Kingdom .. 
United States of America. 
International Co-ordinating Committee of Financial Analysts Association. 
Swiss Federation oflndustrial Holding Companies. 
Exhibit 5.1 
IASC Board Memb'!rs for the two and a half year term ending on 
31 December 1997. 
(Source: Cairns. D. ( 1995), Guide to Applying International Accounting 
Standard, Accountancy Books, p. 12.) 
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Onginal Member Countries. 
Austria. 
Belgium. 
Canada. 
Derunark. 
France. 
Germany. 
Iceland. 
Ireland. 
Italy. 
Luxembourg. 
Netherlands. 
Norway. 
Portugal. 
Spain. 
Sweden. 
Switzerland. 
Turkey. 
United Kingdom. 
United States of America. 
Countries became men;tbers through 
accession(at dates indicated). 
Japan (28th April 1964). 
Finland (28th January 1969). 
Australia (7th June 1971 ). 
New Zealand (29th May 1973) .. 
Mexico (18th May 1994). 
Czech Republic (21st December 1995). 
Hungary (7th may 1996). 
Poland (22"d November 1996). 
Korea (l zth December 1996). 
Exhibit 5.2 
Member Countries of the OECD 
(Source: OECD ( 1998), A Report to the OECD by the Business Sector Advisory 
Group on Corporate Governance, OECD, Paris, p.2). 
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accounting systems found internationally (Roberis et al, 1996). Prior researches 
also found that the level of financial disClosure in annual reports is positively 
related to the efficiency of the capital markets (see for example, Choi, 1973b and 
Barret 1976). 
It may, therefore, be inferred that the more developed the country, the more 
efficient the capital market and the greater the level of disclosure in the annual 
reports. The developing and underdeveloped countries were excluded in this 
study because they are likely to follow the disclosure pattern of their ancestors or 
their level of disclosure will be very low and be rarely viewed as useful to serve 
the needs of shareholders. 
Within the micro-based class (see Figure 2.1), the Netherlands, United Kingdom 
and Canada are chosen. Even though the United States of America (USA) fall 
under the same family as Canada (i.e., having a US influence) and being a 
member country of both the IASC and OECD, they are.not selected because most 
of the information relating to the directors' behaviour of companies in the USA 
are disclosed in the 10-K report. This step is taken to avoid an invalid and biased 
comparison of the annual reports of companies in the different countries. Under 
the UK influence family, New Zealand and Ireland are excluded because they are 
not members of either IASC or OECD or both. Furthermore, New Zealand and 
Ireland have few large companies as compared with the United Kingdom. 
Australia is excluded even though it is a member of both the IASC and OECD, 
because Australia has fewer large companies as compared with the United 
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. . 
Kingdom. The Netherlands is selected because they fall under a sub-class of their 
. . 
mvn (i.e., the business ~conomics, theory sub~class), and are member of the 
IASC and OECD. Within the macro-uniform class, France, Germany, and 
Sweden are selected in this study. France is selected to represent the tax-based 
family, because the other three countries in the same family (i.e., Belgium, Spain 
and Italy) are not members of the IASC. Within the law-based family, both the 
countries (i.e., Japan and Germany) are members of the IASC and OECD and 
have many large companies. In this situation, the country is selected based on 
convenience, that is, in favour of Germany. Sweden is selected because it is from 
a sub-class of its own and is a member of the IASC and OECD. 
The countries selected in this study are, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, France, Germany, and Sweden. 
5.2.2. Selection of companies and accounting periods 
The companies used in this study, to represent the countries chosen above, were 
not selected at random because of the complicated nature of the criteria used in 
the selection of the sample country and companies. One of the purposes of this 
study is to make comparisons between the developed countries who are board 
members of IASC and OECD, with respect to the quality of information relating 
to directors' behaviour disclosed in the annual reports. 
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. Choi (l98l) suggests. that, in order to make international comparisons as. valid as 
. . 
. . . . -· .·.. . . 
possible, it is important to match companies.by size and activity. The companies 
in which agency problems are more prominence are usually the l~ger(base<lon 
the nilmber of shareholders) public limited companies. Prior research has 
demonstrated that agency costs increase with the amount of outside capital (for 
example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the proportion of outside capital tends 
to · be ·higher for larger firms (Leftwich et a!, 1981 ). Large public limited 
. . 
companies from the six countries chosen thus formed the population from which 
the samples were selected. The companies in this study were restricted to large 
public limited companies so as to increase the homogeneity of the sample. The 
activity of the companies is· not considered in this study based on the assumption 
that agency problems associated with agency relationship exist in all sectors of 
the economy (activity). 
The largest companies (based on capital employed as a surrogate for the number 
of shareholders) for the UK, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Sweden 
were selected from the list of Europe's Top 1000 of the Times 1000 (1997). The 
companies from the list were classified according to countries. There were 46 
Dutch companies from the. list, which is the smallest among the five countries, 
Sweden 57, France 140, Germany 141, and the UK 283. Since the number of 
companies from each country was not equal, the Dutch companies were taken as 
the base sample in . which companies from other countries were matched. The 
Canadian companies were selected from the North America's Top lOO of the 
Times 1000 (1997). However, due to the small number of Canadian companies 
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.- . . 
that can be matched ~ith the Dutch companies, the Canadian companies from the 
. . . . 
Toronto, Montreal ~d Vancouver Stock Exchange (extracted from the intemet) 
' . ' . - ' .· 
' . . 
were also used. The capital employed of companies from the Toronto, M~ntreal 
and Vancouver Stock Exchange were calculated based on the definition used in 
the Times 1000 (1997, p. 11): 'Capital employed: shareholder's funds plus long-
term loans (where separately disclosed) plus intracgroup payables plus deferred 
liabilities excluding (for instance companies) technical reserve'. The capital 
employed was converted from Canadian dollar to pounds sterling at the average 
rate in 1996. 
The 1996 (between January 1996 to 31 December 1996) annual reports 
(English version) for the companies selected were requested from the companies 
themselves. There were 34 annual reports (English version) for each country 
obtained from the companies (204 annual reports for the entire sample). The 
companies selected are listed in Appendix 2. 
One of the purposes of this study is to analyse the current disclosure practices of 
the sample countries and it is therefore important to analyse the latest annual 
reports. However, due to the time constraints of this study, and the reporting lag 
for the annual report it is impossible to compare the most recent annual report. 
Alford et al (1993) have identified that the reporting lag for an annual report can 
vary from 3 months in the United States to 11 months in the Netherlands (when 
extended by the shareholders). If special extensions are ignored, Germany has the 
longest annual reporting lag of 8 months among the sample countries. The annual 
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reporting requirements of the sample countries, identified· by AI ford et a! {1993), 
. are as follows: Canada, 140 .to 170 days after· the fiscal year-end; United 
. . 
· Kingdom, 6 months from the fisc~! year-end; Netherlands, 5 months; France 4 
months; Gennany 8 months; and Sweden 6 months from the fiscal year"end. It 
should also be noted that the English version of the annual reports for the 
Netherlands, France, Gennany, and Sweden are usually published after the 
annual reports in their own language have been published. Due to these 
problems, the fiscal year 1996 was chosen for this study. This study limits the 
analysis to one year because prior research shows that the disclosure policies of 
companies remain relatively constant over time. For example Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) identified that finns' disclosure policies may be "sticky" from 
year to year. They noticed that, from causal observation of annual reports; the 
general content of annual reports remains relatively constant over time. 
Companies' infonnation may be disclosed through various ways. For example, 
through annual reports, Datastream, trade journals, proxy statements, and interim 
statements. Lang and Lundholm (1993) using the set of corporate disclosure 
rankings produced by the Association for Investment Management and Research 
documented a significant .rank-order correlation (with a coefficient of 0.6:2) 
between the annual report and other publication disclosure rankings. According 
to Botosan ( 1997), this suggests that a measure of disclosure level produced by 
examining any one aspect of corporate reporting could proxy for the general level 
of disclosure provided by a finn. The annual report. was ranked second in tenns 
of importance after personal interviews by investment analysts and institutional 
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investors in ~ research conducted by Bene~ et a! ( 1995). Based on the above 
assumption· arid research findings, this study· used only the annual reports of 
. . . . 
companies· to measure the quality of disclosure relating to the directors' 
.. 
behaviour since it can serve as a proxy for the amount of disclosure provided by· 
a company across all financial information sources and an important source of 
financial information to the investment analysts and institutional investors. 
Descriptive statistics for the sample companies are provided in Table 5. 1. The 
mean capital employed of the 34 companies from each sample country varied 
from £2,143,336,000 (Sweden) to £3,191,728,000 for Germany and the standard 
deviation varied from £2,247,053,000 for Sweden to £4,005,418,000 for 
Germany. Even though the samples were selected from large companies, the data 
indicated a wide range of company size (seeTable 5.1). 
For the entire sample of 204 companies from the six countries, the mean capital 
employed was £2,953,092,000 with a standard deviation of £3,556,773,000. The 
company size based on capital employed varied from £308,958,000 (Canada) to 
£15,420,349,000 in Germany. 
U.K. Netherlands Canada Germany France Sweden 
'000 '000 '000 '000 '000 '000 
Mean 3,025,245 3,106,510 2,614,318 3,191,728 3,149,865 2,143,336 
Std.Dev. 3,607,723 3,787,555 2,616,209 4,005,418 3,761,665 2,247,053 
Highest 14,034,000 14,713,516· 14,724,970 15,420,349 13,974,571 9,271,968 
Lowest 334,300 338,717 308,958 332,569 378,919 341,277 
Table 5.1 
Descriptive statistics of sample companies 
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Due to the wide range:of company size, a 'one-way analysis of variance' was 
carried outto test for a significant difference of the company size. The. results of 
the 'One-way An~lysis of Variance' are presented in Table .5.2: The F Ratio of 
. . 
.4212 indicates that, at the 5% level ofsignificance, the size of the. company is 
not significantly different. 
Source D.F. 
Between Groups 5 
Sum of square Mean sQuares 
2.6342E+I3 5.2685E+I2 
Table 5.2 
ONE-WAY Analysis of Variance 
5.3. Construction of the disclosure index. 
5.3.1. Disclosure index 
F Ratio F Prob; 
.4212 .8336 
The construction of the disclosure index has been thoroughly discussed in 
chapter 4. In the following sections, the methodological issues of the construction 
of the disclosure index are discussed. The focus of this study is to measure the 
quality (extent) of information relating to directors' affairs disclosed in the 
annual reports of companies in an international setting. There are various ways in 
which the extent of disclosure can be measured in the annual reports. Carpenter 
et a! (1971 ), for example, measured the extent of disclosure by requesting 
analysts to rate each item of information along tWo dimensions based on their 
perceptions of how much information is currently reported and how much 
information should be reported. The difference between the two measures for 
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each· item would represent a measure of disclosure deficiency. However, due to 
the difficulties and the weakness of this approach (see Buzby, 1974), most 
researchers in disclosure studies have used another approach,· known as the 
disclosure index, jn tileir attempt to measure the extent of disClosure (for 
example, Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1974 and 1975;. Barret, 1976 and 
1977; Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; Wiseman, 1982; Firth, 1984; Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1991; Secord and Purwokusumo, 1993; 
Ahmed and Nicolls, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Patton and 
Zelenka, 1997; and Botosan, 1997). 
As mentioned earlier in chapter 4, disclosure indices are extensive lists of 
selected items, which may be disclosed in company reports (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991) .. Many researchers have used a disclosure index since 1961 by 
Cerf to the present. Despite various arguments on the validity and reliability of 
disclosure index as a research tool (discussed in earlier chapter), this method is 
used in this study because there is no other best suitable method to measure 
disclosure quality. However, various improvements and modifications are made 
to overcome the problems and weaknesses of disclosure index and are presented 
in the following sections. " 
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5.3.2~ Selection of Disclosure Items 
In the discussion ofdisclosure items' selection, it was noted that the items used 
in the previous studies were selected by reviewing the investment, financial and 
accounting literature. These methods are also used in this study together with 
reviewing the financial reporting practices in the sample countries. The 
disclosure items in previous studies were usually based, to some extent, on the 
· perceived corporate fmanCial information needs of financial analysts for 
decision-making purposes. This criterion is not used in this study; instead the 
disclosure items were based on perceived ·corporate information needs of 
shareholders for monitoring directors' behaviour. 
The items of information resulting from the selection process were commented 
on by persons familiar in the field of corporate governance/agency theory, i.e. 
those who attended the 'Corporate Governance: Developing a Charter for 
Success' forum held on I November 1996 organised by The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales or those who have written articles 
in the area of corporate governance (see Appendix 3 for the list of persons 
participated in commenting the items}. They were required to commei"it on the 
3:ppropriateness of the items from the point of view of the shareholders to 
· monitor directors' affairs. The 23 disclosure items for this study derived from· 
reviewing the relevant literature and after considering th.,: comments. of the above 
persons listed in Appendix 3 are presented in Table 5.3. 
ISO 
. ! . .' 
. I . Information ori the terms of the directors' service contract or a statement stating 
tbat there was no ser\tiCe contract. 
2 Auditor's report on coworate:governance matters: 
3 Information on corporate governance (compliance with corporate governance 
guidelines or the awareness of the current corporate governance debate). 
4 4. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 
5 Disclosure of related party transactions between the directors and the company or 
a statement that there was no related party transaction between directors and the 
company. 
. . 
6 Information on the independence of the directors. 
7 Directors' other directorship/offices or a statement that there were no 
other directorships/offices .. 
8 Directors' date of appointment or year. of service. 
9 Composition of board of directors. 
10 Directors' ages. 
11 Directors' qualifications .. 
12 Details of audit committee. 
l3 Details of remuneration/compensation committee. 
14 Details of internal control. 
15 Details of nomination committee. 
16 Details of board of director's meeting/working method. 
17 Details of directors' salary/fee. 
18 Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar 
payments. 
19 Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 
. 
20 Details of directors' pension schemes. 
21 Directors' ·emoluments (remuneration). 
22 Details of directors' interest in shares or a statement stating that the directors hold 
no shares in the company. 
23 Details of directors' share option scheme. 
Table 5.3 
Disclosure items relating to directors' behaviour. 
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The disclosure items used m this study were divided into three groups (see 
Appendix 4), similar to that used by Buzby (1974 and 1975). Group i 
. . . . 
represented items, which were self-contained.' These, items were either present or 
not present in the annual reports without any details of specificity or. sub-
elements being given (for example item number 8, directors' date of appointment 
. ' 
or year of service). Group 2 consisted of those items, which could be disclosed in 
varymg degrees of specificity: For example, item number 9, 'the composition of 
the board of directors', can be presented in the annual reports by giving all the 
directors' names together with .their photographs or the directors' names and 
photograph of certain directors or just by giving the directors' names. 
The fmal group represented categories of information, which could be expressed 
in terms of sub-elements of information. Item 17, details of directors' salary/fee, 
for example, could be disclosed in sub-elements, i.e. (i) salary/fee of each 
individual director; (ii) total directors' salary/fee of all the directors for the 
current year; and (iii) total directors' salary/fee of all directors comparative 
figures. Development of the relevant sub-elements was based on an extensive 
review of relevant literature. In this study the sub-elements were limited to the 
most important items so as to make it manageable to carry out. The list of sub~ 
elements for each of the applicable items could be thought of as a type of 
minimum disclosure set. 
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5.3.3. Measurement of Disclosure 
A scoring worksheet was developed to measure the quality of disclosure· of the 
23 items of information in the sample of 204 annual reports of the six countries. 
The worksheet consisted of a listing, grouping and scoring of the items of 
information is shown in Appendix 4. 
As mentioned in the earlier chapter, there are two ways in which index items are 
usually scored, i.e., a dichotomous scoring system (disclosed items are scored as 
1, and non-disclosed items are scored 0) and a modified dichotomous system 
(non-disclosed items are scored 0 and disclosed items carry different scores). 
These scoring systems can be either weighted or unweighted. Researchers in 
disclosure studies have previously either used the unweighted (e.g., Copeland 
and Fredericks, 1968; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, and Botosan, 1997), or the 
weighted system (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buiby, 1974b and 1975), or both 
methods (e.g., Choi, 1973b; Barret, 1976 and 1977, and Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987). 
There was however, a misconception in the used of the scoring systems by 
researchers previously, especially those who used the weighted and both the 
. weighted and unweighted systems. They tended to assume a dichotomous system 
was the same as an unweighted and a modified dichotomous system was 
weighted. Both dichotomous and modified dichotomous systems can actually be 
weighted or unweighted. For example, Buzby (1974b and 1975) and Barret, 
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(1975 .and 1976) m their research used the weights assigned by investment 
analysts as the scores for their disclosure items. 
Buzby (1974b and 1975) used the weights assigned by the analysts for his three 
groups of disclosure items. For group I items (items which were self-contained), 
he gave the maximum weight assigned by analysts for that item if disclosed and 
. zero if not disclosed. In the group 2 items (items which. could be disclosed in 
varying degrees of specificity), full credit (maximum weight assigned for that 
item) was given for the specific disclosure of that item. A partial credit was given 
for a less specific disclosure and zero for non-disclosure. The weights assigned 
by the analysts were split among the sub-elements of the items in his group 3 
items. Points were given for every sub-element disclosed and the maximum score 
equal to the weight assigned to that item. 
The use of weights assigned by the analysts as scores for the disclosure items at 
the early stage (in the worksheet) will complicate the disclosure measurement 
and make the comparison between the weighted and unweighted scoring systems 
invalid. Weights should not be used as scores; instead weights should be used as 
a weighing mechanism to determine the importance or in the context of this study 
the superiority of the disclosure item. When weights assigned by analysts were 
used as scores for the disclosure items in the weighted index, this will lead to 
different maximum scores for each discfosure item, i.e. will vary according to the 
weights assigned by the analysts. Whereas, for the unweighted index (method 
used by previous researchers), the maximum scores for each item of disclosure is 
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equal to l. Since the scores for the. two systems are not on the same basis, 
~orriparison between the syste~s can be misleading imd invalid. La~g and 
Lundholm (i99J, p. 269) .in their conclusion have cautioned against the use of 
weights as disclosure scores, ' ... use of these disclosure scores is not without its 
dangers, particularly because the data are based on analysts' ratings rather than 
the disclosures themselves'. 
To overcome the problem, in this study, the dichotomous index (unweighted), 
modified dichotomous index (unweighted), weighted dichotomous index, and 
weighted modified dichotomous index are used to measure the quality of the 
disclosure of information relating to directors' behaviour. These methods are 
used because they can measure the three elements of quality, i.e. availability, 
adequacy, and superiority of disclosure (discussed earlier in chapter 4). The 
dichotomous index can only measure the availability of disclosure, whereas the 
modified dichotomous index can measure both the availability and adequacy of 
disclosure. The weighted dichotomous index measures the availability and 
superiority. The weighted modified dichotomous index measures all the three 
elements of quality. 
Even though the weighted modified dichotomous index can measure the three 
elements of quality, the unweighted index was introduced in this study to 
compensate for three potential limitations of the weightings. First, since these 
weightings were obtained through a survey and without real economic 
consequences to the respondents, they may not fully reflect investment analysts' 
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actual use of t:ach item. Second, the investment analyst is only a surrogate for the 
. . 
sh~eholders. Third, the used of only the United Kingdom investment analysts in 
this study are onJy a subset of annuai reports users in the world .. The perceptions 
of investment analysts from other countries of the disclosure items may not be 
the same as those of analysts in the United Kingdom. Therefore, the use of an 
unweighted dichotomous index and an unweighted modified dichotomous index 
. ' 
allows an analysis free of the perceptions of a particular user group. 
The dichotomous index (unweighted .and weighted) was introduced to overcome 
the subjectivity of allocating scores to the disclosure items in the modified 
dichotomouS index. 
5.3.3.1. Dichotomous index (unweigbted and weighted) 
For the dichotomous index (unweighted) adopted in this study, an item is scored 
1 if it is disclosed, 0 if it is not disclosed and 'NR' if the item is not relevant to 
the company, for all the 23 disclosure items in the three groups discussed above. 
The problem of whdher to penalise a company for non-disclosure of information 
that was not relevant to it is discussed later. In the case of the weighted 
dichotomous index, an item score under the unweighted dichotomous index was 
multiplied by the weight of that item, as assigned by_ investment analysts, to 
arrive at the weighted score of that item. 
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"5.3.3~2. Modified dichotomous index (unweighted and weighted) 
In the modified dichotomous 'index (unweighted) the maximum possible score of 
10 points can be given for each disclosure item, depends on the fineness or the 
specificity of the information on the item disclosed. As mentioned above, in this 
study the disclosure items. were grouped into three groups, i.e~ group 1, self-
contained items; group 2, items with varying degrees of specificity; and group 3, 
items which could be expressed in terms of sub-elements (fineness). Each itetn in 
group 1 is given 10 points if disClosed, 0 if it is not disclosed, and 'NR' if it is not 
relevant or applicable to the company (discussed below). For group 2 items, the 
10 maximum possible points allocated depend on the degrees of specificity of the 
item. For example where there are only two degrees of specificity for the item, a 
maximum of 10 points is allocated to the higher degree, and 5 points for a lower 
degree of disclosure. If the item is not disclosed, 0 point is given, subject· to 
whether that item is relevant to the company or not. In the case of group 3 items, 
the maximum 10 points are divided equally between the sub-elements. Scores for 
this category of items are the sum of every sub-elements disclosed in the annual 
report. However, if the information on that item is not disdosed at all, 0 point is 
given, and 'NR' if it is not relevant to the company. Details of the scoring system 
for each item of disclosure are given in Appendix 4. In the case of the weighted 
modified dichotomous index, an item score under the unweighted modified 
dichotomous index was multiplied by the weight of that item, as assigned by 
investment analysts, to arrive at the weighted score of that item. 
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5.3.3.3. Not relevant items 
It should be noted that previous disclosure studies did experienced a number of 
practical problems in awarding.scores. The major problem was to decide whether 
a non-disclosed item was, in fact; relevant to a particular company. Certain items 
of disclosure may not be relevant to a particular company and they should not be 
penalised for non-disclostire. Singhvi and Desai, (1971) ignored this problem, 
they assumed that the failure to disclose a particular item was non-disclosure. 
Buzby, (1974 and 1975) defmed the relevance of an item of disclosure to a 
specific company in terms of whether or not it was included in the annual 10-K 
report filed with the SEC. Barret (1976 and 1977), however, did not test for 
relevance, instead he selected the item that was seen as being important enough 
to investors that omission from the 10-K report alone (or its approximate foreign 
equivalent) was not viewed as adequate justification for classifying the item as 
inapplicable. This method is not reliable because there is an element of bias 
toward those items, which the researcher believes to be relevant and important. 
Buzby's method of testing that an item is relevant or not relevant seems reliable, 
but in a cross national disclosure study it is difficult to find the foreign equivalent 
of the 10-K report. This would lead to an invalid conclusions because the 
researchers are not comparing like with like. 
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Cooke ( l989a) adopted a. different approach. Where there was no mention in the 
annual report of a disclosure item, it was concluded that the· item -(}f disclosure 
. ' . . 
was not relevant to that company, and so the company was not penalised for non-
disclosure of information. Cooke (l989a) acknowledged that this procedure 
introduces an element of subjectivity to the disclosure measm:ement. Cooke 
( l989a), however, decided to read the whole of the annual report and make a 
suitable judgement as to whether an item was either not disclosed or not relevant 
to the company. 
Since this study is carried out in an international setting, the method used by 
Buzby (1974 and 1975) is not suitable. This study used a combination of the 
methods adopted by Barret (1976 and 1977) and Cooke (l989a). For items that 
can either be disclosed or not disclosed (for example item number 10, 'director's 
age), and items that are viewed as very important in corporate governance 
literature, such as item number 12, details of 'audit committee', the method used 
by Barret (1976 and 1977) was followed. For other items, the method adopted by 
Cooke (1989a), i.e. a thorough review of the whole annual report to identify the 
applicability of the item, was used. 
5.3.3.4. Overall disclosure quality 
To measure the overall quality of disclosure, this study used the disclosure points 
average (DPA) for the unweighted dichotomous index, unweighted modified 
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dichotomous index, weighted dichotomous index· and weighted·. ~odified 
dichotomous index. This· approach is simihir to the 'grade point average' (GPA) 
. used in calculating students' examination grades in most American colleges and 
univernities.·In calculating DPA the aimual reports are viewed as the examination 
.·answer scripts of students and the scoring woi"ksheet as the marking scheme. 
DPA for a gtven company m an unweighted (dichotomous and modified 
dichotomous) index is defined as the sum of actual scores awarded to the relevant 
item divided by the sum of relevant items. 
n 
LDri 
i=l 
DPA(unweighted) = ___ _ 
n 
L CL· 
. I 
t=l 
Where Dr =the disclosure score of each relevant item, 
CL =a zero-one variable representing the level of applicability, and 
n = the total number of items (n = 23). 
For the weighted (dichotomous and modified dichotomous) index, the DPA for-a 
given firm is defmed as the sum of actual scores awarded for each relevant item 
multiplied by the weight assigned for the relevant item divided by the sum of the 
relevant weights. 
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Where Dr = the disclosure score of each relevant item, 
a = a zero-one variable representing the level of applicability, 
W r = the median weight assigned by investment analysts for each 
relevant item, and 
n =the total number of items (n = 23). 
Examples of the calculations of the unweighted dichotomous DPA, unweighted 
modified dichotomous DPA, weighted dichotomous DPA, and weighted 
modified dichotomous DPA are shown below. The unweighted and weighted 
DPA calculations based on the above methods for all the sample companies are 
presented and analysed in the next chapter. 
5.3.3.5. Individual item disclosure quality 
Apart from calculating and c0mparing the overall disclosure quality of the 
sample companies, this study also calculates and analyses the disclosure quality 
of each individual disclosure item for the six sample countries. As discussed 
earlier, disclosure quality comprises availability, adequacy, and superiority. The 
weighted index is said to measure the superiority of an item over another item 
(between the disclosure items). However, in comparing within each individual 
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Example: Unweighted dichotomous DPA 
Company/Country: British Gas/United Kingdom 
Disclosure item Disclosure Score (Dr) Alpha (a.) 
I 
2 
3 
4 I 
5 I 
6 I 
7 I I 
8 I I 
9 I I 
10 I I 
11 . 0 I 
12 I I 
13 I I 
14 I I 
IS I I 
16 I I 
17 I I 
18 NR 0 
19 I 
20 I 
21 I 
22 I 
23 I 
Total 21 22 
Unweighted dichotomous DPA = 0.955 
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Example: Unweighted modified dichotomous DPA 
.. 
Company/Country: British Gas/United Kingdom 
Disclosure item Disclosure Score (Dr) Alpha (a) 
I 10 
2 10 
3 10 
4 10 
5 10 I 
'6 10 I 
7 10 I 
·8 10 I 
9 10 I 
10 10 I 
11 0 I 
12 7.5 I 
13 10 I 
14 5 I 
15 7.5 I 
16 5 I 
17 10 I 
18 NR 0 
19 10 I 
20 10 I 
21 5 I 
22 10 I 
23 10 I 
Total 190 22 
Unweighted modified dichotomous DPA = 8.636 
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Example: Weighted dichotomous DPA 
Company/Country: British Ga5/United Kingdom 
Disclosure item Disclosure Score (Dr) Weight (W) Alpha (a) ·wa DrWa 
I 1 3 3 3 
2 I 3 3 3 
3 I 3 3 3 
4 I 2 2 2 
5 I 4 4 4 
6 I 3 3 3 
7 I 2 2 2 
8 I 2 2 2 
9 I 3 3 3 
10 I 2 I 2 2 
11 0 2 I 2 0 
12 I 3 I 3 3 
13 I 3 I 3 3 
14 I 3 I 3 3 
15 I 2 I 2 2 
16 I 2 I 2 2 
17 I 3 I 3 3 
18 NR 4 0 0 NR 
19 3 I 3 3 
20 2 I 2 2 
21 4 4 4 
22 4 4 4 
23 4 4 4 
Total 62 60 
Weighted dichotomous DPA = 0.968 
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.Example: Weighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Company/Country: British Gas/United Kingdom 
Disclosure item Disclosure Score (Dr) Weight (W) Alpha (a) Wa. DrWa 
I 10 3 I . 3 30 
2 10 ~ . I 3 30 .) 
3 10 3 I 3 30 
4 10 2 I 2 20 
5 10 4 I 4 40 
6 10 3 3 30 
7 10 2 2 20 
8 10 2 2 20 
9 10 3 3 30 
10 10 2 2 20 
I I 0 2 2 0 
12 7.5 3 3 22.5 
13 10 ~ 3 30 .) 
14 5 3 3 15 
15 7.5 2 2 15 
16 5 2 2 10 
17 10 3 I 3 30 
18 NR 4 0 0 NR 
19 10 3 I 3 30 
20 10 2 I 2 20 
21 5 4 I 4 20 
22 10 4 I 4 40 
23 10 4 I 4 40 
Total 62 542.5 
Weighted modified dichotomous DPA = 8.75 
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. . 
item between·different.countries, the weighted index has no effect because each 
. . . 
individual item is of the same superiority (this is shown in the next chapter). · 
Since the weighted index has no effect, ·in this study only the unweighted 
dichotomous index and unweighted modified dichotomous index are calculated 
and analysed for each individual item. The unweighted dichotomous. index for a 
disclosure item is calculated by taking the percentage of companies disclosing 
the item, i.e. the number of companies disclosing the item divided by the number 
of companies where the item is relevant. The unweighted modified dichotomous 
index for a disclosure item is calculated by taking the percentage of the average 
disclosure scores awarded to the item against the maximum possible score and 
after considering not relevant item. Apart from comparing between the countries 
and the between the disclosure items, the percentage calculated is also used to 
. construct the consensus scores (adopted from Khal and Belkaoui, 1981) and to 
determine the best practice country for each disclosure item. The results and 
analyses of the unweighted dichotomous index and the unweighted modified 
dichotomous index for each individual item for the six sample countries are 
· presented in the next chapter. 
5.3.4. Development of the Questionnaire (weighting the disclosure items) 
In attempting to assign weights to each item, most previous studies have resorted 
to asking fmancial analysts to evaluate the importance of each item. In this study 
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the most appropriate persons to- evaluate the ·importance of.the items are the 
- shareholders .. · Howe~er. due to the small ownership . of shares .by- individual 
,.,shareholders (Mall in, 1997) and the hick of interest for them to monitor directors, 
behaviour, only the institutional shareholders are available for the task. Since the 
institutional shareholders are not individual persons, the -most appropriate 
persons to evaluate. the disclosure items are the analysts employed by the 
institutional shareholders. This procedure was deemed impractical in an 
international setting because of the difficulty- in identifying such analysts (Khal 
and Belkaoui, 1981 ).. Therefore, in this study only the investment analysts 
employed by the UK institutional shareholders and member firms of the London 
Stock Exchange were a.Sked to evaluate the disclosure items. The use of only the 
UK analysts can be justified to some extent by a research carried out by McNally 
et al (1982). McNally et-al (1982) found that there is a level of agreement among 
the external users surveyed in three different countries about the relative 
importance of disclosing selected items. Furthermore, the London capital markets 
are generally regarded as having high disclosure requirements, due in part to their 
relatively long record of experience and expertise (Choi, 1973b). 
A mailed questionnaire was sent to 653 senior investment analysts employed by -
member companies/fmns of the Association of British Insurers, the Association 
of Investment Trust Companies, the London Investment Banking Association 
and the London Stock Exchange. The addresses of the companies/fmns were 
obtained from the respective associations and the London Stock Exchange. 
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The questionnaire sought to gather the weight (level of importance) of each 
disclosure item on directors' affairs usually disclosed in the annual reports of 
companies. The questionnaire used in this study is included in Appendix 5. The 
items in the list were randomly numbered so as to remove any possible bias. The 
questionnaire was subjected to an extensive scrutiny and pilot testing before it 
was fmalised and circulated to the senior investment analysts. To generate a high 
response rate various recommended stimuli were used, such as, keeping the 
questionnaire as short as possible (no longer than two sides of A4), sending a 
follow-up.questionnaire, providing the respondent with a stamped self-addressed 
return envelope, providing a covering letter using a university letter-head 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997, Sekaran, 1984, and Zikmund, 1994 ), offering a 
summary of the results, and sending out the questionnaires at a time which 
avoided the holiday season. 
Respondents to the questionnaire were requested to indicate the degree of 
importance of each disclosure item based on a frame of reference of a 
shareholder monitoring directors' affairs. The expected response was structured 
on a five-point Likert scale of"O" to "4". A "0" indicates that the item should not 
appear in the annual report and il. "4" indicates that it is absolutely essential that 
the item appear in the armual report. The weights "I" to "3" indicate varying 
degrees of intermediate importance. The results of the questionnaire survey 
together with the response rate are reported in the next chapter. 
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Noncresponse bias is a majo~ problem in a mail questionnaire survey. Hussey and 
. . ' 
Hussey (1997; p.164) noted that: 'Non-response is often crucial· in a 
questionnaire survey because your research design will be based on the.factthat 
you are going to generalise from the sample to the population. If you have not 
collected responses from all the members of your sample, the data may be biased 
and thus not representative of.the population'. In an attempt to establish wheth~r 
the response rate had resulted in any bias, the results obtained from the 
questionnaire survey were examined using the test proposed by Oppenheim 
( 1966). Oppenhiem ( 1966) suggested that if one assumes that late respondents 
represent non-respondents, it is possible to detect if non-response .bias was 
present in a sample. The purpose of this test is to establish whether the late 
respondents, considered as non-respondents, had significantly different scores 
from the early respondents. Hussey and Hussey ( 1997) suggest that the responses 
from the follow-up questionnaires be used to represent the late respondents in 
checking bias. In this study, the responses from the follow-up and the first three 
days were identified and median scores obtained for the responses of each items 
of disclosure. The Mann-Whitney test was carried out to test for any significant 
difference between the medians of the two sets· of responses. The test showed 
that there was no significant difference between the median for the .first three 
days and the second follow-up (the 2-tailed probability of 0.0706 is more than 
0.05). This indicates that there was no evidence of non-response bias for the 
entire returned questionnaires. However, when the tests were repeated for each 
item of disclosure between the two sets of responses, there was a significant 
difference in one of the items (2 tail probability of 0.0 195), i.e. item number 3 -
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'Information· .ori corporate governance' (see Table 5.3). For the remaining 22 
items, there were ·no significant differences between the two set; of responses. 
The follow-up responseswere used in this study to determine the weights ofthe 
items even though there was one item with a significant difference between the 
two sets of responses. Thus, care should be taken in interpreting the results of the 
survey. 
5.4. Reliability and Validity of the Disclosure Measurement 
As mentioned earlier, the disclosure index is a useful research tool, which has 
been used in disclosure studies by many researchers since 1961. It is a reliable 
research tool because another researcher can replicate the results and, since the 
scores are extracted from printed annual reports, which remain constant over 
time, there is no obstacle to repetition (Marston and Shrives, 1991, p. 197). 
However, disclosure is not easily measi.rred because the development and 
application of a disclosure index requires subjective assessments by the 
researcher applying the technique (Botosan, 1997). Marston and Shrives (1991, p 
197) recognising the problem of using a disclosure index state that 'Most of the 
researchers have proposed the use of a disclosure index without making explicit 
the fact that this is a testing device designed to provide information about an 
underlying variable that is not amenable to measurement'. According to Cooke 
and Wallace (1989, p 51), " ... fmancial disclosure. is an abstract concept that 
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canriofbe measured directly. It does not possess inherent characteristics by which 
o'ne can determine its intensity or quality like the capacity of a car.'. 
Ball and Foster ( 1982),. however, in their review of disclosure studies, observed 
that there is little_ evidence of the financial reporting literature having a tradition. 
of detailed discussion of validity issues. It is, therefore, important in this study to 
assess the validity of the resulting measure. Previous research.on the association 
between the annual report disclosure level and the fmn characteristics found that 
fmn size has a statistically significant positive association with the disclosure 
level. It may therefore be inferred that, if the DPA measures disclosure quality, 
there should be a significant difference between the large companies and the 
smaller companies. In this study, a Mann-Whitney U test is used to test for 
significant differences between the DPA (unweighted dichotomous, unweighted 
modified dichotomous, weighted dichotomous and weighted modified 
dichotomous) of large and small companies in the six countries. The fust 17 
companies for each country are classified as large and the second 17 companies 
as small (see Appendix 2). The results from the tests show that there is a 
significant difference between the large and small companies in France (for the 
weighted modified dichotomous DPA and unweighted modified dichotomous 
DPA) and the Netherlands (all the four DPAs). The other four countries (the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and Sweden) show no significant difference 
for all the DPAs. The results of the Mann-Whitney tests are shown in Table 5.4. 
Even though the results of previous studies found that the firm· size has a 
statistically significant positive association with the disclosure level, in this study · 
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· United Kingdom .2-tail~d_p : .. ::e~ . .. 
Weighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Weighted.dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted dichotomous DPA 
Canada 
Weighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Weighted dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted dichotomous DPA 
Netherlands 
Weighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Weighted dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted dichotomous DPA 
France 
Weighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Weighted dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted dichotomous DPA 
Germany 
Weighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Weighted dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted dichotomous DPA 
Sweden 
Weighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Weighted dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted modified dichotomous DPA 
Unweighted dichotomous DPA 
* Stgruficance at 1% level. 
** Significance at 5% level. 
Table 5.4 
0.1432 
•. 
···Oi096'S 
0.4084 
0:1543 
. 
0.2087-
0.2485 
0.2214 
0.3424 
0.0438** 
0.0020* 
0.0327** 
0.0047* 
0.0093* 
0.1170 
0.0439** 
0.0817 
0.3522 
0.2394 
0.6543 
0.4985 
0.2087 
0.2273 
0.3096 
0.2686 
Significance probabilities from Mann-Whitney U Test: A comparison 
between large and small companies DPAs 
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the results show that- there is no significant difference between the large and-
small companies in_ four countries. This may be because the sample companies-
are selected from a list of the largest companies in the country and. as presented 
earlier in the chapter; there is no significant difference in the size of the 
companies. The small companies used in the tests are actually small among the 
larger companies. Even though the sample of small companies _are actually 
selected within the large companies _in the country and there is no significant 
difference in the size of the sample companies, the significant different found in 
two countries (France and The Netherlands) may suggest that the DPA is a valid 
measure of disclosure quality. 
5.5. _Statistical Analysis 
In the previous disclosure studies using index scores, a mixture of parametric and 
non-parametric statistical tests were used. The level of measurement achieved 
with a disclosure index corresponds to an ordinal scale (Marston and Shrives, 
1991 ). Parametric tests are only appropriate when the data are interval or ratio-
scaled (Seigel, 1956): Since the level of measurement achieved with a disclosure 
index only corresponds to an ordinal scale arid no assumption is made that the 
data are normally distributed, in this study the non-parametric statistical tests are 
used.This study involves three main ~alyses, i.e. (i} analysis of the overall 
disclosure quality (DP A) between the sample countries, (ii) analysis of the 
disclosure quality of each of the disclosure item between the sample countries, 
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and (iii) analysis of ranking of the disclosure items between the sample countries 
and between. the sample countries and the investment analysts. 
The first analysis on the. DPAs was made between companies m different 
countries to determine whether the overall quality of disclosure differ 
significantly between the countries. The appropriate nonparametric test for this 
purpose is the Kruskal-Wall is one-way analysis of variance (ANOV A) for three 
or more unrelated samples. This test was used to test for the significant 
difference because it is more efficient than other· suitable nonparametric tests 
available (Seigal, 1956, p. 193). Furthermore, according to Seigal (1956, p. 192-
193), 'Compared with the most powerful parametric test, the F test, and under 
conditions where the assumptions associated with the statistical model of the 
parametric analysis of variance are met, the Kruskal-Wallis test has asymptotic 
efficiency of3/ll= 95.5 percent'. However, this test only determines whether the 
groups differ but not which of any two groups differ (Cramer 1998). A number of 
different nonparametric tests are available for use with ordinal data from two 
independent samples, of which the Mann-Whitney U test was the most powerful 
(Seigal, 1956, p. 116). It is also a most useful alternative to the parametric t test 
when -the researcher wishes to avoid the t test's assumption, or when the 
measurement in the research is weaker than interval scaling (Seigal, 1956, p. 
116). Therefore, apart from the Kruskai-Wallis one-way analysis of variance for 
three or more unrelated samples, the Mann-Whitney U test was used to test for 
significant difference in the overall disclosure quality between the two 
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independentsamplesJe, between all pairs ofcountries ( 15 pairs). The results are 
rep~rted in the riext chapte~. 
The second analysis on the .disclosure quality of each of the disclosure items was 
made between companies in different countries· to. determine whether the· quality 
of disclosure of each item differs significantly between the countries. The 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance for three or more unrelated samples . 
was repeatedly used for each disclosure item to test for a significant difference 
between the countries and Mann-Whitney U tests were used to test for· a 
. . . 
significant difference between all possible t=>airs of countries (15 pairs). The 
justifications for choosing · these tests are discussed above. The results are 
reported in the next chapter. 
Finally, the degree of agreement (correlation) of the disclosure items' ranking of 
importance between the sample countries, and betWeen each sample country and 
the investment analysts were also analysed. These analyses were carried out by 
using the Spearman rank correlation. This test was used because according to 
Seigal (1956, p. 202), 'Of all the statistic based on ranks, the Spearman rank · 
correlation coefficient was .the earliest to be developed and is perhaps the best 
known'. Furthermore, the efficiency of the Spearman rank correlation when 
compared with the most powerful parametric correlation, the Pearson r, is about . 
91percent (Seigal, 1956, p. 213). The results of this test are reported in the next 
chapter. 
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Apart from the above 'tests, a factor· analysis is carried out on the questionnaire 
survey in order to group the 23 .. disclosure .items to several factors that link or 
belong together. 
5.6. Summary 
This chapter presented the data and methodology of the study. This chapter 
began by justifying the selection of the sample countries, companies and the 
accounting period. The concept of 'vital countries' was used to select the six 
sample countries of this study, i.e. United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, 
France, Germany, and Sweden. Based on the assumption that agency problems 
are more prominent in large public listed companies, the largest companies from 
the sample countries were identified, matched, and selected. Due to the reporting 
lag of the annual report and time constraints of this study, the annual reports for 
the financial year ending in 1996 were requested from the companies themselves. 
This chapter continued with the discussions of the methodological issues relating 
to the construction of the disclosure index, i.e. the selection of disclosure items, 
the measurement of disclosure quality and the weighting of the disclosure items. 
The reliability .and validity of a disclosure index as a tool for measuring 
disclosure were also discussed in· this chapter. Finally this chapter presented the 
statistical analyses used in this study. 
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--· .. 
·Based· on the data and . methodology ·presented in this chapter, the results are 
reported and analysed in the next chapter. 
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6.1. Introduction 
Chapter6 
R-esults and Analysis 
In the previous chapter the data and the methodology of this study are presented 
and justified. In this chapter the results and analysis of the data based on the 
methodology discussed in the previous chapter are reported and analysed. 
Firstly, the results of the questionnaire survey are shown. In this section the 
median, mean and the rank of the disclosure items based on the perception of the 
senior investment analysts are reported and analysed. Apart from these, factor 
analysis is also conducted on the result of the questionnaire survey. Secondly, the 
actual disclosure (disclosure index) by the sample companies for both the overall 
disclosure and each individual item are presented. This section also presents the 
statistical analysis of the disclosure index and the testing of the hypotheses. 
Thirdly, this chapter shows the degree of agreement, or correlation, between the 
ranking of the perceptions of the senior investment analysts and the ranking of 
actual disclosure by the companies of the sample countries. The correlations of 
the ranking between each possible pair of the sample countries are also presented 
in this section. The final section summarises the chapter. 
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6.2. Results of questionnaire survey 
The questionnaire administration has been discussed in the previous chapter. In 
this· section the results of the survey are reported. A total of 123 usable responses 
were received after two follow-up requests, representing a 21.17% response rate. 
This response rate is considered low compared with those of previous studies (for 
example, Buzby (1974) 26%, Chandra (1974) 49.6%, Firth (1978) 38%, Me 
Nally et al (1982) 44%, and Wallace (1988) 39.2%). However, the rate of 
21.17% is considered acceptable, iri that Hussey and Hussey ( 1997) indicated 
response rates of 10% or less are not uncommon in mail questionnaire surveys. 
Details of the questionnaire survey response rate are shown in Table 6.1. 
Total questionnaires 653 
Usable questionnaires 123 
Incomplete questionnaires 2 
Addressee has gone away (return to sender) 19 
Returned but decline to answer 53 
Response rate 21.17% 
Table 6.1 
Details of questionnaire survey response rate 
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According to Zikmund (I 994, p. 208), ~The _basic calculation for obtaining a 
. ' . . 
- re~p~nse rate is to count the nwriber of questiormaire~ returned or completed, 
then divide this total by the number of eligible people who were contacted or 
requested to participate in the survey. Typically, the number in the denominator 
will be adjusted for faulty addresses and similar problems that reduce the number 
of 'eligible' participants'. In this study the response rate of 21.17% is arrived at 
after adjusting for faulty addresses and similar problems that reduce the number 
of 'eligible' participants, i.e. after deducting from the total sample (653), the 
sample where the addressee has gone away (return to sender) (19) and sample 
where the addressee declined to answer (53). There are two possibilities when the 
questionnaires were returned to the sender, either (l) the firm does- not operate at 
the address anymore, or (2) the fmn businesshas closed down. In this study the 
questionnaires that were returned to the sender were deducted from the total 
sample based on the assumption that the fmn busitiess had closed down. This is 
because if the firm is not at the address anymore, they will normally inform the 
Royal Mail to redirect all their mail to their new address. The questiormaires that 
were returned but the addressee declined to answer were also deducted from the 
total sample because most of the respondents of this category indicated either, 
(1) they were no longer trading, (2) there was no investment analyst, or (3) they 
did not invest in the equity market. Since this study attempts to analyse the 
perception of the shareholders bY using investment analysts as a surrogate, it is 
important to take the sample that represents the shareholders and therefore the 
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respondents who do not wish to answer .because theyare not involved with the 
' . . . . 
equity market or making investments should be eliminated from the total sample. 
There were only two replies that did not answer all the questions. These two were · 
treated as a non-response and not included in the computation of the weights. 
Only two replies did riot answer all the questions, which suggests that the list was 
not too long, which is one of the stimuli suggested by many researchers to 
increase the response rate of a mail questionnaire (for example see Buzby, 1974 
and 1975). However, in this study the response rate is low, despite the use of 
various stimulants for generating a high response rate as discussed in the earlier 
chapter, probably because it was addressed to the investment analyst (position) of 
the organisation. In this study, the questionnaires were sent to the position of 
senior investment analyst and not to the individual (by name) who worked as an 
investment analyst or members of the Institute of Investment Management and 
Research (IIMR) because of the difficulty in identifying investment analysts by 
name. The IIMR has-declined to give the list of their members because it is their 
policy not to release membership details to the member of the public. 
As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the purposes of the questionnaire survey 
were: (I) to assign weights to the disclosure items, (2) to indicate the ranking of 
the items of information in order of importance by the investment analysts, (3) to 
group the 23 disclosure items to severat factors, and ( 4) to measure the degree of 
agreement (consistency) between the weight assigned by the investment analysts 
and the actual disclosure by the companies of the sample countries and to 
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detennine the correlation between the rank by investment analysts and .the actual 
discl~sure by the sample companies. The results and analysis of (I), (2), and· (3) 
are presented in this section and ( 4) are presented towards the end of this chapter. 
In the questionnaire survey, the respondents were requested to indicate the degree 
· of importance they attach to each item·of infonnation. They were instructed to 
use a frame of reference, which should be that of a shareholder using the annual 
reports as a major source of infonnation in monitoring the behaviour of the 
directors. The expected response was structured on a five-point (0 to 4) Likert 
scale. A score of' 4' indicates that the item is extremely important, tapering down 
to '0', which indicates that the item is not at all important. 
The individual scores assigned by the investment analysts for the importance of 
disclosing each item of infonnation are shown in Appendix 6. 
6.2.1. Weighting of the disclosure items 
The individual scores assigned by the investment analysts have been combined 
together into a single median score and are shown in Table 6.2. The medians 
were used as weights in the computation of a weighted disclosure index. In this 
study the median scores were used instead of mean scores because of the nature 
of the measurement scale of the disclosure items. There are four levels of 
measurement scales to consider: a nominal (named) scale, anordinal (ordered) 
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Disclosure Items . Median Score 
I ·Information on the terms of the direetors' service coniract or a statement . 3 
stating that there was no·scrvi~ contract'. 
2 Auditor's report on corporate governance matters: 3. 
3 Information on corporate governanCe (compliance with corporate 3 
governance guidelines or the awareness of the current corporate governance 
debate. . 
. 
:4 . Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial.statements. 2 
5 Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company 4 
or a statement that there was no related. party transaction between directors 
and the company. 
6 lnfonnation on the independence of the directors. 3 
7 Directors' other directorships/offices or a statement that there were no other 2 
directorships/otlices. 
8 Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 2 
9 Composition of board of directors. 3 
10 Directors' ages. 2 
11 Directors' qualifications. 2 
12 Details of the audit committee. 3 
13 Details of remuneration/compensation committee. 3 
14 Details of internal control. 3 
IS Details of nomination committee. 2 
16 Details of board of directors' meeting/working method, 2 
17 Details of directors' salary/fee. 3 
18 Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar 4 
payments. 
19 Details of directors' benefit in kind/other fringe benefits. 3 
20 Details of directors' pension Scheme. 2 
21 Directors' emoluments (remuneration). 4 
22 Details of directors' interest in shares or a statement stating that the directors 4 
hold no shares in the company. 
23 Details of directors' share option scheme. 4 
Table 6.2 
Median scores of the disclosure items 
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.scale, an interval scale and a -ratio scale. Even . though the_· items of disclosure 
_ ~ere rated, intervals are not necessarily fixed. Si~ce --in this study the weights-
were based on- the perceptions of the- investment analysts, there is no reason to 
suppose that an item rated '4' is four times as important as an item rated ' 1 '. 
Therefore, the weighting ofthe disclosure items used in this study only achieved 
the level of measurement of an ordinal scale. Seigal ( 1956) also noted that in the 
.social sciences nominal and ordinal measurement are commonly achieved, Since, 
. . -
as Hussey and Hlissey (1997, p 150) point out the arithmetic mean cannot be 
calculated with an ordinal scale data, in this study the median (mid-value) of the 
frequency distribution is used as a weight. 
6.2.2. Ranking of the disclosure items. 
However, due to several weaknesses of the median, such as: it cannot be used in 
further statistical calculations (Hussey and Hussey, 1997), the limited range of 
scale values (Buzby, 1974) and the possibilities of so many ties in the ranking of 
the disclosure items, in this study both the median and mean scores were used in 
the ranking of the disclosure items. The ranking of the disclosure items based on 
the median and mean scores are shown in Table 6.3. 
As mentioned earlier, one· of the purposes of weighting the disclosure items is to 
identify, which items In the perceptions of the investment analysts, are very 
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: 
.Disclosure Items Mediaii· Rank Mean Rank 
&:o~' .·Score. 
·I. Details of directors' interest in shares or a statement 4 I . 3:59 I 
stating that the directors hold no shares in the 
.. • 
. . · 
company . 
2 Detai Is .of directors' share options scheme. 4 I 3.48 2 
3 Disclosure of related pany transactions between 4 I . 3.43 3 
directors and the company or a statement that there was 
i10 related party transaction between directors and the 
company. 
4 Directors' emoluments (remuneration). 4 I 3.33 4 
5 Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit 4 I 3.26 5. 
sharing or other similar payments. 
6 Details of directors' salary/fee. 3 6 3.09 6 
7. Information on the terms of the directo·rs· service 3 6 2.91 7· 
contract or a statement stating that therr; was no service 
. contract. 
8 Details of directors' benefit in kind/other fringe 3 6 2.91 7 
benefits. 
9 Information on the independence of the directors. 3 6 2.86 9 
10 Details of the audit committee. 3 6 2.76 10 
11 Information on corporate governance (compliance with 3 6 2.74 11 
corporate governance guidelines or the awareness of 
the current corporate governance debate. 
12 Details of internal control. 3 6 2.67 12 
13 Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. 3 6 2.55 13 
14 Composition of board of directors. 3 6 2.55 13 
15 Details of remuneration/compensation committee. 3 6 2.53 15 
16 Directors' other directorships/offices or a statement 2 16 2.49 16 
that there were no other directorships/offices. 
17 Details of directors' pension scheme. 2 16 2.39 17 
18 Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the 2 16 2.28 18 
financial statements. 
19 Directors' qualifications. 2 16 2.20 19 
20 Details of nomination committee. 2 16 2.09 20 
21 Directors' ages. 2 16 2.02 21 
.. 
22 Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 2 16 1.80 22 
23 Details of board of directors' meeting/working method. 2 16 1.59 23 
Table 6.3 
Disclosure items ranked in order of importance. 
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. . 
. . ' . 
· important· and which Items· are ·not very· impmtant- for monitoring the behavioUr 
of the directors. The study of the users' n~eds of disciosure relating to di~ctors'-
behaviour is important for policy makers in designing standards or regulations of _ 
disclosure in this area. This will enable the policy maker to id~ntify, which 
disclosure items are highly demanded by the users and which items are not 
important to the users. 
Out of the 23 disclosure items presented to the investment analysts for weighting, 
5 items have a median weight of '4', 10 items have a median weight of '3' and 8 
items have a median weight of '2'. There are no items with a median weight of 
'1' or '0'. This in a way indicates that no disclosure items are viewed by the 
investment analysts as not very important or not important at all for them in 
monitoring the directors' behaviour. The breakdown of the disclosure items 
based on their importance is shown in Table 6.4 
It can be seen from Table 6.3 that the most important disclosure items in the 
perception of the investment analysts, with a median score of '4', are the items 
relating to the compensation of the directors except one, that is, the item 
concerning related-party transactions. This indicates that the investment analysts 
require a greater amount of information relating to directors' compensation to be 
disclosed in the annual reports of the companies. Among the five items with the 
median score of '4', information relating to the directors' interest in shares and 
directors' share options scheme, based on the mean score, were ranked top with 
an average score of 3.59 and 3.48, respectively. Even though information 
concerning directors' compe11sation received high scores and was ranked among 
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Median Score . Number of Items Percentage 
... 
4 5 . 21.74% 
3 10 43.48% 
. 
2 8 0.00% 
I 0 . 0:00% 
0 0 0,00% 
Table 6.4 
Breakdown of the disclosure items based on their importance. 
the top 6 in the list, it is surprising that information on the details of the 
remuneration/compensation committee was ranked number 15 with an average 
score of2.53. This suggests that investment analysts are more concerned with the 
actual compensation received by the directors than with on the procedure in 
setting the compensations. 
Of the 23 items in the questionnaire, only 8 received an average score below the 
mid-point of the range 0.00 to 4.00. Information on the directors' date of 
appointment and details of board of directors meeting were items ranked at the 
bottom of the list with an average score of 1.80 and 1.59, respectively. 
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6.2:3.Factor analysis of the questionnaire survey 
Apart from the above analysis, a factor analysis was · conducted on the 
questionnaire survey in order to group the 23 disclosure items to several factors 
that link or belong together. This analysis, utilising principal component 
extniction and the varimax rotation technique, was carried out by using the 
statistical package SPSS for MS WINDOWS release 6.1. Technically factor 
analysis should be reserved for ratio-scaled data, whereas it can be argued that 
the Likert-scaled data are ordinal-scaled. However, the intention· is primarily to 
provide a practical way of grouping items of disclosure together, and this 
provides a reasonable approach. 
The factor analysis final statistics are shown in Table 6.5. It can be seen from 
Table 6.5 that there are five factors extracted for the disclosure items relating to 
directors' behaviour. The five factors extracted are responsible for 32.3%, 12%, 
7.3%, 6.6% and 5.1% of the variation in responses. The communality indicates 
the strength of the linear association among the disclosure items. It is the squared 
mult!ple correlation coefficient between a disclosure item and all of the other 
variables. The Eigen value shown in Table 6.5 is a measure of standardised 
variance with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Since the variance that 
each standardised variable contributes to a principal components extraction is 1, a 
component with an Eigen value of less than 1 is less important than an observed 
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Disclosurdtems Communa- Factor Eigen 0/o of 
lity Value Variance· 
I lnlbimation on the terms of the directors' .63147. I 7.42965 32.3 
service contraCt or a statement stating that 
there was no service contract. 
2 Auditor's ~eport on corporate· governance .66697 2 2.74880 . 12.0 
matters 
3 lnformation.on co_rporate governance . 70360 .. 3 1.67874 . 7.3 
(compliance with oorporate governance 
guidelines or the awareness-ofthe current 
corporate governance debate). · 
4 Statement of directors' responsibility in .57105 4 1.51644 6.6 
respect of the financial statement. 
5 Disclosure of related party transactions .57701 5 1.16223 5.1 
between directors and the company or a 
statement that there 'was no related party 
transaction between directors and the 
company.· 
6 Information on-the independence of the .442202 
directors 
7 Directors' other directorships/offices or a .50133 
statement that there were no other 
directorships/offices. 
8 Directors' date of appointment or year of .61113 
service. 
9 Composition of board of directors .61310 
10 Directors' ages. .73128 
11 Directors' qualifications. .60354 
.12 Details of the audit committee . .55944 
13 Details of remuneration/compensation .65681 
committee 
14 Details of internal control. .77510 
15 Details of the nomination committee. .55201 
16 Details of board of directors' meeting/ .30569 
working method 
17 Details of directors' salary/fee. .75290 
18 Details of directors' bonus/performance .70792 
bonus/profit sharing or other similar 
'payments. 
19 Details of directors' benefit in kind/other .77414 
fringe benefits. 
20 Details of directors' pension scheme. .59395 
21 Directors' emoluments (remuneration). .66149 
22 Details of directors' interest in shares or a .81499 
statement stating that the directors hold no 
shares in the company. 
23 Details of directors' share options scheme. .74891 
Table 6.5 
Factor analysis final statistics. 
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vari!itk, and therefore eliminated from the final statistics of Table 6.5 and hence 
the blanks in the table. 
In order to show which of the disclosure items are linked by the factor analysis, 
the five factors extracted are orthogonally rotated as shown in Table 6.6. The 
coefficients in this table represent the correlations between the items and each 
factor and are termed as "factor loadings". In Table 6.6 it can be seen that only 
the items, which are highly loaded are recorded, i.e. with a factor loading above 
0.5. The poorly loaded items are suppressed in order to help the interpretation of 
the factor since the high loading items are the ones that primarily decide what the 
factor might be. 
Factor 1 relates the information on the terms of the directors' service contract to 
the disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company, 
the details of directors salary/fee, the details of directors' bonus or other similar 
payment, details of directors' interest in shares and the details of directors' share 
option scheme. Although this factor incorporates details of salaries and fees, 
these are also represented in Factor 3. Factor 1 represents the contracts between 
the directors and the company, and interests in shares and options. 
Factor 2 represents the corporate governance mattefl!. This factor links six 
disclosure items together, i.e. the auditor's report on corporate governance, the 
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Factor/Description Rot~=!:tor 1 
Factor 1: Contracts between directors and company 
includine; shares and oj)tions. 
I lnfonnation on the tenns of the directors' service contract or a statement .56436 
stating that there was no service contract. 
2 Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company .60398 
or a statement that there was no related party transaction between directors 
and the company. 
3 Details of directors' salary/fee. .66180 
4 Details of directors' bonus/perfonnance bonus/profit sharing or other .71790 
similar payments. 
5 Details of directors' interest in shares or a statement stating that the .77050 
directors hold no shares in the company. 
6 Details of directors' share options scheme. .84373 
Factor 2: Corporate governance matters 
I Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. .79408 
2 Infonnation on corporate governance (compliance with corporate .75289 
governance guidelines or the awareness of the current corporate 
governance debate. 
3 Statement of directors' ~nsibility in respect of the financial statements. .71550 
4 Directors' Qualifications. .51305 
5 Details of the audit committee. .63714 
6 Details of nomination committee. .54450 
Factor 3: ComJ)_ensations of directors 
I Details of Remuneration/compensation committee. .68750 
2 Details of directors' salary/fee. .53595 
3 Details of directors' benefit in kind/other fringe benefits. .84466 
4 Details of directors' l'ension scheme. .62387 
5 Directors' emoluments (remuneration. .61802 
Factor 4: Directors' profile 
I Directors' date of appointment or_y_ear of service .68130 
2 Composition of board of directors .71861 
3 Directors' ages .79451 
Factor 5: Internal control 
I Details of internal control .78933 
Not represented by any factors 
I Information on the independence of the directors. 
2 Directors' other directorship/offices or a statement that there were no other 
directorship/offices. 
3 Details of board of directors' meeting/_working.method. 
Table 6.6 
Orthogonal factor loading of questionnaire items 
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infonnation on corporate governance; the statemc;:nt ofdiredors' rc;:sponsibility in 
·respect of the financial statement, the. directors' qualifieations, the details of the 
audit committee, and the details of ihe nomination committee. 
Factor 3 represents the compensations of the directors. This factor relates the 
. . 
details of the remuneration/compensation committee to the details of directors' 
salary/fee, the details of directors' benefits in kind, the details of directors' 
pension scheme and the directors' emoluments. It may be observed that the 
details of the directors' salaries/fees are more strongly represented in Factor I, 
which focuses more on contracts. 
Factor 4 represents the directors' profile. It links together the directors' date of 
appointment, the composition of board ofdirectors and the directors' ages. 
FaCtor 5 represents the internal control and it does not relate to any other items. 
From Table 6.6 it can also be seen that there are three disclosure items, which are 
not represented by the five factors extracted, i.e. the infonnation on the 
independence of the directors, the directors' other directorships/offices and the 
details of the board's meeting/working method. This is because the factor loading 
of these items for the five factors extracted are low, i.e. below 0.5. Furthennore 
the communality (the linear association among the items) of these three items is 
weak, i.e. .42202 for the infonnation on the independence of the directors, 
.50133 for the directors' other directorship/offices and .30569 for the details of 
the board's of directors meeting/working method. 
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6.3 .. Actual disclosure by sample companies 
As discussed in the earlier chapters, the actual disclosures by companies were 
measured by the use of a disclosure. index. The raw scores of each i~dividual 
item ofdisclosure of the sample companies for the six countries, extracted from 
the worksheets are shown in Appendices? to 12 (for ttie dichotomous score) and 
Appendices 13 to 18 (for the modified dichotomous score). In this chapter the 
. . . . 
disclosure index for both the overall disclosure and each individual item 
disclosure are reported· and analysed .. The overall disclosures are analysed to. 
determine whether there is any significant difference in the disclosure of 
information relating to directors' behaviour in the annual reports of the sample 
countries. Any significant difference in the disclosure of information in relation 
to the directors' behaviour between the sample countries supports the Nobes' 
classiflcation of financial reporting practices discussed earlier. This also suggests 
that there is a lack of harmony in the disclosure of information in the annual 
reports of companies between the sample countries. The findings ofa low overall 
disclosure score of the sample companies also indicates that it contradicts the 
arguments by the anti regulation group or the supporters of market forces, that 
information regarding directors' behaviour are voluntarily disclosed. These 
findings should be of prime interest especially to the international bodies, such as 
the IASC, the OECD and the EU, in harmonising the disclosure practices of their 
members' countries .. 
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The purposes of analysing- the individual items of disclosure, firstly, to identify 
which items are popularly disclosed and which items the companies arereluctant 
to disclose. This classification establishes the priority and the urgencies in the 
improvement of disclosure of information-_in relation to directors' behaviour. 
Secondly, the purpose is to measure the degree of agreement or correlation 
between the ranking of perceptions by the· investment analysts. and the ranking of 
actual disclosure by companies of the sample countries. Any significant 
difference between the ranking of the investment analysts and the actual 
disclosure by companies of the sample countries indicates that there ts 
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent as predicted m 
agency theory. The second pw-pose will be presented in section 6.4 of this 
chapter. 
6.3.1. Overall disclosure 
As discussed in the data and methodology chapter, the overall disclosure for each 
company was measured by the use of the disclosure point average (DPA). The 
DPAs were calculated for (l) the unweighted dichotomous disclosure index 
(UWDDPA), (2) the unweighted modified dichotomous disclosure index 
(UWMDDPA), (3) weighted dichotomous disclosure index (WDDPA), and (4) 
the weighted modified dichotomous disclosure index(WMDDPA). 
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The method of calculating the dis<;losure point average for both weighted and 
unweighted together with an example has already been explained in the data and 
methodoiogy chapter. In this sect.ion, the results of the UWDDPA, UWMDDPA, 
. . . 
WDDPA. and WMDDPA are presented and analysed. The UWDDPA, 
. . 
UWMDDPA, WDDPA and WMDDPA for the 204 companies from the 6 sample 
countries are shown inTables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10, respectively. The percentage 
. . 
of the mean DPAs against the maximum possible score in the sample countries 
are summarised inTable 6.11. 
The above tables show that there were differences in the disclosure practices 
between the sample countries. As described in the data and methodology chapter, 
the differences in the overall disclosure in all the sample countries for the four 
methods of disclosure measurements were tested using the Kruskal-Wallis. The 
results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests for the four methods of measurements are 
summarised in Table 6.12. The results show that there were very significant 
differences between the countries for all four methods of disclosure 
measurement. 
These results in general support the ciassification made by Nobes (1983) 
(discussed in Chapter 2). However, Nobes's classification was concerned with 
measurement and valuation reporting practices, whereas this study is concerned 
with the disclosure practices of directors' information. The results of significant 
differences between the sample countries show that there are differences not only 
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Company* 
U.Kinl!dom 
I 0.87 
2 0.96 
3 0.83 
4 0.87 
5 0.87 
6 0.83 
7 0.74 
8 0.83 
9 0.83 
10 0.87 
11 0.91 
12 0.87 
13 0.87 
14 0.91 
15 .0.87 
16 0.91 
17 0.87 
18 0.96 
19 0.96 
20 0.96 
21 0.83 
22 0.65 
23 0.78 
24 0.83 
25 0.83 
26 0.82 
27 0.87 
28 0.82 
29 0.79 
30 0.96 
31 0.87 
32 0.78 
33 0.82 
34 0.83 
Mean 0.85 
Std.Dev. 0.07 
Maximum 0.96 
Minimum 0.65 
Canada 
0.27 
0.50 
0.52 
0.25 
0.64 
0.48 
0.41 
0.59 
0.52 
0.46 
0.36 
0.45• 
0.41" 
0.60 
0.41 
0.57 
0.46 
0.41 
0.39 
0.48 
0.44 
0.41 
0.36 
0.38 
0.48 
0.26 
0.30 
0.62 
0.38 
0.48 
0.52 
0.55 
0.52 
0.36 
0.45 
0.10 
0.64 
0.25 
. 
UWDDPA** 
Netherlands 
I. 
0.46 
0.43 
0.39 
0.35 
0.48 
0:35 
0.33 
0.20 
0:30 
0.16 
0.27 
0.20 
0.15 
0.52 
0.21 
0.43 
0.24 
0.27 
0.19 
0.15 
0.19 
0.14 
0.30 
0.19 
0.25 
0.19 
0.29 
0.17 
0.20 
0.24 
0.25 
0.23 
0.24 
0.14 
0.27 
0.10 
0.52 
0.14 
France 
0.41 
0.57 
0.48 
0.25 
0.39 
0.16 
0.57 
0.32 
0.09 
0.59 
0.27 
0.39 
0.32 
0.33 
0.09 
0.41 
0.02 
0.26 
0.10 
0.10 
0.36 
0.24 
0.46 
0.14 
0:29 
0.14 
0.46 
0.05 
0.36 
0.26 
0.35 
0.18 
0.09 
0.38 
0.29 
0.16 
0.59 
0.02 
• The company name is shown in Appendix 2. 
"* The figure shown here was extracted from Appendices 7 to 12 
and the maximum possible score for the UWDDPA is I point. 
Table 6.7 
Germany 
0.18 
0.14 
0.25 
0.22 
0.33 
0.24 
0.19 
0.18 
0.27 
0.23 
035 
0.30 
0.27 
0.27 
0.24 
0.18 
0.24 
0.23 
0.27 
0.20 
0.20 
0.23 
0.27 
0.29 
0.19 
0.25 
0.18 
0.18 
0.30 
0.14 
0.18 
0.23 
0.23 
0.27 
0.23 
0.05 
0.35 
0.14 
Unweighted dichotomous disclosure point average 
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Sweden 
0.52 
0.61 
0.36 
0.68 
0.46 
0.36 
0.52 
0.59 
0.52 
0.50 
0.39 
0.48 
0.36 
0.68 
0.17 
0.40 
0.71 
0.44 
0.57 
0.59 
0.55 
0.41 
0.41 
0.44 
0.32. 
0.32 
0.50 
0.36 
0.36 
0.64 
0.40 
0.44 
0.36 
0.50 
0.47 
0.12 
0.71 
0.17 
Company* UWMDDPA** 
. U.Kingdom Canada Netherlands ·France Germany Sweden 
I 7.68 2.10 2.65 2.77 1.25 3.69 
2 8.64 4:0S 2.96 3.99 0.71 3.77 
3 7.15 3.93 2:60 3.02 1.10 2.91 
4 7.43 1.59 3.32 1.44 1.41 4.04 
5 7.54 5.10 3.57 3.06 1.98 2.45 
6 6.67 3:99 2.21 1.58 1.59 2.91 
7 5.80 2.34 2.25 3.84 0.87 3.88 
8 7.43 4.72 1.25 1.99 0.61 4.25 
9 7.15 3.87 2.05 
. 
. 0.40 1.84 3.64 
10 8.04 3.47 0.57 4.20 1.59 2.91 
.. 
11 7.97 2.37 1.84 1.80 2.15 2.99 
12 7.30 3.43 1.04 2.72 1.77 3.42 
13 7.79 3.15 0.92 2.73 1.52 3.07 
14 7.70 4.41 4.68 2.70 1.92 5.02 
15 6.66 2.78 1.10 0.29 1.06 1.16 
16 7.63 4.34 2.61 2.35 0.64 3.38 
17 7.65 3.92 1.85 1.79 1.11 5.75 
18 8.91 2.89 1.90 1.18 1.40 2.99 
19 8.19 3.32 1.17 1.00 1.79 3.65 
20 8.18 3.14 0.92 0.32 0.92 4.03 
21 6.74 3.51 1.05 1.92 1.00 4.67 
22 5.04 3.01 0.87 1.03 1.44 3.08 
23 6.44 2.44 1.72 2.88 1.97 2.92 
24 7.53 2.57 1.35 0.67 1.90 3.13 
25 7.19 4.29 1.92 1:56 0.87 2.34 
26 6.70 2.02 1.05 0.81 1.42 2.31 
27 7.45 1.79 1.71 2.99 1.29 3.55 
28 6.97 4.54 1.26 0.17 0.83 2.76 
29 7.07 2.93 1.04 2.47 1.42 2.95 
30 7.70 3.23 1.57 1.49 0.52 4.62 
31 7.86 4.09 1.74 2.11 0.83 3.06 
32 6.59 3.37 1.49 1.31 1.16 3.30 
33 6.56 3.63 1.83 0.37 1.74 2.41 
34 7.61 2.54 0.87 2.14 1.53 3.17 
Mean 7.32 3.32 1.79 1.91_ 1.33 3.36 
Std.Dev. 0.76 0.88 0.90 1.10 0.45 0.87 
Maximum 8.91 5.10 4.68 4.20 2.15 5.75 
Minimum 5.04 1.59 0.57 0.17 0.52 1.16 
* The company name is shown in Appendix 2. 
** The figure shown here was extracted from Appendices 13 to 18 
and the maximum possible score for the UWMDDPA is 10 points. 
Table 6.8 
Unweigbted modified dichotomous disclos_ure point average 
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Company* WDDPA** 
U.Kin2dom· Canada Netherlands France 
I 0.89 0.26 0.48 0.40 
2 0.97 0.45 0.46 0.56 
3 0.86 0:49 0.41 0.46 
4 0.89 0.26 0.35 0.27 
5 0.89 0.61 0.49 0.39 
6 0.88 0.44 0.35 0.19 
7 0.76 0.36 0.36 0.61 
8 0.86 0.53 0.26 0.33 
9 0.82 0.47. 0.36 0.11 
10 0.89 0.42 0.21 0.59 
11 0.92 0.37 0.29 0.25 
12 0.89 0.44 0.22 0.44 
13 0.88 0.44 0.20 0.32 
14 0.92 0.62 0.56 0.29 
15 0.85 0.40 0.28 0.11 
\6 0.91' 0.61 0.46 0.40 
17 0.89 0.43 0.29 0.22 
18 0.97 0.40 0.32 0.30 
19 0.97 0.39 0.22 0.09 
20 0.96 0.46 0.20 0.12 
21 0.82 0.41 0.25 0.41 
22 0.66 0.40 0.15 0.23 
23 0.79 0.34 0.32 0.48 
24 0.83 0.36 0.20 0.16 
25 0.85 0.42 0.29 0.31 
26 0.84 0.28 0.22 0.14 
27 0.86 0.29 0.34 0.44 
28 0.83 0.58 0.20 0.05 
29 0.81 0.39 0.19 0.32 
30 0.96 0.44 0.29 0.27 
31 0.89 0.48 0.28 0.35 
32 0.83 0.52 0.25 0.18 
33 0.81 . 0.52 0.27 0.11 
34 0.82 0.37 0.15 0.42 
Mean 0.87 0.43 0.30 0.30 
Std.Dev. 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.15 
Maximum 0.97 0.62 0.56 0.61 
Minimum 0.66 0.26 0.15 0.05 
• The company name is shown in Appendix 2. 
• • The figure shown here was extracted from Appendices 19 to 24 
and the maximum possible score for the WDDPA is I point. 
Table 6.9 
Germany 
0.19 
0.16 
0.24 
0,23. 
0.32 
0.25 
0.19 
0.18 
0.27 
0.23 
0.35 
0.31 
0.27 
0.27 
0.24 
0.18 
0.22 
0.23 
0.27 
0.20 
0.20 
0.21 
0.27 
0.24 
0.19 
0.24 
0.18 
0.18 
0.27 
0.15 
0.18 
0.24 
0.21 
0.27 
0.23 
0.05 
0.35 
0.15 
Weighted dichotomous disclosure point average 
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Sweden 
0.49 
0.61 
0.39 
0.69 
0.47 
0.39 
0:56 
0.58 
.0.53 
0.52 
0.44 
0.55 
0.37. 
0.69 
0.23 
0.42 
0.71 
0.50 
0.63 
0.58 
0.53 
0.44 
0.42 
0.47 
0.32 
0.32 
0.52 
0.37 
0.37 
0.63 
0.40 
0.46 
0.37 
0.52 
0.48 
0.12 
0.71 
0.23 
Company• WMDDPA** . 
. 
U.Kine:dom Canada Netherlands France Germany Sweden 
I 7.83 1.92 2.86 2.45 1.37 3.35 
2 8.75 3.58 2.88 3.79 0.78 3.50 
3 7.42 3.65 2.99 2.77 1.05 3.06 
4 7.64 1.55 2.35 1.30 1.59 3.82 
5 7:84 4.80 3.64 2.92 1.91 . 2.20 
6 7.39 3.59 2.12 1.89 1.69 2.88 
7 5.91 1.97 2.32 3.97 0.78 3.98 
8 7:75 4.00 1.64 2.01 0.56 4.07 
9 7.09 3.40 1.70. 0.51 1.85 .3.62 
10 8.33 3.17 0.75 3.92 1.53 2.78 
11 8.06 2.26 2.18 1.45 2.09 2.92 
12 7.49 3 .. 26 1.05 2.92. 1.91 3.79. 
13 7.95 3.38 1.27 2.62 1.61 2.95 
14 7.83 4.45 3.81 2.26 1.90 5.01 
15 6.59 2:68 1.51 0.35 0.96 1.4 
16 7.66 4.51 I 2.34 2.14 0.60 3.33 
17 7.90 3.57 2.12 2.03 0.95 5.58 
18 9.09 2.75 2.58 1.31 1.33 2.85 
19 8.40 3.26 1.61 0.88 1.75 3.62 
20 8.17 2.93 1.27 0.38 0.82. 3.38 
21 6.52 3.22 1.44 2.01 0.91 4.38 
22 5.05 2.9 0.85 1.02 1.21 3.07 
23 6.51 2.20 1.78 2.88 1.94 2.76 
24 7.56 2.36 1.36 0.76 1.98 3.22 
25 7.30 3.79 2.18 1.66 0.76 2.13 
26 6.98 2.17 l.lO 0.75 l.l8 2.14 
27. 7.41 1.53 2.25 2.66 1.21 3.45 
28 7.06 4.06 1.67 0.18 0.73 2.62 
29 7.24 2.91 0.91 2.02 l.l8 2.86 
30 7.80 2.99 2.12 1.56 0.51 4.53 
31 8.02 3.64 2.36 1.86 0.73 2.96 
32 7.00 3.26 1.83 l.l3 1.31 3.29 
33 6.51 3.64 2.03 0.42 1.53 2.25 
34 7.58 2.46 0.85 2.12 1.56 3.02 
Mean . 7.46 3.11 1.93 1.85 1.29 3.26 . 
Std.Dev. 0.79 0:82 0.76 1.03 0.48 0.84 
Maximum 9.09 4.80 . 3.81 3.97 2.09 5.58 
Minimum 5.05 1.53 0.75 0.18 0.51 1.40 
• The company name is shown in Appendix 2. 
** The figure shown here was extracted from Appendices 25 to 30 
and the maximum possible score for the WMDDPA is 10 points. 
Table 6.10 
Weighted modified dichotomous disclosure point average 
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N 
0 
. 0 
Country Disclosure Measurement 
UWDDPA* UWMDDPA* WDDPA* WMDDPA* 
United Kingdom 85% 73% 87% 75% 
Canada 45% 33% 43% 31% 
Netherlands 27% 18% 30% 19% 
France 29% 19% 30% 19% 
Germany 23% 13% 23% 13% 
Sweden 47% 34% 48% 33% 
• The figure shown here was the percentage of the mean disclosure point average from Tables 6.7 to 6.10 
against the maximum possible score (rounded up). 
Table 6.11 
The percentage of mean disclosure point average (DPA) 
against maximum possible score 
N 
0 
....... 
· Corrected for ties 
Methods of disclosure measurements Cases Chi-square D.F 
I. Unweighted dichotomous disclosure point avemge (UWDDPA) 204 138.3942 5 
2. Unweighted modified dichotomous disclosure point average (UWMDDPA) 204 148.3077 5 
3. Weighted dichotomous disclosure point average (WDDPA) 204 137.9776 5 
4. Weighted modified dichotomous disclosure point average(WMDDPA) 204 145.2903 5 
• Significant at I% level ofsignificance. 
Table 6.12 
Kruskal-Wallis One-way ANOV A: All sample countries for the four methods 
of disclosure measurements. 
Si2nificance 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
in the measurement and valuation practices but also in the disclosure practic"es of 
directors' information/ corporate governance matters. 
. . 
Another point to note is that, Nobes carried out his classification in 1980, before 
the enactments in EU countries of the fourth and seventh Directives on Company 
Law (the company law Directives of most relevance to accounting), whereas this 
study is :after the enaci:ments. Since allthe sample countries are members of EU, 
except Canada, and the Directives must be incorporated irlto the laws . of 
member's states, there should not be any differences in their disclosure practices 
between them. However, as mentioned in earlier chapter, the fourth Directive, is 
concerned with the formats, accounting principles and basic accounting 
conventions, and the seventh Directive is regarding consolidated accounting. Up 
to the date of writing this thesis there is no EU Directive on disclosure of 
directors' information or corporate governance matters. This may explain why 
there are differences between the sample countries. 
However, the Kruskal-Wallis test shows only whether the six sample countries 
differ but not which of any two countries differ. Cramer ( 1998 p. 342) suggests 
that the Mann-Whitney U test can be used to make comparisons between all 
possible pairs. In this study, the Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to test for 
significant differences between each possible pair of countries, for the four 
methods of disclosure measurement. The results of the tests for each method of 
disclosure measurement are summarised in Tables 6.13, 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16. 
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United Kingdom -
Canada o.oooo• 
-
Netherlands o.oooo• o.oooo• 
-
France o.oooo• o.oooo• 0.4690 
-
Germany o.oooo• o.oooo• 0.3313 0.0610 
Sweden o.oooo• 0.6316 o.oooo• o.oooo• 
United Kingdom Canada Netherlands France 
• Sogmficant at I% level of sognoficance. 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Netherlands 
France 
Germany 
Sweden 
Table 6.13 
Significance probabilities from Mann-Whitney U test: Unweighted 
Dichotomous Disclosure Point Average (UWDDPA). 
-
o.oooo• -
o.oooo• o.oooo• 
-
o.oooo• o.oooo• 0.8830 -
o.oooo• o.oooo• 0.0154•• 0.0519 
o.oooo• 0.9706 o.oooo• o.oooo• 
United Kingdom Canada Netherlands France 
• Sogmficant at I% level of sogmficanc:e. 
"Significant at s•;. le vet of significance. 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Netherlands 
France 
Germany 
Sweden 
Table 6.14 
Significance probabilities from Mann-Whitney U test: Unweighted Modified 
Dichotomous Disclosure Point Average (UWMDDPA). 
-
o.oooo• -
o.oooo• o.oooo• -
o.oooo• 0.0003* 0.9364 -
o.oooo• o.oooo• 0.0039* 0.0435** 
o.oooo• 0.0622 o.oooo• o.oooo• 
United Kingdom Canada Netherlands France 
• Sogmficant at I% level of sogmficancc. 
•• Significant at w. level of significance. 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Netherlands 
France 
Germany 
Sweden 
Table 6.15 
Significance probabilities from Mann-Whitney U test: .Weighted 
Dichotomous Disclosure Point Average (WDDPA). 
-
o.oooo• -
o.oooo• o.oooo• -
o.oooo• o.oooo• 0.6324 
-
o.oooo• o.oooo• 0.0002* 0.0146•• 
o.oooo• 0.5560 o.oooo• o.oooo• 
United Kingdom Canada Netherlands France 
. . Sognoficant a1 I Yo level of sognoficanc:e . 
•• Significant at S% level of significance. 
Table 6.16 
Significance probabilities from Mann-Whitney U test: Weighted 
Modified Dichotomous Disclosure Point Average (WMDDPA) . . 
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-
o.oooo• 
Germany 
-
o.oooo• 
Germany 
-
o.oooo• 
Germany 
-
o.oooo• 
Germany 
It can be seen from Tables 6. i 3 to 6. l 6 that there were significant differences 
between the United Kingdom and. the other countries for all the four methods of 
disclosure measurement. For Canada, the results show that there were significant 
differences with all other countries, except with Sweden, for. all methods of 
disclosure measurement. There were 'no significant differences between the 
Netherlands ·and France for all the methods of measurement. Between the 
Netherlands and Gennany there were significant differences for all methods of 
measurement, except for . the UWDDPA where it revealed no significant 
difference. The comparisons between France and Gennany show that there were 
significant differences in the WDDPA and WMDDPA but show no significant 
differences for the UWDDPA and UWl'viDDPA. 
From the above tables it can be seen that there were three groupings of countries 
in terms of disclosure in annual reports in relation to directors' behaviour. The 
first group consists of the United Kingdom with the means for UWDDP A, 
UWl'viDDPA, WDDPA and WMDDPA of 0.85, 7.32, 0.87, and 7.46, 
respectively and standard deviations of 0.07, 0.76, 0.07, and 0.79, respectively. 
There were no companies in the United Kingdom with a disclosure point average 
below the mid-point for all the four disclosure measurements. This indicated a 
high level of disclosure quality in the United Kingdom. 
The second group comprised Canada and Sweden. The means of UWDDP A, 
UWl'viDDPA, WDDPA and WMDDPA for Canada were 0.45, 3.32, 0.43, and 
204 
... ·.:,.; 
3.ll, respectively and for Sweden were 0.47, 3.36,0.48, and 3.26, respectively. 
. . . . 
Their standard deviation, high~st and lo~est meim disclosure point average for 
. . 
. . . . 
the four disclosure measurements·· were also . very siinilai-. There were ll· 
companies in Canada and 13 companies in Sweden with the UWDDPA.above 
the mid-point. In the case ofUWMDDPA there were only l company in Canada 
and 2.companies in Sweden with a DPA above the mid-point. For the WI>DPA 
there were 7 companies in Canada and 15 companies in Sweden with a DPA 
above the mid point and no company in Canada and 2 companies in Swederi in 
the case of the WMDDPA. 
The third group is made up of the Netherlands, France and Germany. The mean 
UWDDPAs were 0.27, 0.29, 0.23 for Netherlands, France and Germany, 
respectively. The UWDDPA standard deviations were 0.10 for the Netherlands, 
0.16 for France and 0.05 for Germany. There were 4 companies from these three 
countries with the UWDDPA of above 0.50 (mid-point), i.e., 3 in France and l in 
the Netherlands. No company in Germany had a UWDDPA of above 0.50. The 
mean UWMDDPA for the Netherlands, France and Germany were 1.79, 1.91 and 
1.33, respectively. The UWMDDPA standard deviations were 0.90 for the 
Netherlands, l.lO for France, and 0.45 for Germany. No company from these 
three countries had a UWMDDPA above 5.00 (mid-point). For the weighted 
disclosure point average, i.e. the WDDPA and WMDDP A, these three countries 
also showed a very low level of disclosure. In the case of the WDDPA, the 
means were 0.30 for the Netherlands; 0.30 for. France and 0.23 for Germany with 
standard deviations of 0.10, 0.15 and 0.05, respectively. Only 4 companies from 
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.--· 
these three countries had a wDDPA above 0.50 (mid-point); i.e., 3 companies 
from France and 1. company from the Netherlands. Theme~n WMDDPA for the 
. . . . . . 
Netherlands was 1.93, France 1.85 and Germany 1.29with stimdard deviations of 
0.76, 1.03 and 0.48, respectively. No company from these three countries had a 
WMDDPA above 5.0. The highest WMDDPA from these three countries was 
from France, i.e. 3.97. The statistics shown above suggest that the level and 
quality of disclosure in relation to directors' behaviour of these three countries 
are very low. 
The United Kingdom was at the top end of the list possibly because of the 
Cadbury and the Greenbury's Reports recommending companies to disclose 
information on corporate governance matters and directors' remuneration. 
Another reason is that companies listed on the London Stock Exchange must 
comply with the requirements set out in the publication Admission of Securities 
to Listing (the 'Yellow Book'), and one of the requirements is the disclosure 
about corporate governance and directors' remuneration. 
Previous disclosure studies also indicated that the United Kingdom and the USA 
are the leaders in annual report disclosure. For example, according to Barret 
( 1976) the extent of secrecy appears to vary across countries with lower levels of 
disclosure evident in Japan and continental European countries such as France, 
Germany and Switzerland, compared to the United Kingdom and United States. 
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In the case of Sweden, even though there are no corporate governance guidelines 
or reports, it was in the second group together with Canada; a country with 
corporate go~ernance guidelines (the Dey's Report). This is consiste~t with the 
results of previous disclosure studies, which have included companies from 
Sweden in their sample has shown a good level of disclosure by companies in 
· this country (see for example, Cairns et· al, 1984; and Kahl and Belkaoui, .1981 ). 
Although Sweden is in the same class with France and Germany, in the Nobes' 
classification, the disclosure level . is higher than the two coun_tries. This is 
expected because, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3, Sweden is a country with 
strong influence of stock exchange in respect of accounting and disclosure. 
Canadian comparues disclosed less than United Kingdom companies, even 
though they have a corporate governance guidelines, because the companies in 
this country disclose the information in question in the proxy statements and the 
10-K report, a requirement for companies listed on the NYSE. It should be noted 
that 16 out of the 34 companies from Canada were also listed in the USA. 
However, a statistical test (Mann-Whitney) for a significant difference in the 
disclosure point average between the companies listed only in Canada and 
companies listed both in Canada and the USA, reported a 2-tailed probability of 
0.5121 indicating that there is no significant difference (at the 5% level of 
significance) between the companies listed only in Canada and companies listed 
both in Canada and USA. Instead, on average, the companies listed both in 
Canada and USA reported a higher disclosure point average. 
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Another reason. for Canadian compames disclosing lower than the British 
companies, ma.y'be dueto the securities commissions in the individual provinces 
govern the financial reporting requirements of the public companies. As 
discussed in the earlier chapters, the corporate governance guidelines in Canada 
(the Dey's. Report) were set by the Toronto Stock Exchange. Since the sample 
companies for Canada were selected from Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver 
Stock Exchanges,. not all sainple companies will comply with the Dey's Report. 
Under all four methods of disclosure measurement, the Netherlands, France and 
Germany were at the lower end of the ranking. The results is not surprising for 
France and Germany because, as discussed in Chapter 3, these two countries 
legal system is highly codified and prescriptive. Companies in these two 
countries tend to disclose only the items that are prescribed by the law or 
accounting plan. For example, the French companies are required to disclose 
certain information under the Plan Comptable General and it is often the case 
that no other additional disclosure is provided except that are required by the 
Plan. 
Small and weak stock exchanges in these two countries also contribute to the low 
disclosure. level of information of directors' behaviour. Since most corporate 
governance guidelines around the world are incorporated into the stock exchange 
listing rules, country with weak stock exchange is unable to enforce these rules, 
thus resulting in low disclosure level. Relating to the small stock exchanges, the 
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. . . . . 
major sour~s offin~nce for. the French and German companies (as .discussed in 
chapter 3)may also· lead to the low level ofdis~losure. Usually banks and the 
' ~ . 
. . .. 
. . . . 
goverrunent, as the providers of finance, will appoint their staffs as the directors 
of the· companies. Therefore the. banks .and the governments a~e able to~ get the 
information direct from the companies without relying on the annual reports. 
However, it Is surprising for the Netherlands to be grouped.together with France 
and Germany. Although the company law in the Netherlands is incorporated in 
the Civil Code, similar to France and Germany, the Code has not provided a 
detailed framework. The Code provides some general rules for preparing 
fuiancial statements, but · the main consideration that governed accounting 
policies was that they should be generally acceptable and that fmancial 
statements should give a true and fair view, similar to the UK practices. Since it 
is similar to the UK practices and fall under the same class in the Nobes' 
classification, the Dutch companies should be disclosing similar to that of the 
UK. 
The Netherlands' showing a low level and quality of disclosure may be due to 
the corporate governance guidelines in this country (Peter's Report) became 
effective only for armual reports ending after 31 December 1997, whereas the 
armual reports analysed in this study were for the year ending between January 
1996 and December 1996. This means that the companies are not required to 
follow the guidelines at this point However, there were .companies in the 
Netherlands that indicated they voluntarily followed the proposed guidelines. 
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The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test on the overall disclosure quality above are 
relatecl'to the main hypothesis number I put forward in chapter I : 
Hl: The overall disclosure quality of information relating to directors' 
affairs is different between the UK, Netherlands, Canada, France, 
Germany and Sweden. 
Table 6.12 (above) reports the significance probabilities from the Kruskal-Wallis 
Onecway ANOV A for the four disclosure measurements. The significance 
probabilities from Table 6.12 indicate that the hypothesis is not rejected at the 
1% level of significance for all methods of disclosure measurement. 
This shows that there is no harmony in the practices of disclosing information 
relating to directors' behaviour or corporate governance matters internationally. 
The result also supports the classification made by Nobes (1983). The possible 
reasons for the differences in the disclosure practices have been discussed in the 
above section. 
6.3.2. Individual items 
The raw scores of each individual item of disclosure of the sample companies for 
the six countries, extracted from the worksheets are shown in Appendices 7 to 12 
210 
·.(for dichotomous score) and Appendices 13 to 18 (for modified dichotomous 
score). Looking throughAppendi~es 7 to 18 can provide an item-by-item feel- . 
· for the qualltyof disclosure in the annual reports of the sample companies. There 
appeared to be great variability in the quality of disclosure between both the. 23 
disclosure items ofinfonnation and the six countries. 
6.3.2.1. Dichotomous disclosure index 
The variability in the number of companies disclosing each item. of disclosure in 
the six countries is presented in Table 6.17. This table shows the scores in a 
dichotomous measuring system, i.e. 0 for non-disclosure and 1 for disclosure. 
From the 23 items evaluated, only one item, i.e. the information on the 
composition of the board of directors was disclosed by almost all sample 
companies with 99.57% of companies disclosing. Only one company in Germany 
did not disclose this item. The auditor's report on corporate governance on the 
other hand was poorly disclosed by companies in all the countries, with the entire 
sample percentage of 10.29% (21 companies). All the 21 companies were from 
the United Kingdom. 
The auditor's report on corporate governance is recommended by the Cadbury's 
Report in the United Kingdom. However, this is a guideline and incorporated 
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Enlirt tamnle United Kin•dom Canada Nc1htrl1nds Fraoct Germany s,.tden 
OiJCioturt llems Se A 8 c Se A 8 c A 8 c A 8 c A 8 c A 8 c A 8 c 
I lnfomacJon on chc remu of lhe direccon' service concrac1 204 S7 0 27 94Yo 34 )3 0 97.06% 0 0 0.00% I 0 294% 0 0 0.00% 0 0 0.00% 23 0 67.65% 
2. Auduor's repon on corporate aovemence malletS 204 21 0 10 29"/o 34 21 0 6176% 0 0 0 00'/o 0 0 0 OO'Io 0 0 000'/o 0 0 OOOY, 0 0 0 00'/o 
3 Information on corporate aovunancc. 204 93 0 45.59"/o 34 34 0 10000'1. 31 0 91.18% IS 0 44. 12% 10 0 294Wo I 0 2.94% 2 0 s 88% 
4 Stlcemcnl of dercc1on' responsibi lity en respecl of the financial s.lalemenu 204 71 0 31.1W, 34 )4 0 10000'1. 31 0 91.18% 0 0 OOOY, 11 0 3235% I 0 2.94% 0 0 0.00'/o 
s Di.Klosurt of rclaled party transacuons bctwec.n d1rCCion and the company 204 10 0 3431% 34 26 0 764Wo 7 0 20.59% 17 0 SOOOYo 2 0 s 8BY. 14 0 41.18Y, 4 0 11 76% 
6 lnformauon on lhe inde~c.oce of the direc1on. 204 31 0 1520% 34 7 0 20 59% 16 0 47.06% 0 0 000'/o 7 0 2059% 0 0 000'/o I 0 2 94% 
7 Dtrec.tors' other dirtclonhiploffkes 204 116 0 56.86% 34 )3 0 9706% )) 0 97.06% 0 0 0 00'/o 17 0 so 00'1. 0 0 0 00'/o )) 0 97.06% 
8 Directors' date of appomtmtnl or year of seNice 204 89 0 43 63% 34 32 0 94 12'Yo 10 0 29.41Yo 0 0 0 OO'Io 13 0 38 24% I 0 2 94~. 33 0 9706% 
9 Composi1ion of board of direcoocs. 204 203 0 99.SIY. 34 34 0 10000'/o 34 0 10000'1. )4 0 100 OO'Io 34 0 100 OOYo )) 0 97.061'. 34 0 100 00'/o 
I 0 Oirec.1on'ages 204 82 0 40.20% 34 32 0 94 12% 3 0 8.82% 10 0 29.41% 2 0 s 88% 2 0 S 88Y, 33 0 97.06% 
11 . Oirc.c1011' qu•hlications 204 sa 0 2843% 34 14 0 41 I&Y, 14 0 41 18% 0 0 0 00'/o 0 0 000'/o 14 0 41.18% 16 0 47.06Yo 
12 Dc:t.a&ls of audit commutee 204 96 0 47.06% 34 J3 0 97 06Y, 34 0 100.00% 11 0 3235% 13 0 38 24% 2 0 5.88% 3 0 882% 
13 Dcta•l of rcmunera~ion/compc.nsalion comm1Utc 204 97 0 47 SS% 34 32 0 9412% 29 0 85.29% 10 0 2941Yo IS 0 52.94% 0 0 0.00'/o a 0 23.53% 
14 De coils of inoemol corurol. 204 76 0 31.25% 34 34 0 100.00'1. 31 0 91.18'Yo 6 0 1765% 2 0 s 88% 0 0 0 OO'Io 3 0 8 82% 
IS Details of nomination committee 204 72 0 35.29'1'. 34 23 0 676W, 22 0 64.71% 8 0 23 SJY, 11 0 32 3S% 2 0 S 88Y, 6 0 11.6SY, 
16 De1.1ols of board of direccocs muun&fworking method 204 lOS 0 SI 47% 34 16 0 47.06-t. 12 0 35.29% 26 0 76.47% 13 0 38 24Yo 32 0 94.12% 6 0 17.65% 
N 
...... 
17 Deoools of doreccocs' salary/fee. 204 78 0 38 24% 34 32 0 94 12% 0 0 0 OO'Io I 0 2 94'Yo IS 0 44 12Yo 0 0 0 00'/, 30 0 88 24% 
18. De:t.aJis of d•rcciOf'l' bonu,Vpcrformancc bonuslptolil sharing Of 01her 11milar payme.nlJ 204 47 71 35.34% 34 28 s 96.55% 0 18 0.00'/, 0 26 0 00'/o 0 7 0 00'/o 0 11 0.00% 19 4 63 33% 
N 19 Deooils of direcoors' benefios in kond/oohcr fringe b<nefios 204 47 80 37.90% 34 32 2 100.00'1. I 12 4.SSY, 0 26 0 00'/o 0 23 OOOYo 0 12 0 00'/o 14 s 48 28% 
20. De~.ails of darccton' pension schemes. 204 72 12 37.50% 34 30 2 93 75% I 3 3.23% 0 2 0.00'/o I s 3 4SYo )) 0 9706% 7 0 20 59% 
21 Dire.clon' cmolumcna(remunera1ion) 204 160 0 780% 34 H 0 100 OOYo 0 0 0 00'/o 34 0 100 OO'Io 24 0 7059% 34 0 100.00'/o )4 0 100 00'/o 
22 DetaeiJ or duecton' inlcre.sl in shlles 204 84 0 41 18Yo 34 )) 0 97 06% 6 0 17 65% 4 0 11 16Yo 8 0 23 SJ% 0 0 OOOY, )) 0 9706% 
23 Details of dlfcctors' share opuon scheme 204 94 as 78.99"/o 34 32 2 100 OOYo 17 9 68.00'/o 17 9 68 OOY, 19 9 76 00'/o 0 )) 0~"· 9 23 81.82% 
Se · Enure sample SIZC 
Se· Sample Siu f01 each country. 
A - Number of companies disclosonaohe otem (see Appendices 7 eo 12) 
8 . Number of companies wherelhe ioem ofinfonnooion is nooapplicable (see Appendices 7 eo 12) 
C • Percen1.1ge of companies disclosong ohe ioem. This foaure was decermoned by Llkina A divided by (S minUJ 8) 
Table 6.17 
Dicholomous disclosu rt iodtx oftach iltm. 
into the Listing Rules of the Stock Exchange. Therefore this piece ~f information 
_is not mandatory, and hence only 21 companies disclosing. 
The distribution of the percentage of companies disclosing the items is shown in 
Table 6.18: From Table 6.18 it can be seen that the items were disclosed by most 
of the companies in the United Kingdom, with 7 items disclosed by all the 
companies (100%) and only 3 items disclosed by less than 50% of the 
companies. Sweden is second with I 0 items that were disclosed by more than 
50% of the companies, followed by Canada (9 items), the Netherlands (5 items), 
France (5 items) and Germany (3 items). The Netherlands was rank higher than 
France even though it has 5 items disclosed by more than 50% of the companies 
because 2 of the items were disclosed by all the companies in the Netherlands as 
compared with only I in France. 
It is not surprising for the companies in the United Kingdom to lead because as 
mentioned earlier, the United Kingdom are the leader in annual report disclosure. 
Apart form this, the Cadbury and Greenbury's Reports also contributed to the 
high disclosure by the companies in the United Kingdom. 
Analysing the entire sample column of Table 6.17 and 6.18 indicate that there 
was a lack of consensus in terms of the annual reports' disclosure of items 
relating to the directors' behaviour internationally. Kahl and Belkaoui (1981) use 
the percentage of companies disclosing an item, i.e. the number of companies 
reporting the item divided by the number of companies for which a given 
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Number of items 
Percentage of 
company disclosing Entire sample United Kingdom Canada Netherlands France Germany Sweden 
100% 0 7 2 2 1 1 2 
90% to <100% 1 10 4 0 0 3 4 
80% to <90% 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
70% to <80% 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 
60% to <70% 0 2 2 1 0 0 2 
50% to <60% 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 
40% to <50% 6 2 2 1 1 2 2 
30% to <40% 8 0 1 1 5 0 0 
20% to <30% 2 1 2 3 3 0 2 
10% to <20%. 2 0 1 2 0 0 3 
>0% to <10% 0 0 3 2 4 6 4 
N 
....... 
0% 0 0 5 9 5 11 2 
-+>- Total 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Table 6.18 
Distributio11 of dichotomous disclosure index 
iriforn1ation item ~as applicable~ to determine the relative importance of each 
item of information. The percentage disclosing each item of informati~n is ~plit 
to provide c~nserisus scores in terms' of items showing high, m~derate and low 
' ' . 
consensus. Kahl and Belkaoui {198\) suggest that this classification establishes 
the priorities and urgencies for the improvement of international financial 
reporting. The low consensus items should be of prime interest to the 
Internatiomil Accounting Standards Committee in standardising the financial 
reporting practice internationally (Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981 ). Kahl and Belkaoui 
(1981) however did not explain how to classify the consensus scores into high, 
moderate and low consensus. The consensus score was simply split by taking the 
fust 10 highest scores as high, the next 10 as moderate and the remaining 10 as 
low, out of the 30 items of information evaluated. 
In ·this study, the approach used by Kahl and Belkaoui was adopted because it 
can provide guidance to international regulators on which items that were 
popularly disclosed and which items that were not so popularly disclosed by 
companies internationally. However the consensus score is divided only into 
above average and below average. The consensus score of SO% and above is 
classified as above average and the score below SO% ::ts below average. The 
consensus score classification for the entire sample is shown in Table 6.19. The 
above average consensus score in Table 6.19 indicates a large number of sample 
companies disclosing such information, whereas the below average consensus 
score shows a small number of sample companies disclosing the item. 
2\S 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
. 17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Disclosure Items 
Above average consensus 
Composition of board of directors. 
Details of directors' share option scheme. 
Directors' emo I ument( remuneration). 
Directors' other directorship/offices. 
Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 
Below average consensus 
Detail of remuneration/compensation committee. 
Details of audit committee. 
Information on corporate governance. 
Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 
Details of directors' interest in shares. 
Directors'ages. 
Details of directors' pension schemes. 
Details of directors' salary/fee. 
Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 
Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 
Details of internal control. 
Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar payments . 
Details of nomination committee. 
Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 
Directors' qualifications. 
Information on the terms of the directors' service contract. 
Information on the independence of the directors. 
Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. 
Table 6.19 
Dichotomous index consensus scores. 
Consensus scores 
99.51% 
78.99% 
78.43% 
56.86% 
51.96% 
47.55% 
47.06% 
45.59% 
43.63% 
41 .67% 
40.20% 
38.54% 
38.24% 
37.90% 
37.75% 
37.25% 
35.34% 
35.29% 
34.31 % 
28.43% 
27.94% 
15.20% 
10.29% 
The result shows only s items. with consensus scores of above SO%; sugge~ting 
the arguments by the. ariti regulation group that infmination regarding directors' 
behaviour is vofuntarily disclosed is . not true. The above average consensus 
s~ores range from 51.96% to 99.51%. There were 18 below average consensus 
score items, with scores ranging from 10.29% to 47.55%. This large number of 
below average consensus score items indicates that there is lack of consensus or 
harmony ainong the sample countries. This, in a way, suggests that international 
accounting standards are required in this area of information disclosure. The list 
of below average consensus scores items should be of interest to international 
standards setters and regulators such as the IASC, the OECD and the EU, since 
. . 
their objective is to harmonise the reporting practices among their members. This 
result should also be ofprime interest to the OECD, which is currently looking 
into the issues of corporate governance (OECD, 1998). 
However care should be taken in using the above results, since it was based on a 
dichotomous measuring system, i.e. without taking irito consideration the views . 
of the users (superiority) and the adequacy of the information disclosed. To 
overcome this problem in this study a modified dichotomous system was used, 
where non-disclosure were scored 0 and disclosure varies from greater than 0 to 
l 0, measuring the adequacy of disclosure. The modified dichotomous index of 
each item was then weighted with the median score of the investment analysts to 
measure the superiority of disclosure i.e. to take into consideration the 
importance of the item in the perception ofthe investment analysts. 
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. 6.3.2.2. Modified dichotomous disclosure index 
. . 
. . . 
It was mentioned in earlier chapters that there is some confusion in the use of 
weights in disclosure studies. Previqus disclosure studies that usedweights have 
allocated the median or mean scores from questionnaire slirveys of users to the 
disclosure items (for example, Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973; Buzby, 
·1974 &1975; Barret, 1976 & 1977, Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; and McNally et al, 
1982). Those who used weights in their disclosure studies claimed that they take 
into consideration that some items of information are relatively more important 
than others. For example Barret (1977, p 9) suggests that the weighted data can 
be compared with the 'possible in:dex score' in order to determine how 
extensively the average firm discloses the particular item in question. 
However, in this study the points allocated for each disclosure item are not the 
median or mean score of the users, but a maximum point of 10 for each item. The 
maximum point is then distributed depending on the degree of specificity 
(fineness) or the sub-elements of the item disclosed by a particular company to 
arrive at the modified dichotomous index for each item. It should be stressed here 
that the points allocated to each item are not the weights but simply a score to 
measure the adequacy of disclosure. The score for each item is then multiply by 
the median weights assigned by investment analysts to arrive at the weighted 
modified dichotomous disclosure index for each item. This weighted index 
reflects the importance of each disclosure item. However, in this study, the 
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weight~ modified dichoto.mous disclosure lridex for each individual item will 
not be analysed because the weights assigned by. the analysts have no effect when 
analysing each. individual item (as discussed in the earlier chapters). This can be 
seen from the mean column in Appendices 13 to 18 (modified dichotomous 
index) having the same value as the mean column in Appendices· 25 ·to 30 (a 
. weighted modified dichotomous index). 
The modified dichotomous disclosure index (unweighted) for each item 1s 
presented in Table 6.20 and for comparison purposes, the weighted disclosure 
index, calculated using methods adopted by most of the previous researchers is 
presented in Table 6.21. It can be seen from column B in Tables 6.20 and 6.21 
(the percentage of the mean score for each item against a possible index score for 
each item) is exactly the same. This also shows that the importance of each item 
based on the perceptions of the users has no effect when analysing each 
individual item, i.e. whatever point is used will produce exactly the same result. 
Therefore, in this study, only the unweighted modified dichotomous disclosure 
index is used to analyse the quality of each individual item. 
Colurrln B in Table 6.20 measures the quality of disclosure for each item, i.e. in 
term of how extensive is the average firm disclosure for each item, whereas 
column C. in Table 6.17 measures the percentage of companies disclosing each 
item. It should be noted that the percentage in column B Table 6.20 is not 
equivalent to the percentage of column C in Table 6.17, wherever the disclosure 
item has various degrees of specificity or sub-elements. 
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N 
N 
0 
Pouible 
in de& Entire umple U.Kiacdom 
Disclosure llems score• A 8 A B 
I. lnfonnation on the tenns of the directors' service contract. 10 2.79 27.94% 9.71 97.06% 
2. Auditor's repon on corporate governance mallers. 10 1.03 10.29% 6.18 61.76% 
3. lnfonnation on corporate governance. 10 4.56 45.59% 10.0 100.00% 
4. Statement ofdireccors' responsibil ity in respect ofche financial scatemencs. 10 3.77 37.75% 10.0 100.00% 
5. Disclosure of related party cransaccions between direccors and the company. 10 3.43 34.31% 7.65 76.47% 
6. lnfonnation on the independence of the directors. 10 1.52 15.20% 2.06 20.59% 
7. Directors' other directorship/offices. 10 5.69 56.86% 9.71 97.06% 
8. Directors' dale of appointment or year of service. 10 4.36 43 .63% 9.41 94.12% 
9. Composition of board of directors. 10 6.16 61.61% 6.55 65.54% 
I 0. Directors'ages. 10 3.91 39.05% 9.28 92.81 o/o 
11 . Directors' qualifications 10 1.49 14.87% 2.13 21 .32% 
12. Details of audit committee. 10 2.99 29.90% 6.32 63.24% 
13. Detail of remuneration/compensation commiuee. 10 3.42 34. 19"/o 9.34 93.38% 
14. Details of internal control. 10 1.91 19. 12% 5.29 52 94% 
I 5 Details of nomination committee. 10 2.24 22.43% 4.63 46.32% 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 10 3.97 39.71% 2.94 29.4 I o/o 
17. Details of directors' salary/fee. 10 2.27 22.71% 7. 11 71.10% 
18. Details of directors' bonus/perfonnance bonus/profit sharing or other s1milar payments. 10 1.65 1648% 6 96 69.56% 
19 Details of directors' benefits in kind/ocher fr inge benefits 10 1.39 13.93% 7.03 70 31% 
20 Decails ofd1rec1ors' pension.schemes. 10 I 93 19.26% 7.89 78.91% 
21 Directors' emolument( remuneration). 10 4.28 42.78% 9.61 96.08% 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. 10 272 27.21% 9.56 95.59% 
23. Details of directors' share option scheme. 10 3.95 39.52% 9 38 93.75% 
• The figure shown here was the max1mum poss1ble score can be awarded to an Item en the sconng worksheet (see Appendix 3) 
A- The figure shown here was the mean of the raw score (Appendices 13 · 18) after tak ing into consideration the not applicable Items. 
B • The figure shown here was the percentage of A against possible index score. 
Table 6.20 
Canada NtCbtrllnds 
A 8 A 8 
0.00 0.00% 029 2.94% 
0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 
9.12 91.18% 4.41 44.12% 
9.12 91.18% 0.00 0.00% 
2.06 20.59% 5.00 50.00% 
4.71 47.06% 0.00 0.00% 
9.71 97.06% 000 0.00% 
2.94 29.41% 0.00 0.00% 
4.59 45.94% 5.90 58.97% 
0.88 8.82% 2.76 27 65% 
I .85 18.48% 000 0.00% 
6.69 66.91% 1.54 15.44% 
5.51 55. 15% 1.47 14.71% 
4.56 45.59% 0.88 8.82% 
4.19 41.91% 1.25 12 50% 
2.35 23.53% 6. 18 61.76% 
0.00 0.00% 0.20 1.96% 
0.00 000% 000 000% 
0.1 I I 14% 0.00 000% 
0.16 1.61 % 000 0.00% 
0.00 0.00% 4.85 48 53% 
0.59 5.88% 0 29 2 94% 
4.40 44 00% 3 70 37 00% 
Unweighted modified dichotomous disclosure index of each individual item, 
France Gmu•nr Swtdtn 
A B A B A B 
0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 6.76 67.65% 
0.00 000% 000 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 
2.94 29.41% 029 2.94% 0.59 5.88% 
3.24 32.35% 0.29 2.94% 000 0.00% 
0.59 5 88% 4.12 41.18% 1.18 11.76% 
2 06 20.59% 0.00 0.00% 0 29 2.94% 
5.00 50.00% 0.00 0.00% 9.71 97.06% 
3.82 38 24% 0.29 2.94% 9.71 97.06% 
5.26 52.56% 5.36 53.56% 9.31 93.07% 
0.21 2. 10% 0 59 5.88% 9.71 97.06o/o 
0.00 0.00% 2.86 28.61 o/o 2.08 20.84% 
2.57 25 74% 0.29 2.94% 0.51 5. 15% 
3.0 1 30.15% 0.00 0.00% 1.18 11.76% 
0.29 2 94% 000 0.00% 0 44 4.4 I o/o 
2 06 20.59% 0.29 2.94% 1.03 10.29% 
2.79 27.94% 8.09 80.88% 1.47 14.71% 
1.86 18 62% 0.00 0.00% 4.46 44.58% 
000 0.00% 000 000% 2.93 29.29% 
000 000% 000 000% I 21 12 13% 
009 0.86% 2.79 27 94% 0 62 621% 
2.57 25.74% 3.09 30 88% 5 54 55.43% 
0.74 7 35% 000 0.00% 5.15 51.47% 
3.85 38 50% 000 0 00% 2.39 23.86% 
N 
N 
-
l'ouible in- Entire sample U.Kioedom Canada Nerherlands 
Dis<losure hems des S(Ore" A 0 A 0 A 0 A 8 
I. lnfonnarion on rhe renns of rhe direc rors' service conrracl. 3 0.838 27.94% 2.91 91.06% 0.00 0.00% 0.09 2.94% 
2. Audiror's repon on corporarc govem&Jocc mallers. 3 0.309 10.29% 1.85 61.16% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 
3. lnfonnation on corporate governance. 3 1.368 45.59"1. 3.00 100.0% 2.74 91.18% 1.32 44.12% 
4. Statemenc of direc1ors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 2 0.155 37.75% 2.00 100.0% 1.82 91.18% 0.00 0.00% 
S. Disclosure of re la red pany rransacrions berween direcrors and rhe company. 4 1.373 34.31% 3.06 76.47% 0.82 20.59% 2.00 50.00% 
6. lnfonnarion on rhe independence ofrhc direc rors. 3 0.456 15.20% 0.62 20.59% 1.41 47.06% 0.00 0.00% 
7. Directors' other directorshjp/offices or a statemcnl that 1hcrc were no o1hcr directorship/offices. 2 1.137 56.86% 1.94 97.06% 1.94 97.06% 0.00 0.00% 
8. Directors' da1e of appoinunent or year of service. 2 0.873 43.63% 1.88 94. 12% 0.59 29.4 1% 0.00 0 .00% 
9. Composirion of board of direcrors. 3 1.848 61.61% 1.97 65.54% 1.38 45.94% 1.77 58.91% 
I 0. Direcrors'ages. 2 0.781 39.05% 1.86 92.81% 0. 18 8.82% o.ss 21.65% 
11. Directors' qualificarions. 2 0.297 14.87% 0.43 21.32% 0.37 18.48% 0.00 0.00% 
12. Derails ofaudir commillcc. 3 0.897 29.90% 1.90 63.24% 2.01 66.91% 0.46 15.44% 
13. Detail ofremunerationlcompensarion commiuee. 3 1.026 34.19,... 2.80 93.38% 1.65 55 .15% 0.44 14.71% 
14. Derails ofinremal control. 3 0.574 19. 12% 1.59 52.94% 1.37 45 .59% 0.26 8.82% 
I 5. Derails of nomination cooruniucc. 2 0 449 22.43% 0.93 46.32% 0.84 41.91% 0.25 12.50% 
16. Details ofboard of directors meeoinglworking method. 2 0.794 39.71% 0.59 29.41% 0.47 23.53% 1.24 61.16% 
.17. Derails of directors' salary/fee. 3 0.681 22.71% 2. 13 71.10% 0.00 0.00% 0.06 1.96% 
18. Derails of direcrors' bonuslperfonnance bonuslprofir sharing or other similar paymeniS. 4 0.659 16.48% 2.78 69.56% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 
19. Derails of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 3 0.418 13.93% 2. 11 70.31% 0.03 1.14% 0.00 000% 
20. Details of direcoors' pension· schemes. 2 0.385 19.26% 1.58 78.91% 0.03 1.61% 0.00 0.00% 
2 I. Directors' emolu.ncnc(remuncraaion). 4 1.711 42.78% 3.84 96.08% 0.00 0.00% 1.94 48.53% 
22. Derails of directors' interest in shares. 4 1.088 27.21% 3.82 95.59% 0.24 5.88% 0. 12 2.94% 
23. Derails of directors' share option scheme. 4 1.581 39.52% 3.75 93.75% 1.76 44.00% 1.4 8 37.00% 
• Mcdoan wcoght assogned by onvcsrmenr analySIS (sec Table 5.2) 
A- The figure shown here was derennined by taking the mean of the raw score (Appendices 13 • 18) divided by rhema.oonuon possible score (10) multiply by the possible index score' 
0 - The figure shown here was the percenrage of A againSI possible index score. 
Table 6.21 
Weighted disclosure index of individual disclosure item. 
Frant.t Germany Sweden 
A 0 A 0 A 0 
0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 2.03 61.65% 
0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 
0.88 29.41% 0.09 2.94% 0.18 5.88% 
0.65 32.35% 0.06 2.94% 0.00 0.00% 
0 24 5.88% 1.65 41.18% 0.47 11.76% 
0.62 20.59"/o 0.00 0.00% 0.09 2.94% 
1.00 50.00% 0.00 0.00% 1.94 97.06% 
0.76 38.24% 0.06 2.94% 1.94 97.06% 
us 52.56% 1.6 1 53.56% 2.79 93.07% 
0.04 2.10% 0. 12 5.88% 1.94 97.06% 
0.00 0.00% 0.57 28.61% 0.42 20.84% 
0.77 25.14% 0.09 2.94% 0. 15 S. IS% 
0.90 30.15% 0.00 0.00% 0.35 11.76% 
0.09 2.94% 0.00 0.00% 0.13 4.4 1% 
0.41 20.59"1. 006 2.94% 0.21 10.29"/o 
0.56 27.94% 1.62 80.88% 0.29 14.71% 
0.56 18.62% 0.00 0.00% 1.34 44.58% 
0.00 000% 0.00 0.00% 1. 17 29.29% 
0.00 0 .00% 0.00 0.00% 0.36 12. 13% 
002 0.86% 0.56 27.94% 0. 12 6.21 % 
1.03 15.14% 1.24 30.88% 2.22 55.43% 
0.29 7.35% 0.00 0.00% 2.06 51.47% 
1.54 38 SO% 000 0.00% 0.95 23.86% 
Analysing the data contained in Table 6:20 shows that there were no major 
differences in the results presented in Table 6.17. For the entire sample, 
disclosure item number 9, i.e. the 'composition of board of directors' leads the 23 
disclosure items with a quality of disclosure of 61.61 %. At the bottom of the I ist 
is the 'auditor's report on corporate governance' with a disclosure quality of 
10.29%. These results were similar to that of the dichotomous index presented 
earlier. There were however only two items with a percentage of over 50 in the 
modified dichotomous disclosure index as compared with five items under the 
dichotomous index. 
The United Kingdom leads among the sample countries with 19 items achieving 
a the disclosure quality of above 50%, followed by Sweden with 7 items, Canada 
5 items, Netherlands 3 items, and Germany and France with 2 items. Even 
though both France and Germany has two items· with disclosure a quality of 
above 50%, France was ranked bottom because the two items were in the range 
of 50% to <60%, whereas for Germany one of the items was in the range of 80% 
to <90% and one item was in the range of 50% to <60%. The distribution of the 
disclosure quality is shown in Table: 6.22. 
There was however slight variations at the lower end of the ranking of the 
countries when compared with the dichotomous index discussed earlier. Under 
the dichotomous index Germany was rank bottom of the list, followed by France 
at number 5 and Netherlands at number 4. However after taking the quality of 
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N 
N 
w 
Percentage 
of disclosure 
quality 
100% 
90% to <100% 
80% to <90% 
70% to <80% 
60% to <70% 
50% to <60% . 
40% to <50% 
30% to <40% 
20% to <30%. 
10% to <20% 
>0% to <10% 
0% 
Total 
Number of items 
Entire sample United Kingdom Canada Netherlands France Germany Sweden 
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
0 8 3 0 0 0 4 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1 4 1 1 0 0 1 
1 1 1 2 2 1 2 
3 1 5 2 0 1 1 
6 0 0 1 4 1 0 
5 3 3 1 6 2 3 
7 0 1 3. 1 0 5 
0 0 4 4 5 6 5 
0 0 5 9 5 11 2 
23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Table 6.22 
Distribution of unweighted modified dichotomous disclosure index. 
disclosure into consideration (the modified dichotomous index), France ~as at 
the bottom of the list, foilowed by Germany and Netherlands at numbers 5 and4, 
respectively. The top ofthe list remains the same, for both the dichotomous index 
and the modified dichotomous disclosure index, with United Kingdom atthe top 
followed by Sweden and Canada. 
The consensus scores based on the modified dichotomous disclosure index are 
shown in Table 6.23. These consensus scores measure the relative importance of 
each item of information after taking the disclosure quality into consideration, 
i.e. the consensus in terms of the quality of disclosure not the just the number of 
companies disclosing such items. It shows slight variations from that under the 
dichotomous index consensus scores. The dichotomous index consensus scores 
discussed in the section above showed that there were five items with above 
average consensus scores, however under the modified dichotomous consensus 
scores, there were only two items with above average consensus scores. The two 
items were 'composition of board of directors' and ·'directors' other 
directorship/offices'. This small number of items with above-average consensus 
scores indicates that information disclosed by the sample companies was not 
detailed or adequate. As suggested earlier standard setters/regulators should be 
concerned with the items that fall under the below-average consensus scores 
category. They should also consider the degree of specificity and the sub-
elements of each disclosure item in designing standards or regulations. 
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N 
N 
VI 
Rank 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Disclosure Items Consensus scores 
Above average consensus 
Composition of board of directors. 61.61% 
Directors' other directorship/offices. 56.86% 
Below average consensus 
Information on corporate governance. 45.59% 
Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 43.63% 
Directors' emolument(remuneration). 42.78% 
Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 39.71% 
Details of directors' share option scheme. 39.52% 
Directors'ages. 39.05% 
Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 37.75% 
Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 34.31% 
Detail of remuneration/compensation committee. 34.19% 
Details of audit committee. 29.90% 
Information on the terms of the directors' service contract. 27.94% 
Details of directors' interest in shares. 27.21% 
Details of directors' salary/fee. 22.71% 
Details of nomination committee. 22.43% 
Details of directors' pension schemes. 19.26% 
Details of internal control. 19.12% 
Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar payments. 16.48% 
Information on the independence of the directors. 15.20% 
Directors' qualifications. 14.87% 
Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 13.93% 
Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. 10.29% 
Table 6.23 
Unweighted modified dichotomous disclosure index consensus scores 
.. · -. ~ 
The consensus scores described above measure the degree of consensus for the 
entire sample. It does not test for significant differences bet~een the practices in 
the sample countries for each disclosure item. In this study, Kruskal-Wallis. tests 
were carried out to test for the differences between the six sample countries for 
each disclosure item. The results of the tests are summarised in Table 6.24. From 
Table 6.24 it can be seen that there were very significant differences between the 
sample countries for all the 23 disclosure items. The very high level of 
significance for all the 23 disclosure items implies that there were inconsistencies 
in quality of disclosure of information relating to directors' behaviour within the 
sample countries, which may suggest that information is not voluntarily disclosed 
in the absent of regulation. This test however shows only whether the six sample 
countries differ but not which of any two countries differ. Cram er ( 1998 p. 342) 
suggests that the Mann-Whitney U test can be used to make comparisons 
between all possible pairs. The results of these comparisons may help regulators 
and standard setters to identify the country with a 'best practice' disclosure, 
which enables them to adopt or adapt to their standard or regulation. However in 
this study the Mann-Whitney U tests were not carried out on all the 23 disclosure 
items for all the possible pairs, but only on the items that were viewed to be 
important and very important by the investment analysts (i.e. items with a 
median score of 3 and 4 in Table 6.2). There were 15 items with a median score 
of 3 and 4 in Table 6.2. The other 8 disclosure items were ignored in this study 
because the investment analysts viewed ·them as less important. 
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Corrected for ties 
Disclosure Items Cases Chi-square D.F Significance 
I. Information on the terms of the directors' service contract. 156.6291 5 .oooo• 
2. Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. 115.8529 5 .0000* 
3. Information on corporate governance. 118.4232 5 .oooo• 
4. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 155.7946 5 .oooo• 
5. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 53.6716 5 .0000* 
6. Information on the independence of the directors. 44.2489 5 .0000* 
7. Directors' other directorship/offices. 156.7045 5 .oooo• 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 126.4808 5 .oooo• 
9. Composition of board of directors. 41 .3544 5 .oooo• 
10. Directors'ages. 138.2068 5 .oooo• 
11 . Directors' qualifications. 39.1573 5 .0000* 
12. Details of audit committee. 116.6293 5 .oooo• 
13 . Detail of remuneration/compensation committee. 124.0119 5 .oooo• 
14. Details of internal control. 150.8685 5 .oooo• 
15. Details of nomination committee. 50.0018 5 .oooo• 
16. Details of board .of directors meeting/working method. 63.9 128 5 .0000* 
17. Details of directors' salary/fee. 143.6099 5 .oooo• 
18. Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar payments. 9 1.9314 5 .oooo• 
19. Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 103.7605 5 .oooo• 
20. Details of directors' pension schemes. 150.5903 5 .oooo• 
21. Directors' emolument(remuneratio~). 169.6145 5 .oooo• 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. 165.5673 5 .oooo• 
23. Detai ls of directors' share option scheme. 65.5343 5 .oooo• 
• Significant at I% level of significance 
Table 6.24 
Kruskal-Wallis One-way ANOVA: All Sample Countries 
Since one of the objectives of· this study is to identify best practice m the 
disclosur~ of information relating to directors' behaviour, comparisons were 
made with the country that produced the best practice for each disclosure item 
(the item with a median score of 3 and 4) and not for all the possible pairs. The 
best practice for each item was determined by comparing columns 8 of the. six 
sample countries in Table 6.20. The country with the highest percentage of mean 
raw score against a possible index score (i.e. column 8 in Table 6.20) was chosen 
as the best practice. Out of the 15 important and very important items, 12 items 
of best practice were from the United Kingdom, 2 from Canada and 1 from 
Sweden. The Mann-Whitney U test for two independent samples was used to 
compare the best practice country with the other countries (pair-wise) for each of 
the 15 items. The results of the significance of the probabilities from the Maim-
Whitney U test to compare the country with best practice with the other countries 
are presented in Table 6.25. 
For the 12 items where the United Kingdom had the best practice, the Mann-
Whitney U test comparing United Kingdom with Canada shows significant 
differences in eleven items. For the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and France, and the United Kingdom and Germany there were 
significant differences in all the 12 items. Comparing the United Kingdom with 
Sweden shows significant differences in eleven of the twelve items. Comparing 
Canada's 2 best practice items with other countries show significant differences 
in both the items and in all the countries except with the United Kingdom where 
only 1 item shows a significant difference. Comparing the only item where 
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Disclosure Items 
I. lnforma1ion on I he 1erms of I he direclors' service con1rac1. 
2. Audilor's repon on corpora1e governance maners. 
3. lnformalion on corporale governance. 
4. Disclosure of relaled pany 1ransac1ions be1ween direclors and I he company. 
5. Informal ion on 1he independence of I he direclors. 
6. Composi1ion of board of direc1ors. 
7. Delails of audi1 comminee. 
8. Deaail of remunera1ionlcompensa1ion comminee. 
9. Deaails of inaernal conarol. 
I 0. Deaails of direclors' salary/fee. 
11 . Deaai ls of direclors' bonus/performance bonus/profil sharing or olher similar paymenas. 
I 2. De1ails of direc1ors' benefias in kindlo1her fri nge benefi1s. 
I 3. Direclors' emolumenl(remuneraaion). 
14. Delails of direcaors' inleresl in shares. 
15. Delails of direc1ors' share oplion scheme. 
B.P.(%)- Bes1 Praclice (percenlage of I he mean modified dicho1omous raw score). 
• • Significam al 1% level of significance. 
•• - Signilicanl al 5% level of significance. 
Median 
score U. Kin2dom 
3 B.P.(97.06"!.) 
3 B.P.(61.76"/o) 
3 B.P.(t 00.00"/o) 
4 B.P.(76.47"/o) 
3 0.0220•• 
3 0.0002° 
3 0.4652 
3 B.P.(93.38%) 
3 B.P.(52.94%) 
3 B.P.(71.1 0%) 
4 B.P.(69.56'Yo) 
3 B.P.(70.31 "lo) 
4 B.P.(96.08%) 
4 B.P.(95.59%) 
4 B.P.(93.75"/o) 
Table 6.25 
Canada Netherlands France Germany~ 
o.oooo• o.oooo• o.oooo• o.oooo• 
o.oooo• o.ooo<i• o.oooo• o.oooo• 
0.0787 o.oooo• 0.0000• o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 0.0246•• 0.0000• 0.0033• 
B.P.(47.06%) o.oooo• 0.0220 .. o.oooo• 
o.oooo• o.oooo• o.oooo• o.oooo• 
B.P.(66.9t %) o.oooo• · o.oooo• 0.0000• 
o.oooo• o.oooo• o.oooo• o.oooo• 
0.0262•• o.oooo• o.oooo• b.oooo• 
0.0000• o.oooo• ooooo• o oooo• 
0.0000• o.oooo• o.oooo• 0.0000• 
o.oooo• o.oooo• ooooo• o.oooo• 
0.0000• o.oooo• 0.0000• o.oooo• 
o.oooo• o.oooo• o.oooo• o oooo• 
o.oooo• 0.0000• o.oooo• o.o3 1s•• 
Significance probabilities from Mann-Whitncy U test: A comparison of the country with best practice, with other countries. 
Sweden 
0.0016• 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
B.P.(93.07%) 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
0.0518 
0.0025• 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
o.oooo• 
0.0000• 
- . 
. Sweden had the best practice revealed that there were significant differences 
between Sweden and all the other countries. 
The high level of significance between· the best practice country . with other 
countries for all the important and very important items indicates that there were 
inconsistencies or a lack of harmony in the disclosure of information relating to 
directors' behaviour in an international setting. This finding also support the 
argi.unents that information will not be adequately disclosed in the absent of 
regulation. In this case the United Kingdom had 12 best practice items out of 15 
items under consideration and a high level of significance is because the 
Cadbury's and Greenbury's recommendations were publicly endorsed in the 
United Kingdom and incorporated in the Listing Rules (Hampel Report, 1998, 
para. 1.5). Without these endorsement and Listing Rules it is doubt that the 
United Kingdom companies will disclose this information adequately and 
voluntarily in their annual reports. 
6.4. Degree of agreement between actual disclosure by companies and 
investment analysts' perceptions 
The degree of agreement between the actual disclosure by compames of the 
sample countries with the investment analysts' perceptions was analysed by 
comparing the ranking of the percentage of disclosure index (mean) against the 
maximum possible score with the ranking of the percentage of investment 
analysts' mean weight against the maximum possible score. The ranks for the 23 
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disclosure items of the· s1x sample countries (unweighted dichotomous and 
unweighted modified dichotomous) and the investmeilt analysts are presented in 
. . 
Tables 6.26and 6.27. As shown in the above section, the weighted index was not 
ranked because it produced the same results as the unweighted one. 
An examination of the data in Tables 6.26 and 6.27 indicate that both the 
dichotomous and modified dichotomous methods showed a remarkable lack of 
agreement in the ranking of the disclosure items between the sample countries 
and the investment analysts. Since both methods of measurement showed a 
disagreement with the investment analysts' ranking and since the dichotomous 
method determines only the availability of information, whereas the modified 
dichotomous method determines both the availability and adequacy of 
information disclosed (discussed in earlier chapters),. in this study only the 
modified dichotomous index is discussed. Apart from comparing between the 
ranking of actual disclosure by companies of the sample countries and the 
investment analysts' ranking, this study also compares the ranking of the actual 
disclosure by companies between each possible pairs of countries. This 
comparison seeks to identify the differences between the actual disclosures by 
the companies with what the investment analysts consider desirable. The 
objective of this comparison also seeks to identify the differences in the rankings 
between the sample countries. The higher the differences between the rankings, 
the higher the degree of disagreement ·between actual disclosure and what the 
investment analysts expected. The higher the differences between the rankings of 
the actual disclosures by company in the sample countries, the higher the degree 
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N 
w 
N 
U. Kin do m Canada Netherlands 
Disclosure Items A Rank A Rank A 
I. Information on the terms of tbe directors' service contract 97.06% 8 0.00% 19 2.94% 
2. AudilOr's repon on corporate governance mauers. 61.76% 20 0.00% 19 0.00% 
3. Information on corporate governance. 100.00% I 91.18% 4 44. 12% 
4. Statemem of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 100.00% I 91.18% 4 000% 
5. Disclosure of related party transactioM between directors and the company. 7647% 18 20.59% 14 50.000/o 
6. Information on the independence of the directors. 20.59% 23 47.06% 10 0.000/o 
7. Directors' other directorship/offices. 97.06% 8 97.06% 3 O.OO'Ya 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. ' 94. 12% 13 29.41% 13 0.00% 
9. Composition of board of directors. 100.00% I 100.00% I 100.00% 
I 0. Directors'ages. 94.12% 13 8.82% 16 29.41 % 
I I Directors' qualifications. 41.18% 22 41. 18% 11 0.000/o 
12. Details of audu commiuee. 97.06% 8 100.00% I 32.35% 
13. Detai l of remuneration/compensation committee. 94.12% 13 85.29% 7 29.41% 
14. Details of internal control. 100.00% I 91. 18% 4 17.65% 
15. Detai ls of nomination commiuee. 67.65% 19 64.71% 9 23.53% 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method 47.06% 2 1 35.29% 12 76.47% 
17. Details of direc tors' sa lary/fee. 94. 12% 13 000% 19 2.94% 
18 Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar payments. 96.55% 12 0.00% 19 0.00% 
19. Details of directors' benefits m kind/other fringe benefits-. 100.00% I 4.55% 17 0.00% 
20. Details of directors' pension schemes. 93.75% 17 3.23% 18 0.00% 
21 . Directdrs' emolument( remuneration). 100.00% I 0.00% 19 100.00% 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. , 97.06% 8 17.65% 15 11.76% 
23. Details of directors' share option scheme. I 00.000/o I 68.000/o 8 68.00% 
A - The figure shown here was the percentage o f the mean of the raw score (Appendices 7-12) agamst the poSSible mdex score (I). 
B - The figure shown here was the percentage of mean investment analysts' score against possible score ( 4 ). 
Table 6.26 
Rank 
13 
15 
6 
15 
s 
IS 
15 
15 
I 
8 
IS 
7 
8 
11 
10 
3 
13 
15 
15 
15 
I 
12 
4 
France 
A RMnk 
0.00% 19 
0.00% 19 
29.4 1% 12 
32.35% 10 
S.88% IS 
20.59% 14 
50.00% 5 
38.24% 7 
100.00% I 
5 88% 15 
0.00% 19 
38.24% 7 
52.94% 4 
5.88% 15 
32.35% 10 
38 24% 7 
44. 12% 6 
0.00% 19 
0.00% 19 
3.45% 18 
70.59% 3 
23.53% 13 
76.00% 2 
Ranking of dichotomous score and investment analysts' score. 
Germany Sweden l. Anal st5 
A Rank A Rank B Rank 
0.00% 13 67.65% 9 72.75% 7 
0.00% 13 0.00% 22 63.75% 13 
2.94% 10 5.88% 20 68.50% 11 
2.94% 10 0.00% 22 56.50% 18 
41.18% 5 11.76% 17 85.15% 3 
0.00% 13 2.94% 21 71.50% 9 
0.00% 13 97.06% 3 62.25% 16 
2.94% 10 97.06% 3 45.00% 22 
97.06% 2 100.00% I 63.75% 13 
5 88% 7 97.06% 3 50.50% 21 
41 18% s 4706% 12 5500% 19 
5.88% 7 8 82% 18 69.00% 10 
0.00% 13 23.53% 13 63.25% 15 
0.00% 13 8.82% 18 66 75% 12 
5 88% 7 17.65% 15 52.25% 20 
94. 12% 4 17 65% 15 39 75% 23 
0.00% 13 88 24% 7 77 25% 6 
0.00% 13 63 33% 10 81.50% 5 
0.00% 13 48.28% 11 72.75% 7 
97.06% 2 20.59% 14 5915% 17 
100.00% I 100 00% I 83.25% 4 
0.00% 13 9706% 3 89.75% I 
0.00% 13 81.82% 8 87.00% 2 
N 
w 
w 
U. Kin do m Canada Netherlands 
Disclosure Items A Rank A Rank A 
I. Information on the terms of the directors' service contract. 97.06% 3 0.00% 19 2.94% 
2. Auditor's repon on corporate governance matters. 61.76% 18 0.00% 19 0.00% 
3. Information on corporate governance. 100.0% I 91.18% 2 44.12% 
4. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 100.0% I 91.18% 2 0.00% 
5. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 76.47% 12 20.59% 13 50.00% 
6. Information on the independence of the directors. 20.59% 23 47.06% 6 0.00% 
7, Directors' other directorship/offices. 97.06o/o 3 97.06% I 0.00% 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 94. 12% 7 29.41% 11 0.00% 
9. Composition of board of directors. 65.54% 16 45.94% 7 58.97% 
10. Directors'ages. 92.81% 10 8.82% 15 27 .65% 
11 . Directors' qualifications. 21 .32% 22 18.48% 14 0.00% 
12. Details of audit committee. 63.24% 17 66.91% 4 15.44% 
13. Detail of remuneration/compensation committee. 93.38% 9 55.15% 5 14 .71% 
14. Details of internal control. 52.94% 19 45.59% 8 8.82% 
15. Details of nomination committee. 46.32% 20 41.91% 10 12.50% 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 29.41% 21 23.53% 12 61.76% 
17. Details of directors' salary/fee. 71.10% 13 0.00% 19 1.96% 
18. Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar payments. 69.56% 15 0.00% 19 0.00% 
19. Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 70.31% 14 1.14% 18 0.00% 
20. Details of directors' pension schemes. 78.91% 11 1.61 % 17 0.00% 
21 . Directors' emolument(remuneration). 96.08% 5 0.00% 19 48.53% 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. 95.59% 6 5.88% 16 2.94% 
23. Details of directors' share option scheme. 93.75% 8 44.00% 9 37.00% 
A - The figure shown here was the percentage of the mean of the raw score (Appendtces 13 - 18) agamst the poss tble mdex score (I 0). 
B- The figure shown here was the percentage of mean investment analysts' score against possible score (4). 
Table 6.27 
Rank 
12 
15 
5 
15 
3 
15 
15 
15 
2 
7 
15 
8 
9 
11 
10 
I 
14 
15 
15 
15 
4 
12 
6 
France 
A Rank 
0.00% 19 
0.00% 19 
29.41% 7 
32.35% 5 
5.88% 15 
20.59% 11 
50.00% 2 
38.24% 4 
52.56% I 
2.10% 17 
0 .00% 19 
25.74% 9 
30.15% 6 
2.94% 16 
20.59% 11 
27.94% 8 
18.62% 13 
0.00% 19 
0.00% 19 
0.86% 18 
25.74% 9 
7.35% 14 
38.50% 3 
Ranking of modified dichotomous score and investment analysts' score. 
Germany Sweden I. Anal sts 
A Rank A Rank B Rank 
0.00% 13 67.65% 5 72.75% 7 
0.00% 13 0.00% 22 63.75% 13 
2.94% 8 5.88% 18 68.50% 11 
2.94% 8 0.00% 22 56.50% 18 
41.18% 3 11.76% 14 85.75% 3 
0.00% 13 2.94% 21 71.50% 9 
0.00% 13 97.06% I 62.25% 16 
2.94% 8 97.06% I 45.06% 22 
53.56% 2 93.07% 4 63.75% 13 
5.88% 7 97.06% I 50.50% 21 
28.61% 5 20.84% 11 55.00% 19 
2.94% 8 5.15% 19 69.00% 10 
0.00% 13 11.76% 14 63.25% 15 
0.00% 13 4.41% 20 66.75% 12 
2.94% 8 10.29% 16 52.25% 20 
80.88% I 14.71% 12 39.75% 23 
0.00% 13 44.58% 8 77.25% 6 
0.00% 13 29.29% 9 81.50% 5 
0.00% 13 12.13% 13 72.75% 7 
27.94% 6 6.21% 17 59.75% 17 
30.88% 4 55.43% 6 83.25% 4 
0.00% 13 51.47% 7 89.75% I 
0.00% 13 23.86% 10 87.00% 2 
of disagreement between them. To support the findings statistically Speannan 
rank correlation coefficients were calculated between the ranking of each sample 
country and· the investment analysts' ranking, and between the rankings of each 
possible pairs of country. The Speannan correlation coefficients for the modified 
dichotomous index (unweighted) are shown in Table 6.28. 
The results of the Speannan correlation coefficients are also used to test the main 
hypothesis number 2 posed in chapter l, that is: 
H2: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between each sample country and the investment 
analysts and between each possible pairs of countries. 
This hypothesis is further broken-up into the following hypotheses: 
Hl: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between the United Kingdom and the investment 
analysts. 
H2: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between Canada and the investment analysts. 
H3: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between the Netherlands and the investment analysts. 
H4: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between France and the investment analysts. 
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I. Analysts -
-
-
U. Kingdom 0.1933 -
N(23) -
Sig 0.377 -
i. 
Canada -0.3085 0.1078 -
N(23) N(23) -
Sig 0.152 Sig 0.624 -
Netherlands 0.1264 0.0349 0.1521 -
N(23) N(23) N(23) -
Sig 0.566 Sig 0.874 Sig 0.488 -
France -0.1694. 0332 0.7206 0.3679 -
N(2J) N(2J) N(2J) N(2J) -
Sig 0.440 Sig 0.122 Sig 0.000 Sig 0.084 -
Germany -0.4022 . -0.1169 0.0635 0.5058 0.1841 -
N(23) N(23) N(23) N(23) N(23) -
Sig 0.057 Sig 0.595 Sig o:774 Sig 0.014 Sig 0.400 -
Sweden 0.0156 0.3374 -0.2609 0.147 0.1677 0.1028 -
N(23) N(23) N(23) N(23) N(23) N(23) -
. Sig 0.944 Sig0.115 Sig 0.229 Sig 0.503 Sig 0.444 Sig 0.641 -
I. Analysts U. Kingdom Canada Netherlands France Germany ·swedeo 
(Coefficient/ (Cases)/2-tailed significance) 
Table 6.28 
Modified dichotomous index Spearman correlation coefficients 
H5: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the rariking of 
the disclosure items between Germany· and the investment analysts. 
H6: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between Sweden and the investmentanalysts. 
H7: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between the United Kingdom and Canada. 
H8: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
H9: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between the United Kingdom and France. 
HlO: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between the United Kingdom and Germany 
Hll: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between the United Kingdom and Sweden. 
Hl2: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between Canada and the Netherlands. 
Hl3: There is no agreementor association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between Canada and France. 
H14: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between Canada and Germany. 
HIS: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between Canada and Sweden. 
Hl6: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between the Netherlands and France. 
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·. Hl7: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure iteinsbetween the Netherlands and Germany. 
H 18: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items bet~~enthe Netherlands and Sweden. 
Hl9: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
·the disclosure items between France and Germany. 
H20: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between France and Sweden. 
H21: There is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of 
the disclosure items between Germany and Sweden. 
6.4.1. United Kingdom 
The findings reported in the above sections for each individual item shows that 
United Kingdom disclosed the most information in terms of the number of 
companies disclosing (availability) and the adequacy of disclosure. However the 
above analysis did not consider the need of the users (i.e. the investment 
analysts). Comparing the. rankings of disclosure by the United Kingdom 
companies and the ranking of the perceptions .of the investment analysts for the 
23 disclosure items showed that there was a disagreement in most of the items. 
The differences in the rankings between the United Kingdom companies and the 
investment analysts are shown in Table 6.29. From Table 6.29 it can be seen that 
there are only 5 items where the rankings differ by 3 or less places. This, in a 
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U. Kingdom Investment Analysts 
Disclosure Items A Rank B 
I. lnfonnation on the tenns of the directors' service contract. 97.06% 3 72.75% 
2. Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. 61.76% 18 63 .75% 
3. Infonnation on corporate governance. 100.0% 1 68.50% 
4. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 100.0% I 56.50% 
5. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 76.47% 12 85.75% 
6. Infonnation on the independence of the directors. 20.59% 23 71 .50% 
7. Directors' other directorship/offices. 97.06% 3 62.25% 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 94.12% 7 45.00% 
9. Composition of board of directors. 65.54% 16 63.75% 
I 0. Directors'ages. 92.81% 10 50.50% 
I I. Directors' qualifications. 21.32% 22 55.00% 
12. Details of audit committee. 63.24% 17 69.00% 
13. Detail of remuneration/compensation committee. 93.38% 9 63.25% 
14. Details of internal control. 52.94% 19 66.75% 
15. Details of nomination committee. 46.32% 20 52.25% 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 29.41% 21 39.75% 
17. Details of directors' salary/fee . 71.10% 13 77.25% 
18. Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar payments. 69.56% 15 81 .50% 
19. Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 70.31 % 14 72.75% 
20. Details of directors' pension schemes. 78.91% 11 59.75% 
21 . Directors' emolument(remuneration). 96.08% 5 83.25% 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. 95.59% 6 89.75% 
23. Details of directors' share option scheme. 93 .75% 8 87.00% 
A - The figure shown here was the percentage of the mean of the raw score (Append1ces 13 - 18) agamst the posstble mdex score (I 0). 
B- The figure shown here was the percentage of mean investment analysts' score against possible score (4). 
Table 6.29 
Rank 
7 
13 
11 
18 
3 
9 
16 
22 
13 
21 
19 
10 
15 
12 
20 
23 
6 
5 
7 
17 
4 
I 
2 
Differences in ranking between the United Kingdom companies and investment analysts. 
Difference 
in rank 
4 
-5 
10 
17 
-9 
-14 
13 
15 
-3 
11 
-3 
-7 
6 
-7 
0 
2 
-7 
-10 
-7 
6 
-1 
-5 
-6 
way, indicates that there was r{o agreement or very low agreem~nt between the 
actUal disclosure by the United Kingdom companies and what the investment 
analysts desired, The results of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (see 
Table 6.28) of 0.1933 and the 2-tailed significance probability of 0.377 tend to 
support the view that there is no agreement or a very low positive correlation 
between the ranking of the actual disclosure by the United Kingdom companies 
and the ranking on the importance of the items by the investment analysts. Based 
on these results, the hypothesis (H l) that there is no agreement or association 
(correlation) in the ranking of the disclosure items between the United Kingdom 
and the investment analysts is not rejected. This result supports the arguments in 
agency theory (discussed in the earlier chapters) that there is information 
asymmetry between the principal and the agent. 
There were 13 items with negative ranking differences, i.e. the items where the 
analysts . considered them important but were not popularly disclosed by the 
companies. The negative rankings vary from -1 to -14. The policy makers and 
standard setters in the United Kingdom should consider the items with a higher 
negative difference in setting or improving the standards and regulations on the 
disclosure of information relating to directors' behaviour. This is necessary in 
order for the companies to serve better the needs of the shareholders (investment 
analysts). 
However it must be noted that the differences in ranking between the companies 
and the investment analysts should not be looked in isolation in proposing 
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standards or regulations. The quality of disclosure of each item should also be 
· considered (i.e. column A of Table 6.29). As can be seen from column A of 
Table 6.29, only four items had a percentage of below 50%. This indicates that 
United Kingdom companies produce a high quality of.disclosure of information 
relating to directors' behaviour, even though there were many items with 
negative ranking differences. This is because of the slight variation in the. quality 
of disclosure by the United Kingdom companies for each item. Therefore, it may 
be suggested that policy makers and standard setters should also look at the items 
with negative ranking differences and with a low disclosure quality. 
6.4.2. Canada 
The rankings of the actual disclosure by companies m Canada show 
disagreement with that desired by the investment analysts. The differences in the 
ranking between the Canadian companies and the investment analysts are shown 
in Table 6.30. Only 2 items had rankings that differed by 3 or less places. The 
results of the Spearman rank correlation showed that there was a low negative 
correlation (a coefficient of -0.3058 and a 2-tailed significance probability of 
0.152) between the rank of actual disclosure by Canadian companies and the rank 
of importance by the investment analysts. These results supported the argument 
that there is a disagreement between the two rankings. Based on these results, the 
hypothesis (H2) that there is no agreement or association (correlation) in the 
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Canada Investment Analysts 
Disclosure Items A Rank B 
I. lnfonnation on the tenns of the directors' service contract. 0.00% 19 72.75% 
2. Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. 0.00% 19 63 .75% 
3. lnfonnation on corporate governance. 91.18% 2 68.50% 
4. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 91.18% 2 56.50% 
5. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 20.59% 13 85.75% 
6. Information on the independence of the directors. 47.06% 6 71.50% 
7. Directors' other directorship/offices. 97.06% I 62.25% 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 29.41% I I 45 .00% 
9. Composition of board of directors . 45.94% 7 63 .75% 
I 0. Directors'ages. 8.82% 15 50.50% 
11. Directors' qualifications. 18.48% 14 55.00% 
12. Details of audit committee. 66.91% 4 69.00% 
13. Detail of remuneration/compensation committee. 55.15% 5 63.25% 
14. Details of internal control. 45.59% 8 66.75% 
15. Details of nomination committee. 41.91% 10 52.25% 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 23.53% 12 39.75% 
17. Details of directors' salary/fee. 0.00% 19 77.25% 
18. Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing o" other similar payments. 0 .00% 19 81 .50% 
19. Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 1.14% 1'8 72.75% 
20. Details of directors' pension schemes. 1.61 % 17 59.75% 
2 L Directors' emolument(remuneration). 0.00% 19 83.25% 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. 5.88% 16 89.75% 
23. Details of directors' share option scheme. 44 .00% 9 87.00% 
A - The figure shown here was the percentage of the mean of the raw score (Appendtces 13 - 18) agamst the posstble rndex score ( 10). 
B- The figure shown here was the percentage of mean investment analysts' score against possible score (4). 
Table 6.30 
Differences in ranking.between the Canada companies and the investment analysts. 
Rank 
7 
13 
I I 
18 
3 
9 
16 
22 
13 
21 
19 
10 
15 
12 
20 
23 
6 
5 
7 
17 
4 
I 
2 
Difference 
in rank 
-12 
-6 
9 
16 
-10 
3 
15 
11 
6 
6 
5 
6 
10 
4 
10 
11 
-13 
-14 
-11 
0 
-15 
-15 
-7 
ranking of the disclosure items between Canada and the investment analysts is 
not rejected~ 
Similar to that reported for the United Kingdom, the regulators and standard 
setters in Canada should consider the list of items with high negative ranking 
differences and a low disclosure quality. 
In contrast to the disclosure quality in the United Kingdom, the Canadian 
companies disclosed less information relating to directors' behaviour. From the 
23 items surveyed only 5 items had a disclosure quality of above 50%. The 
possible reason for this low level of disclosure, as discussed in the previous 
section, is because the Canadian companies disclosed these types of information 
in the proxy statements and the 10-K Report. However, the regulators and 
standard setters in Canada should consider proposing disclosure standards or 
regulations on the items with negative ranking differences and a low disclosure 
quality in the annual reports, since not all companies produced the proxy 
statements and the 10-K Report. Furthermore, previous researches also found 
that annual reports were ranked at the top as financial information sources for the 
users (for example, Bence et al (1995), p. 22) and are widely used for decision-
making purposes. 
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6.4.3. Netherlands 
The differences in the ranking between the Dutch companies and the investment 
analysts are shown in Table 6.3 L There were 8 items where the rankings differed 
by 3 or less places. Even though there were 8 items where the rankings differed 
by 3 or less places, the results of Spearman rank correlation .showed that there 
was a low positive correlation (a coefficient of 0.1264 and a 2-tailed significance 
probability of 0.566) between the rank of actual disclosure by the Dutch 
companies and the rank of importance by the investment analysts. These results 
indicate that there is a very low degree of agreement between the two rankings, 
which implies that what do the analysts desire is not being provided by the 
disclosing companies in the Netherlands. These results also support hypothesis 
H3, that there is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of the 
disclosure items between the Netherlands and the investment analysts. 
In order for the shareholders to be better served with information relating to 
directors' behaviour, the regulators and standard setters in the Netherlands should 
consider the items with high negative ranking differences and the items with a 
low disclosure quality. In the Netherlands there were only 3 items wher-e the 
disclosure quality was 50% and above. There were 9 items with a disclosure 
quality of 0.00% (see column A of Table 6.31), i.e. not disclosed at all by the 
Dutch companies. There were 8 items with negative ranking differences in the 
Netherlands. 
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Netherlands Investment Analysts 
Disclosure Items A Rank B 
I. Infonnation on the tetms of the directors' service contract. 2.94% 12 72.75% 
2. Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. 0.00% 15 63.75% 
3. Information on corporate governance. 44.12% 5 68.50% 
4. Statement of directors' responsibi lity in respect of the financial statements. 0.00% 15 56.50% 
5. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 50.00% 3 85.75% 
6. Infonnation on the independence of the directors. 0.00% 15 71.50% 
7. Directors' other directorship/offices. 0.00% 15 62.25% 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 0.00% 15 45.00% 
9. Composition of board of directors. 58.97% 2 63 .75% 
. I 0. Directors'ages. 27.65% 7 50.50% 
11 . Directors' qualifications. 0.00% 15 55.00% 
12. Details of audit committee. 15.44% 8 69.00% 
13. Detail ofremuneration/compensation committee. 14.71% 9 63.25% 
14. Details of intern~ I control. 8.82% 11 66.75% 
15. Details of nomination committee. 12.50% 10 52.25% 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 61.76% I 39.75% 
17. Details of directors' salary/fee. 1.96% 14 77.25% 
18. Details of directors' bonus/perfonnance bonus/profit sharing or other similar payments. 0.00% 15 81.50% 
19. Detailsof directors1 benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 0.00% 15 72.75% 
20. Details of directors' pension schemes. 0.00% 15 59.75% 
21. Directors' emolument(remuneration). 48.53% 4 83.25% 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. 2.94% 12 89.75% 
23. Details of directors' share option scheme. 37.00% 6 87.00% 
A -The figure shown here was the percentage of the mean of the raw score (Appendtces 13 - 18) agamst the posstble mdex score (I 0). 
B - The figure shown here was the percentage of mean investment analysts' score against possible score ( 4 ). 
Table 6.31 
Differences in ranking between the Netherlands companies and the investment analysts. 
Rank 
7 
13 
11 
18 
3 
9 
16 
22 
13 
21 
19 
10 
15 
12 
20 
23 
6 
5 
7 
17 
4 
I 
2 
Difference 
in rank 
-5 
-2 
6 
3 
0 
-6 
1 
7 
11 
14 
4 
2 
6 
1 
10 
22 
-8 
-10 
-8 
2 
0 
-11 
-4 
As discussed in the- previous section, there is one possibility why the Dutch 
companies' disclosure qmility was very low for most of the items. The possibility 
is that the annual reports used in this study were for the year ended in I 996, 
whereas the report on corp.orate governance (Peter's Report) was recommended 
to the Dutch companies for annual reports ended in 1997. Regulators and 
standard setters in the Netherlands should consider the guidelines of the Peter's 
Report and the actual disclosure in the annual reports by the Dutch companies 
after the year 1997 before drafting any standards or regulations in this area of 
disclosure. 
6.4.4. France 
In the case of France, there were 12 items with negative ranking differences 
between the companies and the investment analysts and there were only 2 items 
with a disclosure quality of 50% or above. For five items there was no disclosure 
at all, i.e. a disclosure quality of 0.00%. The details of the differences in ranking 
between the French companies and the investment analysts and the mean 
percentage against the maximum possible score are shown in Table 6.32. The 
Spearman rank correlation between the rank of actual disclosure and the rank of 
the investment analysts shows that there was a low negative correlation with a 
coefficient of -0.1694 and a 2-tailed ·significance probability of 0.440. This 
indicated that there was no agreement in France between what the companies 
produce and what is demanded by the shareholders (investment analysts) in 
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France Investment Analysts 
Disclosure Items A Rank B 
I. Information on the terms of the directors' service contract. 0 .00% 19 72.75% 
2. Auditor's report on corporate governance matters . 0.00% 19 63.75% 
3. Information on corporate governance. 29.41% 7 68.50% 
4. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 32.35% 5 56.50% 
5. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 5.88% 15 85 .75% 
6. Information on the independence of the directors. 20.59% 11 71.50% 
7. Directors' other directorship/offices. 50.00% 2 62.25% 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 38.24% 4 45 .00% 
9. Composition of board of directors. 52.56% I 63 .75% 
'I 0. Directors'ages. 2. 10% 17 50.50% 
11 . Directors' qualifications. 0.00% 19 55.00% 
12. Details of audit committee. 25.74% 9 69.00% 
13. Detail of remuneration/compensation committee. 30. 15% 6 63 .25% 
14. Details of internal control. 2 .94% 16 66.75% 
15. Details of nomination committee. 20.59% 11 52.25% 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 27.94% 8 39.75% 
17. Details of directors' salary/fee. 18.62% 13 77.25% 
18. Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar payments. 0 .00% 19 81 .50% 
19. Details of directors' benefits in kind/other !Tinge benefits. 0.00% 19 72.75% 
20. Details of directors' pension schemes. 0.86% 18 59.75% 
2 1. Directors' emoiument(remuneration). 25.74% 9 83 .25% 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. 7.35% 14 89.75% 
23. Details of directors' share option scheme. 38.50% 3 87.00% 
A - The figure shown here was the percentage of the mean of the raw score (Appendices 13 - 18) agamst the possible mdex score (I 0). 
B- The figure shown here was the percentage of mean investment analysts' score against possible score (4). 
Table 6.32 
Differences in ranking between the France companies and the investment analysts. 
Rank 
7 
13 
I I 
18 
3 
9 
16 
22 
13 
2 1 
19 
10 
15 
12 
20 
23 
6 
5 
7 
17 
4 
I 
2 
Difference 
in rank 
-12 
-6 
4 
13 
-12 
-2 
14 
18 
12 
4 
0 
1 
9 
-4 
9 
15 
-7 
-14 
-12 
-1 
-5 
-13 
-1 
relation to the inf~rmation relating to directors' behaviour. These results are also 
. . . . . . . 
consistent with the hypothesis (H4) that there is no agreemei1t or association, 
(correlation) in the ranking of the disclosure items between France and ihe · 
investment analysts. 
Similar to the approach taken with the other countries, the regulators and 
standard setters in France should be concerned with the items with high negative 
rank differences and items with a low percentage mean against a maximum 
possible score (a low disclosure quality) in order to fulfil the needs of the 
shareholders. 
Even though in France companies are recommended to follow the Vienot Report · 
on corporate governance since 1995, their annual reports show a poor disclosure 
of information relating to directors' behaviour. There are two possibilities for this 
poor showing of the French companies: (1), as discussed in the earlier section,. 
they are required to disclose certain information under the 'Plan Comptable 
. General' and it is often the case that no additional disclosure is provided with 
respect to items covered in detail by the 'Plan' (Barret, 1977 p. 9) and (2) the 
recommendations of the Vienot's Report on corporate governance was not 
incorporated in the listing rules of their stock exchange. This also support the 
·.argument proposed earlier, that information relating to directors' behaviour is not 
voluntarily disclosed without regulation: 
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. 6.4:5, Germany 
The differences in ranki£1g for the German companies and the percentage mean 
against a maximum possible score are presented in Table 6.33. Analysing the 
'difference in rank' column of Table 6.33 suggests that there is a disagreement 
between the rankings. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient, to establish 
whether there is a degree of agreement between ranking of actual disclosure by 
German companies and the ranking of importance by the investment analysts, 
confirmed that there is no agreement between the rankings, with a moderate 
negative correlation coefficient of -0.4022 and a 2-tailed significance probability 
of 0.057. These results indicate that the shareholders are not getting the 
information on directors' behaviour that they desire. These findings should be of 
prime interest to the regulators and standard setters in Germany in order to 
improve the disclosure of information relating to the directors' behaviour in the 
companies' annual reports. These results suggest, following hypothesis (HS), that 
there is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of the disclosure 
items between Germany and the investment analysts. This can be interpreted that 
the shareholders in Germany are not getting the information relating to directors' 
behaviour that they desired. The reason for this may ·be due to lack of 
regulations or guidelines on corporate governance in Germany to encourage 
companies to disclose such information. This is inline with the argument of this 
thesis proposed in earlier chapters that the information is not voluntarily 
disclosed without the intervention of regulatory bodies. 
248 
Germanv Investment Analysts 
Disclosure Items A Rank B 
I. lnforma.tion on the terms of the directors' service contract. 0.00% 13 72.75% 
2. Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. 0.00% 13 63.75% 
3. Information on corporate governance. 2.94% 8 68.50% 
4. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 2.94% 8 56.50% 
5. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 41.18% 3 85.75% 
6. Information on the independence of the directors. 0.00% 13 71.50% 
7. Directors' other directorship/offices. 0.00% 13 62.25% 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 2.94% 8 45.00% 
9. Composition of board of directors. 53.56% 2 63.75% 
i 0. Directors'ages. 5.88% 7 50.50% 
11. Directors' qualifications. 28.61% 5 55.00% 
12. Details of audit committee. 2.94% 8 69.00% 
13. Detail of remuneration/compensation committee. 0.00% 13 63.25% 
14. Details of internal· control. 0.00% 13 66.75% 
15. Details of nomination committee. 2.94% 8 52:25% 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 80.88% I 39.75% 
17. Details of directors' salary/fee. 0.00% 13 77.25% 
18. Details of directors' bonus/perfonnance bonus/profit sharing or other similar payments. 0.00% 13 81.50% 
19. Details of dire.ctors' benefits in kind/other !Tinge benefits. · 0.00% 13 72.75% 
20. Details of directors' pension schemes. 27.94% 6 59.75% 
21. Directors' emolument(remuneration). 30.88% 4 83.25% 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. 0.00% 13 89.75% 
23. Details of directors' share option scheme. 0.00% 13 87.00% 
A - The figure shown here was the percentage of the mean of the raw score (Appendtces 13 - 18) agamst the posstble mdex score (I 0). 
B - The figure shown here was the percentage of mean investment analysts' score against possible score ( 4 ). 
Table 6.33 
Differences in ranking between Germany companies and the investment analysts. 
Rank 
7 
13 
11 
18 
3 
9 
16 
22 
13 
21 
19 
10 
15 
12 
20 
23 
6 
5 
7 
17 
4 
I 
2 
Difference 
in rank 
-6 
0 
3 
10 
0 
-4 
3 
14 
11 
14 
14 
2 
2 
-1 
12 
22 
-7 
-8 
-6 
11 
0 
-12 
-11 
As discussed m the earlier sections, Gem1an companies· disclosed the least 
irifonnation relating to directors' behaviour in the companies' annu13.l re,ports 
amongst the six sample countries. [t can be seen in column A of Table 6.33 that 
there were ll items with 0~00% score. There were 8 items with negative rank 
differences between the companies' actual disclosure ranking and the investment 
analysts' ranking, indicating that the investment analysts viewed the items more 
important compared withthat produced by the companies. As suggested earlier 
regulators and standard setters should consider the items with negative rank 
differences and items with a low disclosure quality in drafting standards and 
regulations on disclosure relating to directors' behaviour in Germany. 
6.4.6. Sweden 
Among the sample countries, Sweden was ranked second behind the United 
Kingdom in the overall disclosure and individual item disclosure. Even though 
Swedish companies show a high level of disclosure of information in relation to 
directors' behaviour, the Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.0156 and the 2-
tailed significance of 0.944 indicate that there was no significant correlation or a 
very very low correlation between the ranking by the investment analysts and the 
ranking of actual disclosure by the Swedish companies. Based on these results, 
the hypothesis (H6) that there is no agreement or association (correlation) in the 
ranking of the disclosure items between Sweden and the investment analysts is 
not rejected. The result of no correlation suggests that there is room for 
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improvemen.t for ~he S_wedish policy makers and standard setters to consider. As 
suggested with the other countries earlier, the regulatorS and standard setters 
should consider the items with high negative rank differences and a low 
·percentage score to improve the standards or regulations on disclosure of 
directors' information in Sweden. There were 7 items where the percentage score 
was above SO% and only 2 items with percentage scores of 0.00% (see Table 
6.34 ). Form Table 6.34 there were I J items with the negative rank differences. 
The result of no correlation between the ranking of the investment analysts and 
the ranking of the percentage of actual disclosure by companies may be due to no 
corporate governance guidelines or reports recommending disclosure of 
information.relating to directors' behaviour in Sweden. Even though there is no 
report on corporate governance in Sweden, the results of only 2 items with 0.00% 
of actual score against a maximum possible score, indicate that certain companies . 
in Sweden are disclosing information relating to directors' behaviour voluntarily. 
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Sweden Investment Analysts 
Disclosure Items A Rank B 
I. lnfonnation on the terms of the directors' service contract. 67.65% 5 72.75% 
2. Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. 0.00% 22 63.75% 
3. lnfonnation on corporate governance. 5.88% 18 68.50% 
4. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 0.00% 22 56.50% 
5. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company. 11 .76% 14 85.75% 
6. Information on the independence of the directors. 2.94% 21 71.50% 
7. Directors' other directorship/offices. 97.06% I 62.25% 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 97.06% I 45.00% 
9. Composition of board of directors. 93.07% 4 63.75% 
I 0. Directors'ages. 97.06% I 50.50% 
11 . Directors' qualifications. 20.84% 11 55.00% 
12. Details of audit committee. 5.15% 19 69.00% 
13. Detail of remuneration/compensation committee. 11 .76% 14 63.25% 
14. Details of internal control. 4.41% 20 66.75% 
15. Details ofnomination committee. 10.29% 16 52.25% 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method . 14 .71% 12 39.75% 
17. Details of directors' salary/fee. 44.58% 8 77.25% 
18. Details of directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other s imilar payments. 29.29% 9 81.50% 
19. Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 12.13% 13 72.75% 
20. Details of directors' pension schemes. 6.21% 17 59.75% 
2 1. Directors' emoluinent(remuneration). 55.43% 6 83.25% 
22. Details of directors' interest in shares. 51.47% 7 89.75% 
23. Detai ls of directors' share option scheme. 23.86% 10 87.00% 
A -The figure shown here was the percentage of the mean of the raw score (Append1ces 13 - 18) agamst the poss1ble mdex score ( I 0). 
B- The figure shown here was the percentage of mean investment analysts' score against possible score (4). 
Table 6.34 
Differences in ranking between Sweden companies and the investment analysts. 
Rank 
7 
13 
11 
18 
3 
9 
16 
22 
13 
21 
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10 
15 
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20 
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I 
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Difference 
in rank 
2 
-9 
-7 
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-12 
15 
21 
9 
20 
8 
-9 
1 
-8 
4 
11 
-2 
-4 
-6 
0 
-2 
-6 
-8 
6.4. 7. Summary of the correlation between sample countries' ranking and 
investmentanalysts' ranking · · 
The summary of the correlation between the six sample countries' rariking and 
the investment analysts' ranking discussed in above sections is shown in the · 
.. diagram below. 
France 
(- 0.1694) 
Canada 
(- 03085) 
Germany 
(- 0.4022) 
I 
lo 
Negative Correlation 
Sweden 
(0.0156) 
Netherlands 
(0.1264) 
U. Kingdom 
(0.1933) 
Low 
Diagram 6.1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.3 0.6 
Moderate 
Positive Correlation 
High 
The correlation between sample countries' ranking and investment analysts' 
ranking 
The diagram above indicates that there is no agreement between what is b~ing 
produced by the companies in the sample countries with what is perceived as 
important by the investment analysts. These findings should be useful in guiding 
the national and international regulator~ and standard setters in promulgating a 
regulation or standard in this area of disclosure. 
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6.4.8. Correlation in the ranking. between each possible pair of the sample 
. . countries · · · · 
In this section, the correlation· between the ranking of actual disclosure by 
companies in 15 possible pairs of sample countries are analysed. It is not 
intended in this section to compare the actual differences in the ranking of the 
disclosure items between the countries· since individual disclosure items between 
countries have been analysed and discussed in the above section. The correlation 
between the rankings in 15 pairs of sample countries is analysed to test the 
hypotheses H7 to H21 above. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the 
level of harmony between each pair of the sample countries on the rankings of 
the information relating to directors' behaviour. A higher correlation coefficient 
indicates a high level of harmony between the pair and vice-versa. The Spearrnan 
correlation coefficients for the 15 pairs of countries are shown in Table 6.28 
above. 
There is a very low positive correlation in the ranking of the disclosure items 
between the United Kingdom and Canada (Spearman correlation coefficient of 
0.1078 and 2-tailed significance probability of 0.624). This indicates that 
hypothesis (H7), that there is no. agreement or association (correlation) in the 
ranking of the disclosure items between the United Kingdom and Canada, is not 
rejected. 
Regarding the association between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the 
Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.0349 and the 2-tailed significance 
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.. _.._,., ... · .. , ... ~ 
probability is 0:874. These show that there is a very low degree of agreement 
between· these two countries. Therefore, the hypothesis (H8), that here is no . 
agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of the. disclosure. items 
between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, is not rejected. 
In the case of the United Kingdom and France, there is a moderate correlation 
between the rankings (Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.332 and 2-tailed 
significance probability of 0.122). Therefore, the hypothesis (H9), that there is no 
agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of the disclosure items 
between the United Kingdom and France, is rejected. 
Hypothesis (HlO), that there is no agreement or association (correlation) in the 
ranking of the disclosure items between the United Kingdom and Germany, is 
not rejected because there is a negative correlation between the two countries 
(Spearman correlation coefficient is- 0.1169 and 2-tailed probability 0.595) 
For the United Kingdom and Sweden, the hypothesis (Hll), that there IS no 
agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of the disclosure items 
between the United Kingdom and Sweden, is rejected. There is ;._ moderate 
correlation between the two countries (Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.3374 
and 2-tailed significance probability is 0.115). 
As to the relationship between Canada and the Netherlands there is a low positive 
correlation (Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.1521 and 2-tailed significance 
255 
probability is.0.488). Therefore, hypothesis (Hl2), thatthere is no agreement or 
. . ·•. . 
assoCiation (correlation) in the ranking of the disclosure items between Canada 
and the Netherlands, is not rejected. 
Hypothesis (Hl3), that there is no agreement or association (correlation) in the 
ranking of the disclosure "items between Canada and France, is rejected because 
the Spearrnan correlation coefficient between these two countries is 0.7206 and 
significance probability is 0.000. 
As to the association between Canada and Germany the hypothesis (Hl4), that 
there is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of the disclosure 
items between Canada and Germany, is not rejected because there is a very low 
correlation coefficient between them (Spearrnan correh1tion coefficient is 0.0635 
and 2-tailed significance probability is 0.774). 
There is a negative correlation between Canada and Sweden (Spearrnan 
correlation coefficient is - 0.2609 and 2-tailed significance probability is 0.229). 
This resulted in hypothesis (HlS), that there is no agreement or association 
(correlation) in the rank.ingofthe disclosure items between Canada and Sweden, 
being accepted. 
Between the Netherlands and France there is a moderate positive correlation of 
0.3679 and 2-tailed significance probability of 0.084. Therefore, hypothesis 
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(H16), that there is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking of the 
disclosure items between the Netherlands and France, is rejected. 
The Netherlands and Germany also have a moderate positive correlation, 
therefore hypothesis (H17), that there is no agreement or association (correlation) 
in the ranking of the disclosure items between the Netherlands and Germany, is 
rejected. The Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.5058 and 2-tailed significance 
probability is 0.014 between these two countries. 
However for the Netherlands and Sweden there is a low positive correlation, 
therefore, the hypothesis (HI&), that there is no agreement or association 
(correlation) in the ranking of the disclosure items between the Netherlands and 
· Sweden, is not rejected. The Spearman correlation coefficient between these two 
countries is 0.1470 and the 2-tailed significance probability is 0.503. 
France and Germany also show a low correlation with the Spearman correlation 
coefficient of 0.1841 and 2-tailed significance probability of 0.400. This 
indicates that hypothesis (H19), that there is no agreement or association 
(correlation) in the ranking of thP. disclosure items between France and Germany, 
is not rejected. 
France and Sweden show a similar result with those of France and Germany. The 
Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.1677 and 2-tailed significance probability is 
0.444 indicate that hypothesis (H20), there is no agreement or association 
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(correlation) in the. ranking of the disclosure items between France and Sweden, 
is not rejected. 
For Germany and Sweden there IS also a iow positive correlation (Spearman 
correlation is 0.1028 and 2-tailed significance probability is 0.641), which 
suggest that hypothesis (H21) that there is no agreement or association 
(correlation) in the ranking of the disclosure items between Germany and 
Sweden, is not rejected. 
The hypotheses H7 to H21 and the Spearman correlation coefficient between the 
15 pairs of the sample countries are summarised in diagram 6.2 below. From 
diagram 6.2 it can be seen that there are two pairs of countries with a negative 
correlation, i.e. Canada and Sweden, and United Kingdom and Germany. This 
indicates that the companies in Canada and Sweden, and in United Kingdom and 
Germany have a different emphasis on the importa·nce of each of the disclosure 
item. 
There are 8 pairs of countries with a low correlation coefficient indicating that 
there is low degree of agreement in the rankings of information relating to 
directors' affairs in the annual reports of companies in these countries. These low 
levels of agreement and negative correlation between the countries suggest a lack 
of harmony in the rankings of the disclosure items. This piece of information is 
considered to be useful to the regulators and standard setters, especially 
international regulators and international standard setters, such as the OECD, EU 
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Diagram 6.2 
Summary of hypotheses H7 to H21 and Spearman correlation coefficient 
between 15 pairs of sample countries 
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and IASC, in helping their efforts to harn1onise standards on disclosure of 
information relating to directors' behaviour: However, it should be reminded that 
this result show only the level of harmony in the rankings of the disclosure items 
and not the level of harmony of the actual disclosure practices of information 
relating to directors' behaviour in the sample countries. Therefore, this result 
should be used in conjunction with the results presented in the earlier sections. 
6.5. Summary 
This chapter presents the results and analyses of the study. Firstly this chapter 
presents the results of the questionnaire survey by discussing the response rate, 
the median and mean weights for each disclosure item and the ranking of the 
items in order of importance. Secondly this chapter reports on the results of the 
actual disclosure by the sample companies of the six sample countries. This 
section was divided into (I) overall disclosure, and (2) individual items 
disclosure. 
The overall disclosures were reported for the dichotomous disclosure index, the 
modified dichotomous disclosure index, the weighted dichotomous disclosure 
index and the weighted modified dichotomous disclosure index for each of the 
sample companies in the sample country. A Kruskall-Wall is test was used to test 
for the difference, for each disclosure index, between the sample countries and a 
Mann-Whitney U test was used to test between each possible pairs of countries. 
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The results of these tests suggest that there were significant differences between 
the countries. 
For the individual items' disclosure, the dichotomous index and the modified 
· dichotomous index for each disclosure item for the six sample countries 'tere 
shown. This section also shows that weighting has no effect on the calculation of 
the disclosure index of each item. Consensus scores were determined for both the 
dichotomous and the modified dichotomous in order for the regulators and 
standard setters to have a closer look at which items that were not popularly 
disclosed by companies in the sample countries. Apart from the consensus scores 
this section also presents the results of the statistical analysis to test for the 
differences between the sample countries and each possible pairs of countries for 
each disclosure item. This section also highlighted at country with the best 
practice for each item that was viewed as being important or very important by 
investment analysts. 
Finally this chapter presents the results and analysis on the degree of agreement 
or correlation between the perception of the investment analysts and the actual 
disclosure by the companies for each of the sample countries, and between each 
possible pair of the sample countries. 
In the next chapter, the summary and conclusion of this study are presented. This 
includes the limitations of this study and areas for future research. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
7.1. Summary and conclusions of the study 
This study started with the examination of the problems related to corporate 
governance, which arise from the so-called divorce between ownership and 
control or the agency relationship in a bUsiness organisation. One of the common 
recommendations suggested that can overcome these problems was 
'transparency' or a better information disclosure to the shareholders. However, 
there have been debates between the proponents and opponents ofregulations on 
the disclosure of information. The opponents argued that companies for various 
reasons voluntiuily disclose information. The opponents of regulations also 
argued that the disclosure of information relating to directors' behaviour is not 
necessary since the directors can be disciplined and monitored by market forces 
and other corporate governance controlling mechanisms. However, the 
proponents of regulations criticised the various reasons suggested by the 
oppon-::nts of regulations. The proponents of regulations argued that, if 
information relating to directors' behaviour is voluntarily disclosed, then why 
there is demand for transparency by various groups, and if the market forces and 
controlling mechanisms can discipline and monitor directors' behaviour, why 
. have they not done so? The author supported the arguments of the proponents of 
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regulations, i.e. there should. be regulation. on ·the. di~~losure of infonnation 
relating to directors' behaviour in order to reduce the agency costs. · 
The purpose of this study was to assess. the 'transparency' or the quality of 
disclosure of infonnation relating to directors' behaviour in the annual reports of 
large companies in six key countries (United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, 
France, Gennany, and Sweden), and to detennine whether there are significant 
differences in the quality of the overall disclosure and the disclosure of each 
individual item between the countries. In addition, this study also focused on the 
detennination of the correlation or association between the ranking of importance 
of the disclosure items placed by the investment analysts and the ranking of 
disclosure quality produced by companies in each country, and the correlation of 
the ranking between each pair of the six countries. The findings, of disclosure 
items being not transparent or of inadequate disclosure and the existence of 
significant differences between the countries, ·support the proponents of 
regulations on the disclosure of infonnation. These fmdings need to be relayed to 
the regulators and standard setters, especially the international regulators and 
standard setters, to help them in fonnulating a regulation or standard in the 
disclosure of infonnation relating to directors' behaviour. 
A disclosure index, known as a disclosure point average (DP A), based on 23 
items of infonnation relating to directors' behaviour, was developed to measure 
the overall quality of disclosure in the 1996 annual reports of 204 large listed 
companies in six countries (34 companies per country). The disclosure point 
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average for each company was calculated using the dichotomous (UWDDPA) 
and the modified dichotomous (UWMDDPA) methods of measuring. These two 
methods were then weighted to arrive at the weighted dichotomous disclosure 
point average (WDDPA) and the weighted modified dichotomous disclosure 
point average (WMDDPA). The weights for the disclosure· items were gathered 
from a questionnaire survey. of senior investment analysts in the United 
Kingdom. The percentage of the mean disclosure point average against the 
maximum possible score showed there were slight variations between the four 
methods of measuring disclosure quality for each sample country. 
There were three groupings of countries in terms of disclosure of information 
relating to directors' behaviour in the annual reports. The first group with the 
highest level of disclosure quality for the four methods of measurement was the 
United Kingdom. The second group comprised Sweden and Canada, followed by 
the Netherlands, France, and Germany in the third group. There were great 
variations in the level of disclosure quality between the three groups. The 
percentage mean DPAs against the maximum possible score for the first group 
were in the range of 73% to 87%. For the second group, the percentage mean 
DPAs against a maximum possible score were in the range of 31% to 4 7% and 
for the third group it ranges from 13% to 30%. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that there were significance differences (p < 0.01) 
in the disclosure quality for all the four methods of measurements between the 
countries. The groupings of the countries mentioned above were supported by the 
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Mann~ Whitney U tests. Also Mann~Whitriey U tests showed that there were 
signifi~~c~ diffe~e~ces (p < 0.001) between the United Kingdom and each other 
' - . . . . . 
cotintry: For Canada and Sweden the Mann-Whitney U test revealed that .there 
· were no significance differences between.· them for all the four methods of 
measurement. The test also revealed that there were no significance differences 
between France and Netherlands for all the four methods of measurement. As to 
the relationship between France and Germany the test showed that there were no · 
significance differences for the UWDDPA and UWMDDPA methods of 
'measurement, and between Netherlands and Germany there were no significance 
differences for the UWDDPA. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were used to test 
the hypothesis that the overall disclosure quality of information relating to 
directors' behaviour is different between the UK, Netherlands, Canada, France, 
Germany, and Sweden and between each possible pairs of the countries. From 
the result of the Kruskal-Wallis test the first part of the hypothesis was accepted. 
The second part of the hypothesis, i.e. between each possible pair of the 
countries, all were accepted except between Canada and Sweden, and France and 
Netherlands, where they were rejected, for all the four methods of measurement. 
The hypothesis was rejected between Netherlands and . Germany for only the 
UWDDPA method of me&Surement. In between France and Germany the 
hypothesis was rejected for the UWDDPA and UWMDDPA methods of 
measurement only. 
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The results showed that there were great variations in the overall disclosure 
quality of information relating to directors' behaviour in the arinual reports of 
companies in the six countries. Five of the countries also showed a low level of 
disclosure quality with the percentage mean DJ;> As against a maximum possible 
score of below 50%. These variations and the low level of disclosure indicated 
that the companies in the countries were not transparent and there was no 
harmony in the disclosure practice of the information. These also indicated that 
the arguments of the opponents of regulations that information relating to 
directors' behaviour is voluntarily disclosed is incorrect. It may therefore be 
concluded that in order for companies to be more transparent, as suggested by 
most of the corporate governance committees, and for the regulators and standard 
setters to harmonise the practices between the countries, a regulation or standard 
should be promulgated in this area of disclosure. 
Analysing each individual item revealed that not all the items were poorly 
disclosed by all sample companies. The unweighted modified dichotomous index 
consensus score showed that two items with a above-average consensus score, 
i.e. information on the composition of board of directors and information on 
directors' other directorship/offices. This indicated that all sample companies 
popularly disclosed the two items. It may therefore be suggested that regulators 
and standard setters should look only at the items with a below average 
consensus score in drafting a regulation or standard in this area. However, not all 
the items with below average consensus scores were important in the perceptions 
of the investment analysts. Out of the 21 disclosure items with below average 
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consensus score, only 15 items were viewed to be important an-d very important 
by investment analysts (i.e. items with a median score of 3 and 4). Therefore it 
may be suggested to the regulators and standard setters that'they look at only the -
. . ' ' 
items that were viewed to be important and very important by the investment 
analysts yet had a below average consensus score, in drafting a regulation or 
standard on the disclosure of information relatingto·directors' behaviour. 
The high level of overall disclosure quality in the United Kingdom was also 
reflected in the disclosure of each individual item. Out of 15 items viewed by 
investment analysts as important and very important, :12 items of best practice 
were from the United Kingdom. For the remaining 3 items, 2 items of best 
practice were from Canada and 1 from Sweden. The Mann-Whitney U test 
revealed that for the 12 items where the best practice was from the United 
Kingdom, there were significant differences between the United Kingdom and all 
the other countries except one item where it showed no significance. different, i.e. 
with Canada for information on corporate governance. For the 2 items where the 
best practice was from Canada, the Mann-Whitney U test showed that there were 
significant differences with other countries for both the items except one item, 
i.e. details of the audit committee, where there was no significant difference with 
the United Kingdom. There were significant difference between Sweden and 
other countries that adopted disclosures of best practice. 
The results of significant difference between the best practice -country with other 
countries for almost all the important and very important items indicated that 
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-there were inconsistencies or a lack ofham1ony in the disclosure of information 
relating to directors' behaviour in the six countries. 
Apart from the differences in the overall disdosure quality and each individual 
item between the countries, the Spearman correlation coefficients revealed that 
were negative correlation or only a very low positive correlation between the 
ranking of the quality of each of the disclosure item produced by each country 
and the ranking of importance of each of the disclosure item by the investment 
analysts. The Spearman correlation coefficients were used to test the second main 
hypothesis, i.e. there is no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking 
of the disclosure items between each sample country and the ranking of the 
investment analysts. The results of the Spearman correlation coefficient of a 
negative correlation or a very low positive correlation tend to support the 
hypothesis that there was no agreement or association (correlation) in the ranking 
of the disclosure items between each sample country and the ranking of the 
investment analysts. These results indicate that the companies are not producing 
the information that is viewed to be important by the investment analysts. These 
results may provide regulators or standard setters a useful input in drafting 
regulation or standard on _the disclosure of information relating to directors' 
behaviour. 
There was also lack of agreement or association in the ranking of the disclosure 
items between each possible pair of the sample countries. Out of I 5 possible 
pairs of countries, only 5 pairs where there were moderate or high correlation 
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between therri. The 5 pairs were between Netherlands and Gennany, Netherlands 
and France, United Kingdom and Sweden, United Kingdom and France, and 
Canada and France. The other 10 pairs either have very low positive correlation 
or negative-correlation. These res tilts were also used to test the second part of the 
second main hypothesis, i.e. there is no agreement or association in the ranking 
of the disclosure items· between each possible pairs of the countries. The results 
suggested that 5 hypotheses from the second part of second main hypothesis be 
rejected: The 5 hypotheses were between Netherlands and Gennany, Netherlands 
and France, United Kingdom and Sweden, United Kingdom and France, and 
Canada and France. This lack of agreement or association in the ranking of the 
disclosure items between the countries may indicate that there was lack of 
hannony in disclosing such items in the annual reports of companies in the 
sample countries. This result should be useful to international regulators and 
standard setters, such as IASC, OECD and EU, in order for them to hannonise 
the regulation or standard on disclosure of information relating to directors' 
behaviour. 
7.2. Limitations of the study 
The results of this study must be interpreted in the context of the limitations of 
the research methodology used. These limitations relate to the sample selection, 
weighting of the disclosure items, construction of disclosure index, concentration 
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on annual reports, and the"likeJihood that mandatory disclosures are more likely 
to be picked up. 
7.2.1. Sample selection 
The countries selected in this study were discussed in chapter 4, 'Data and 
· Methodology'. However, there is very little evidence to support that the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, France, Germany, and Sweden disclosure 
practices are representative of all developed, developing, and under developed 
countries disclosure practices. Instead, the result of this study may be limited to 
the differences between the six countries only, without representing the 
disclosure practices of other countries not selected in this study. 
The companies included in this study to represent the six sample countries were 
selected from the list of Europe's top 1000 large companies based on capital 
employed except Canada where the companies were selected from the Canadian 
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchanges and Vancouver Stock 
Exchanges. However, since this study att~!mpt to match the sample companies by 
size in order to make international comparison as valid as possible, only 34 
companies from each countries were available and able to be matched. These 
companies however, formed only a small percentage of the total large companies 
in each country. In addition, due to the matching procedure adopted in this study, 
the sample companies could not be selected randomly. Thus, the results obtained 
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·App_endix 4 
Scoring Worksheet 
Country:-------- Capital Employed: _____ _:_ __ _ 
Company: _______ _ Audit Firm: ___________ _ 
Year Ended:. _______ _ Industry:. ________ _ 
Group l 
I. Information on the terms of ihe directors' service contract or a statement 
stating that the.re was no se~ice contract. 
[ I 0 points for disclosure, 0 point tor non-disclosure] 
2. Auditor's report oncorporate governance matters. 
· [ lO points for disclosure, Opoint for non-disclosure] 
3. loformatio~ on corporate governance (compliance with corporate governance 
guidelines or the awareness of the current corporate governance debate) . 
[ I 0 points for disclos~re, 0 point for non-disclosure] · 
4. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 
[ 10 points for disclosure, 0 point for non-disclosure] 
5. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company or 
a statement that there was no related party transaction between directors and 
the company. 
[ I 0 points for disclosure, 0 point for non-disclosure] 
Score 
D 
D 
6. Information on the independence of the directors ( related and unr~lated directors{ 
[ lO points for disclosure, 0 point for non-disclosure] 'IL.. ___ .J 
7. Directors' other directorships/offices or a statement that there were no other 
directorships/offices. 
[ 10 points for disclosure, 0 point for non-disclosure] 
8. Directors' date of appointment or year of service. 
[ I 0 points for disclosure, 0 point for non-disclosure] 
Group 2 
D 
D 
9. Composition of board of directors. r---J 
(a) Name and photograph of all directors. L__j 
(b) Name of all directors and photograph of certain directors. 
(c) Name of all directors. 
[10 points if disclose (a), 3.33 plus 3.33 multiply by the number of directors with 
photograph divide by total number of directors, if disclose (b), 3.33 points if 
disclose (c), 0 point if non-disclosure] 
10. Directors' ages. r---J 
[10 points for disclosure of all directors' ages, 10 points multiply by the number of L__j 
directors' ages disclose divide by total number of directors if certain directors' ages 
are disclose] 
11. Directors' qualifications. r---J 
[10 points for disclosure of all directors' qualifications, 10 points multiply by the L__j 
number of directors' qualifications disclose divide by total number of directors,· 
if certain directors' qualifications are disclose] 
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12. Details of audit committee. 
(a) Audit commitiee report 
(b)Detail information (such as the tenns of reference) and cornpositi()n of the 
audit committee · 
(c) Composition of the audit committee . . 
(d) infonnation on the existence of the audit committee 
[ 10 points if disclose (a), 7.50 points if disclose (b), 5 points if disclose (c), 
2.50 if disclose (d), and 0 point for non-disclosure] 
13. Details of remuneration/compensation Committee. 
(a) Remuneration/compensation committee report 
(b) Detail information (such as the tenns of reference) and composition of the 
remuneration/compensation committee 
(c) Com(Josition of the remuneration/compensation committee 
(d) lnfonnation on· the existence of the. remuneration/compensation committee 
[ 10 points if disclose (a), 7.50 points if disclose (b), 5 points if disclose (c), 
2.50 if disclose (d), and 0 point for non-disclosure) 
14. Details or internal control . 
(a) Report on internal control 
(b) lnfonnation on the-existence of the internal control 
[ 10 points if disclose (a), 5 points if disclose (b)) 
15. Details of nomination committee. 
(a) Nomination committee report 
(b) Detail infonnation (such as the tenns of reference) and composition of the 
nomination committee 
(c) Composition of the nomination committee 
(d) lnfonnation on the existence of the nomination committee 
[ 10 points if disclose (a), 7.50 points if disclose (b), 5 points if disclose (c), 
2.50 if disclose (d), and 0 point for non-disclosure) 
16. Details of board of directors meeting/working method. 
(a) Number/dates of board meeting and subjects discussed 
(b) Number/dates of board meeting 
[ 10 points if disclose (a), 5 points if disclose (b)) 
Group 3 
17. Details or directors' salary/fee. 
(i) Salary/fee of each individual director. 
(ii) Total directors' salary/fee for the current year. 
(iii) Total directors' salary/fee comparative figures. 
[3.33 points for each item disclose, and 0 point for non-disclosure) 
18. Details or directors' bonus/performance bonus/profit sharing or other similar 
payments. 
(i) Bonus of each individual director. 
(ii) Total directors' bonus for the current year. 
(iii) Total directors' bonus comparative figures. 
[3.33 points for each item disclose, 0 point for non-disclosure and N.R if not relevant] 
19. Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits. 
(i) Value of benefits in kind of each individual director. 
(ii) Nature of the benefits. 
(iii) Total value of directors' benefits in kind for the current year. 
(iv) Total value of directors' benefits in kind comparative figures.· 
[2.50 points for each item disclose, 0 point for non-disclosure and N.R if not relevant] 
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20, Details of directo~· pension schemes.. _ . r---1 
(i) Accrued pension entitlement at the end of the year of each individual director. L_j 
(ii) ·Accrued pension entitlement at the beginning of the year of C::.ch individual director. 
(iii) Total directors' accrued-pension entitlement for the current year. 
(iv) Total directors' accrued pension entitlement comparative figures. 
[2.50 poinis.for _each item-disclose, 0 point for non-disclosure and N:R if not relevant) 
21. Directors' emolitments(remuneration); 
(i) Emoluments for each individual director. 
(ii). Emoluments for each individual director-comparative. fig-ures. 
(iii) Total directors' emoluments-tor the current year. 
(lv) Total directors' emoluments comparative figures, 
[2.50 points for each item disclose, and 0 poirit for non-disclosure] 
22. Det-ails of directors' interest in shares "or a statement stating that the directors 
hold no shares in the company . 
(i) Number of shares held by each individual director at the.end of the year. 
(ii) Number of shares held by each individual directors at the beginning of the year. 
(iii) Total number of shares held by directors at the end·ofthe year. 
(iv) Total number of shares held by directors at the beginning of the year. 
[2.50 points for each item disclose, and 0 point for non-disclosure] 
23. Details of directors' share options scheme. 
(i) Number of share options granted during the year of each individual director. 
(ii) Number of share options exercised during the year of each individual director. 
(iii) Option period/ date exercisable of options. 
(iv) Exercise price of share options. 
(v) Number of directors' share options outstanding at the beginning of the year. 
(vi) Number of directors' share options outstanding at the end of the year. 
(vii) Number of share options granted to directors during the year. 
(viii) Number of share options exercised by directors during the year. 
[ 1.25 points for each item disclose, 0 point for non-disclosure, and N.R if not relevant] 
(If items (i) and (ii) are disclose, items (vii) and (viii) will be given 1.25 points each) 
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Appendix 5 
DIRECTORS' INFORMATION SURVEY 
This questionnaire presents a list of many items of information on directors affairs which could be presented 
·in the annual reports of companies. You are required to apply a weight to each of the item. Each category 
.represents varying degrees of importance 10 you (as shareholder) of having the items of information appear in 
annual reports in monitoring behaviour. of directors. · 
To weigh the items, you simply enter one of the following integers: 0, I, 2, 3, or 4 into the designated 
box under the heading 'weight' tor each item. Entering a '0' indicates that the-item is not important in 
·monitoring the behaviour of directors. Entering a '4' .indicates that it is extremely important for this 
purpose. The weights I to 3 should be used to indicate varying degrees of intermediate importance. 
Note that there is no requirement that the weights be assigned with equal frequency. Use as many '4s'' 
or 'Is' for example, as you feel are warranted by the included items of information. 
I. Information on directors' date of appointment or years of service. 
2. Details of remuneration committee, such as remuneration committee's report, terms of 
reference and composition of the remuneration committee. 
3. Details of directors' benefits in kind/other fringe benefits, such as benefits in kind of each 
director by name, the nature of the benefits and comparative figures. 
4. Information about the internal control, such as report on the internal control. 
5. Information of the board of directors meeting, such as the number/dates of board meeting 
and the subjects discussed. 
6. Directors' emoluments (remuneration), such as emoluments of each director by name and 
comparative figures. [Emoluments refers to the total of salary/fee, bonus, and other payments 
made to the directors]. 
7. Information on corporate governance, i.e. compliance with corporate governance guidelines 
or the awareness of the current corporate governance debate. 
8. Information on directors' qualifications. 
9. Details of directors' pension schemes. 
10. Information on directors' ages. 
11. Composition of board of directors, such as their names, positions and photographs. 
12. Information on the terms of the directors' service contracts, such as the notice periods or 
a statement stating that there were no service contracts. 
13. Disclosure of related party transactions between directors and the company, such as loans, 
contracts and etc. or a statement that there were no related party transactions between 
directors and the company. · 
WEIGHT 
(0- 4) 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
14. Details of audit committee, such as audit committee report; terms of reference and composition 11 
of the audit committee. L__l 
15. Details of directors' interest in shares, such as the number of shares currently held by each 11 
individual director and their families. L__j 
16. Details of directors' share options scheme. CJ 
17. Auditor's report on corporate governance matters. CJ 
18. Statement of directors' responsibility in respect of the financial statements. 
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'19. ·Information about directors' current other directorships or offices. 
20. Details ofdirecto~' bonusfperformarice bomisfp~fit sharing or other similar payments, such 
as bonus of each director by name and comparative figures. 
. . 
· 21. Details of the nomination committee, such as the nomination committee's report, terms of 
reference and composition of the nomination committee. 
EJ 
D 
D .. · 
D 
i2. D~ils ~f directors' _salaryffee, such as salary of each director. by na;.,e and com~arativc figures:CJ 
23. Information aboutthe independence of the directors, such as information on the appointment of~ 
non-executive directors. · L_j 
The following questions have been included. in order to determine the breadth of institutional and 
occupational coverage represented by the returned questionnaires. 
1. What type of firm are you associated with? 
Bank D Insurance company D Brokerage house D Other ....... : .................... .. 
(Please specify) 
2. Does your job involve analysing annual reports of companies as a basis of investment decision? 
YesO No 0 
Any other comments? Please specify. 
Would you like an executive summary of my results? 
If so, please provide 
YesO 
• Name: ........................................................................ . 
• Company: ................................................................... .. 
• Address: .................................................................... .. 
No 0 
(Please note that names of individuals and companies will not be published) 
Kindly return the questionnaire in the 'Freepost' envelope, which is for the attention of l.Ramli, University of 
Plymouth Business School, Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL 1 1 BR. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP 
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6. Wonnatioooolhc ~"'" o( lhe direclon 
7 Oirecaon' I:Kber directonhiploffieel 01 a Slt.lc:m:nl &hat Lhetc wa-e no other dir«.ICN"Shlploffic:cs. 
I Ouecsors' date of appoi.ntrrau or year of service. 
9. COf11Xl'illoo o( boord o( dnocoors. 
10. DirOCIOn'aas. 
11. Oirec1ors' qual if!Caliona. 
11. Dluils olaudi1 corminoe. 
11. Oec.a&J ofrerruwatiorV'COIJ1Milllllm connittce 
14. Dolails ollllllrnll ..,...,.,. 
IS. Dluils ol nort'ltWion conmnee 
16. Dluils olboord oldireclon n-.ne/""'lana .....r.ocl 
17 Dluils ol direclon' salary/fee. 
1 &. D<wls o( direc10r1' bonullpcrformonce bonuslp<olil sharing or 0111« simlar payrn:nu 
19 Octal is ol diroaon' bmeli11 in Unri/Oihcr ("""e bmelils. 
10 Dolails ol direc1ors pauloo scllemoo 
21 Oirec1on' emolumcnl(nrn..,cnlial) 
22. Oc:tails ol direaors' Wera.t &n shares or a st.al~ s1au.na W1 lhe directors hold no shares 10 lhe con.,-.1)'. 
2l. Dolt~ls ol diteaors' share oprion sdlcm:. 
MOIIn 
11 n D ,. 15 16 17 11 19 lO Jl J1 JJ ,1.4 
0 0 0 u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0029-l 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OOOOf 
0 0 I I I 0 0 0 0 0 I I I 0 0 44 12 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0110( 
I 0 0 0 I 0 I I 0 I I 0 I 0 0 5001 
0 0 0 0 u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00001 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 2941 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O.!~JOt 
0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3135 
0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 02~1 
0 u 0 u u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1165 
0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2353 
0 I I I I I I I I I I I • I I 0 1(>41 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 029-l 
IV ,.. 0 
"' 
IV Ill 
"' 
0 
"' 
nr nr 0 
"' "' 
OUI'IOl 
"' 
IV 0 Ill 
"' 
nr IV u Ill Ill IV 
"' 
Ill IV 0 0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I OOOt 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 111 
I 0 I 0 nr I I 0 IV I IV I 0 0 or.ar.: 
4 3 7 4 j 4 6 4 4 j j s j 3 
21 21 ll 21 20 21 21 2l 20 21 20 21 21 21 
0. 100 O IH 0 304 0 I !XI 0150 0 190 0 286 u 174 0 200 0238 0 2SO 0 227 0 238 0 143 
C F ounlr : ranee 
Db. 
lcecn .... I 1 J 4 
I 0 0 0 0 
l 0 0 0 0 
J 0 0 I 0 
4 I I 0 I 
s 0 0 0 0 
6 0 I 0 0 
7 I I I I 
a I I I 0 
9 I I I I 
10 u 0 I 0 
11 0 0 0 0 
I! 0 I I 0 
IJ I I I 0 
14 0 0 0 0 
IS I I I 0 
16 0 I I 0 
17 I I 0 0 
11 0 0 u rv 
19 nt 0 0 nt 
10 0 0 0 0 
11 I I I I 
11 0 I 0 I 
ll I I I nt 
To1.-l 9 11 11 5 
Rd.lltrm 22 23 21 20 
DPA 0 409 0 565 0 478 0.25 
rv . No& rdevant (nOI apphcable). 
• Name of conlJ&tlie:s are lis1ed •n append&~ 2. 
••Owsdocwc I tens· 
s 6 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
I 0 
0 0 
0 0 
I 0 
0 0 
I I 
0 u 
0 0 
I 0 
I 0 
0 \) 
I 0 
u 0 
I I 
0 rv 
0 rv 
0 f1l 
I I 
0 0 
I nt 
9 ) 
2l 19 
0.191 0 158 
7 a 9 10 11 11 IJ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 I 0 I 0 I I 
0 0 0 0 I 0 I 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 I 0 I 0 I I 
I 0 0 I I 0 0 
I 0 0 I I 0 0 
I I I I I I I 
u 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I I 0 I 0 0 I 
I I 0 I 0 I \) 
0 0 0 I 0 I 0 
I 0 0 I 0 0 0 
I I 0 I 0 I I 
I 0 0 I I 0 0 
rv 0 0 0 0 0 rv 
rv 
"' 
0 ... rv 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I I I 0 0 I I 
I 0 0 I 0 I 0 
I 0 rv I I I 0 
11 7 2 ll 6 9 7 
21 22 22 22 22 2l 22 
0571 0 318 0091 0.591 0273 0191 0 JIB 
t. lnformu100 on lhc tcmw ol Lhe d.reaOt'S' sen•icc contract a a s1.a1enau suuinjlhll there was no serviQC corurld 
2 Audtaor's repon on corporate &0''«1\anCt rrAUCJS. 
Appendix 10 
Dichotomous raw scores 
COMPANY• 
14 IS 16 17 11 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
I 0 0 I 0 
0 0 I 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 I 0 
I 0 I 0 0 
I 0 0 0 0 
I I I I I 
I 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 I 
l 0 I 0 I 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 I 0 0 
I 0 I 0 0 
0 0 I (l I 
0 0 0 nr 0 
rv 0 
"' "' 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 I I 0 I 
0 0 0 0 0 
nr f1l I I I 
7 2 9 • (, 
21 22 22 11 lJ 
0 331 0091 0409 019 0261 
). lnlormuion en corporate l(h"em&nte {ton~IIIUlCC "·ilh COipollle K()VCI'l\MCC &uiddinct 01 the 1\\'&l'eneiJ of lhc current COf'poiiiC 80\'4!l"nnnCCC debaiC) 
Staacrncw of dircctcn' rcaponsit>.liry ln respect ollhe rinanaaJ StaiCI'l'll!ntJ 
19 10 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
I 0 
0 0 
I I 
0 0 
0 0 
0 ll 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
"' 
rv 
nr rv 
0 I 
0 0 
nt nr 
2 2 
20 20 
0100 0100 
O•tciC~~utc o( rdaled pany transacaions between dircaOI's and the C<lfl1JII'I)' 01 a statc:mcnt thal there was no rdated pany transadion bdween djuct«s and the c:of'11)at1)' 
6 lnform&~ion on the iJirltpmrknce of~ .. daror:tors. 
7, Otreaors' other doror:tonhiplollitcs or a Slaletnml thal ~ ..... 1\0't no otl"" dlror:torshoploiT""" 
I. Directors' dale of appolntmcnl or year of service. 
9 Cfl111l01rtion of board of dorettors 
IQ OirlldCf1'1iCS· 
11 Diror:tors' qualifiauons. 
11. O.Alls olaudu comrri11oc. 
ll Dcwl of .......... oont ........... arion CCIIYTiuce. 
14, Dclails oC intr:mal ccnuol 
l' Dclails of ncainaoon c.ocrmnee. 
16. Dclaib oC board oC dareaon """'inai--Llnal rrctbcd 
17 Dclails of <iretton' salary/fee. 
11. Dclaib ol rarecwrs• bonuslpwfomwoce bonus/J"'clil shanr11 or other sifftlar paymosu. 
19. Dclails ol diror:ton' b<ndilS in bndlother frin&e barefiu 
20. Dclails of diretton ponsicn sdiOmcs. 
ll. Direc~on• end...-(r.....-all<rn) 
ll. Dclai!J ol dileaors'inlert&l in shart& ora""""""' slatina thal the dirlldCf1 hold no shares in lho """1'1"Y· 
2J O..oils oC dilor:tor1' share oplion S<:hcrrA 
M tan 
11 11 lJ 14 1S 16 27 18 19 JO ]I Jl JJ 34 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ooooc 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 oooc 
0 I 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 I) 0 0 2941 
0 0 I 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 0 0 0 3235 
0 tl I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00588 
0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 205 
I 0 0 0 0 I I 0 I 0 I I 0 0 05000 
0 0 I 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 I I 0 I 0 3824 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1.00 
0 0 u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ousa 
0 0 0 0 0 0 ll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
l 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 I I 0 0 0 I 0 3824 
I I I 0 0 0 I 0 0 I I 0 0 I 0 5294 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00588 
0 I 0 0 0 0 I 0 I I 0 0 0 0 0,3235 
0 I) I I) 0 0 I (l I 0 0 0 0 I 01824 
I I I I I 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 04412 
0 0 0 0 nr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IV ooooc 
rv rv rv rv rv nt rv nt 0 0 0 IV nt nt 0000( 
0 nt 0 0 I 0 0 IV 0 0 0 0 0 0 OOH5 
I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I I I I 0 705 
I 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 1)5) 
I 0 I I 0 I I f1f' rv I I 0 0 I 0 7r~X 
I s 10 1 (, 1 10 I I 6 a • 2 • 22 21 22 22 21 22 22 20 21 ll 21 22 21 11 
0164 0238 0455 0116 0.286 0116 O.<SS 0050 0 164 0 261 0148 0. 182 0091 0.181 
Appendix 11 
Dlchocornous raw scores 
C G ountr : errn1ny 
Oil. CO~tPANV• 
hem•• I 1 ) • 5 6 7 I 9 10 11 12 I) I. 15 16 17 11 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 ll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J 0 0 0 0 I) 0 •' 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 
• 0 11 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 I 0 0 I I I 0 0 I 0 I I I I 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 I 0 I 0 0 0 I 0 I I I I 0 0 I 0 
12 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 I 
I) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 I 0 I I I I I I I I 0 I I I I I I I 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IS 0 Ill IV 0 11 0 Ill 0 0 0 Ill IV 0 0 0 0 IV 0 
19 0 0 IV 0 IV IV 0 0 0 0 IV IV 0 0 IV 0 0 0 
10 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
ll I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
21 0 0 0 (I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 Ill Ill IV 0 IV Ill Ill nr IV IV IV Ill Ill IV IV Ill Ill Ill 
To1al • ) 5 5 7 5 • • (, ~ 7 G G 6 ~ • ~ ~ Rtl.lt~• 22 21 20 2) 21 21 21 22 22 22 20 20 22 22 21 22 21 22 
DPA 11 1~2 0 l~l 0 250 0 21 7 0 ))) 0 21~ 0 I•XI 0 182 0 273 0221 0 ) 50 0 lOO 1117) 017J 0 2JH 0 182 0 lJH 0 227 
nt · Not rde\ ani (noa ;pphcable). 
• Name o( t0ft1WUC:S arc hsled ln appcndi" 2. 
••Oiscla&utc l1errw: 
I 1nfCin1l&lion on the tern ol the dittc&ors' ltnlco c:on~raet or a ttAlerre'le slalinslhal lhere ""no ser"H:c con~rac&. 
2 Audi1ot's rcpon oo corporase io,·anancc n-..11cn.. 
l WOf'TfDIKJn on corporalc flO\'em&ncc (Ci0n1)1•ancc \\1th corporate IQ\0'1\&nCC auiddLDeS or the awareness o( &he current corpora1c JO''etnlnte dcba.le) 
4 SWtnml o( dlrOCian' rcspon&ibollly'" rcspoc1 ollhc: fu>ancial slalemm&s. 
" 0 
0 
0 
I 
I 
0 
0 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
I 
I 
0 
IV 
6 
22 
0 27) 
20 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
0 
IV 
IV 
I 
I 
0 
Ill 
• 20 
0200 
5. Oudasure o( relarod pany rransaaions be•..., direaan and lhc: c:on.,any or a uaremm~lhallbcre was no rdatod pany rrans!ICII<ln be11...., direcron and lhc: COIJ1liii1Y. 
6 WonNiicn oa lhc: ~o(lhc: dorlltlors 
1. Oi.recton' o&hcr diroctorshiploffic:es «a swcmen1 lhaalherc \Wfc no a.her direc.lonhip'offic:es. 
I Dueaon' dare o( appolnunrro 01 yeor o( aen Ieo. 
9 C""1J1'Ill<ln of bootd of direaors. 
10. Oueaors'IJ'I. 
11 OuOCIOis' Ql>al1fi<Oiicns. 
12 Dcuils o( audir cormiuec. 
ll Oewl ol reti'Ulentionl~ation comriuee 
14 Daails o( .. omal ca11rol. 
15 llelails of nomna~oa cormiur:e. 
16. llcuils o( bootd of direa01s moctin&'worl;lna merhod. 
17. llcuils o( direcu>rs' salary/fee. 
1~. 1lelaiis oldirec:ran' bcnuslperforn'"""" bonuslprolirlhlrina 01o0\el' simlar paym<nrs. 
19. llcuils o( diretlan' beneliiS in l.indloO\el' frinJI< benof111. 
20. llcuils of dlreaan pension scherta. 
21. Diredon' anolum<r\l(r.........,..;on~ 
22. llcuils of diroaon' inlerCSI '"shar<1 01 a slalarallllaUna lhallhc: direcran hold no shares in rho COIJ1liii1Y. 
ll. Daails o( direaon' share Of>lioo scheiN. 
Me-an 
21 ll 13 H 25 26 17 21 n 30 Jl l1 J) ~ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I) 0 0 0 11 0 0 029-l 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0029~ 
0 0 I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 04118 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (I 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0029-l 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0 9706 
0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00}88 
0 I 0 I 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 0 I I 0All8 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00}88 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 00~88 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0~ 12 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000 
IV 0 0 IV 0 IV 0 0 Ill 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
Ill 0 0 0 nr IV 0 0 Ill Ill 0 0 0 0 0 OOllO 
I I I I I I I I I 0 I I I I 09706 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
nr IV IV Ill Ill Ill IV rv rv Ill Ill nr nr N 110000 
4 s G 6 ~ s • ~ ~ J ~ l s 6 
20 22 22 21 21 20 21 22 20 21 22 22 22 22 
0 200 0 227 0 273 0 2H6 0 19<1 0 210 0 182 U IH2 0 lOO 0 1.) 0 182 0 227 0 227 0 271 
c s ed ounlr : w en 
Ois. 
Hc.tn•• I 1 J 4 s 
I 0 I 0 I 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
J 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 
s 0 0 I 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 I I I I I 
• I I I I I 9 I I I I I 
10 I I I I I 
11 0 I 0 0 I 
11 0 0 0 I 0 
IJ I 0 0 I 0 
14 I 0 0 I 0 
IS I I 0 0 0 
16 I 0 0 I 0 
17 0 I 0 I I 
11 0 I 0 I I 
19 nt I I I I 
10 I I 0 I 0 
11 I I I I I 
21 I I I I I 
ll nr I nr nr Ill 
Toul 11 I< I IS 10 
Rd. lwns .21 23 22 22 22 
DPA 0 52< 0.609 0.364 0 612 OHS 
nr · Not rcleviJ\1 (noc apphcabk:) 
• Namt of compauict &re liued i1' appcndJ" 2 
.. OI.Kklcu.re llan· 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
I 
0 
0 
I 
I 
nr 
. I 
22 
0 )64 
1 I 9 10 11 11 IJ 
I I I I 0 I I 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 I 0 0 0 0 0 
I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I I I I 0 0 0 
0 I 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 I 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I I I I I I I 
I 0 I I I I 0 
0 0 N I I I 0 
0 I I 0 0 0 0 
I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I nr 
"' 
nr 0 I nr 
12 13 11 11 9 11 I 
23 22 21 22 23 23 22 
0 S22 0 S91 0 52< 0 500 0 391 0 471 0 364 
1 IAformacion on lhc: LCmU of the dlfcaOii' scrvtee concraa 01 1 nac.eancnc IWUlJ l1w ~ wu no tcrvicc contl'K.I 
2 Awdnor's n:pon on corporate JQ\o'CmlnCC mancn 
Appendix 12 
Dichotomous raw score.s 
0 
COMPANY• 
14 IS 16 17 11 
I 0 I 0 I 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
I 0 0 I 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
I 0 I I I 
I 0 . I I I 
I I I I I 
I 0 I I I 
I 0 0 I 0 
0 0 0 I 0 
I 0 0 I 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 I 0 
I 0 0 I 0 
I I I I I 
I I N I I 
I 0 
"' 
Ill 0 
I 0 0 I 0 
I I I I I 
I 0 I I I 
IV 0 
"' 
nr I 
IS 4 I IS 10 
22 23 20 21 23 
0612 0.174 0 400 0 714 O<H 
l lnfonna.ttoo on eotpOtalc aovemance (c:o.npllancc \\ilh corporate JO¥CttWlCC auKtdincs or the 1\\'a.rcnc:ss of the current COipOf&lC ao\'c.mancc dchltc:). 
4 Sutc:rnc:Oc of ditocton' rcspon.sibtlity in taped of the finand.alstalcmentt 
19 20 
I I 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
0 0 
I I 
0 0 
0 I 
0 I 
I I 
I I 
I 0 
0 0 
I I 
I I 
I IV 
13 13 
1l 22 
0 565 0 591 
.S. Oi.&dolutc of related pany U'alls.C:tionl bctwcca dm:a:or~ and tht cxmpany ot a SU.Iemc:nl thallhcre waJ no rtbtcd pany traru.acdon bl.iwccn di.rc:c:aon and the: company 
6 IM>nnalian OD W iodcpcndcnc:c of W dtrcc\On 
1 Dutlaon' other d.in:ctorduplolficcs Of a 1we:mcnt dw then were ao oc.bcr du'CCCOI"'bip'officc:s 
I Ovettots' date of appotllllllelll Of year of JCMC< 
9. ~ioaofboordofdilcaon 
IODVCCion'-· 
11. o.,..,.,... qualiliatloos. 
12. Oclails ofaodit -.Naoe. 
ll. D<Wio(taiiiiDCBiioa/....._-..,.,...;; ...... 
14, Daails o( iaocmaiC>C>nllol. 
IS. Dcwls of-u.atioa «>tNninoe. 
16. Daails of boord of diR<IOfl ,_...,,..,Iona mctliod. 
11. O...iu of dircaon' Jalaty/fcc. 
11. D<W11 o( dircaon'l>c>clw/pctfo<manoo bonullprollllhatlrc Of Olhcr similar poymcnu. 
19. D<Wia of dircaon' bmcl\u in lcindlotbcr frin&c bmcfi1.1 
20. Daails o( dir=on pouioa-.. 
21. Due<IOtTmiOIWIICtll(tuliUJ\CraUon). 
22. OcWlJ o{diroc.ton' inacrcst in lhar« or 1 ttalemc.u llaliua ttw the directors hoid no aharea i.n &he company. 
23. D<Wia of diR<IOrl' lhatc oplion l<homc. 
Mur1 
11 1l 1l 14 lS 16 17 11 19 )0 )I 31 JJ .14 
I I I I 0 0 I I 0 I I I 0 I 06765 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 00588 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 117 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00294 
I I I I I I I I · I I I I I I 0 970! 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0 9ZQ! 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I OO()C 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0 970<! 
I 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 I I I 0 I 0470<! 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 oou 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 OllS 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 081 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 176S 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 176 
I I I I I I I I I I 0 0 I I 0112 
0 I 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 
"' "' 
I 0 nr 0 6JJ 
0 0 I 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 
"' 
0 I I 0 412 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20S 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I~O!lClC 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0970<! 
1\1 nr nr I 
"' '" 
1\1 nr nr I nr I nr I 01112 
12 9 9 10 7 7 11 I s I< I 10 I 11 
22 22 22 2) 22 22 22 22 22 22 20 1l 22 22 
0 Hl 0409 0409 0 4ll 0 )I I 0 318 0 500 0 )64 0 364 0 636 0 400 0.435 0 ]64 0 500 
Appendix 13 
Modined dichotomous raw scores 
C U ' d K ' d ountr: : n11e IDRC om 
Dia. 
lLan·· I 1 l ~ 
I 10 10 10 Ill 
2 10 10 10 10 
l 10 10 10 10 
~ 10 10 10 10 
s 10 10 10 10 
' 
0 10 0 0 
7 10 10 10 10 
• 10 10 10 10 9 J)J 10 36 10 
10 10 10 10 0 
11 0 0 0 0 
11 7S 7S s s 
13 10 10 10 10 
14 s s s 10 
IS 10 7 S 0 s 
16 0 s 0 J 
17 667 10 667 667 
11 667 IV 667 6 .67 
19 1.S 10 15 7S 
20 10 10 10 10 
11 10 s 10 10 
1l 10 10 10 s 
l3 10 10 10 10 
To1ll 1767 190 164 4 170 K 
Rd. htms ll 12 23 23 
DPA 7 681 8 636 715 7428 
rv- Not rdnono (not applocable) 
• Name of ~Cii 11e bslcd in appendix 2 
.. Disclosure her:r.: 
s 
' 10 10 
10 10 
10 10 
10 10 
10 10 
0 10 
10 0 
10 0 
) )) Jl) 
10 0 
0 0 
2S 2.5 
10 10 
s s 
25 IS 
0 s 
10 10 
10 10 
10 10 
10 s 
10 10 
10 10 
Ill 10 
173 3 1533 
13 13 
7J36 6 667 
7 • 9 10 11 11 IJ 
Ill 10 Ill 10 10 10 10 
0 0 0 10 10 10 0 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
0 10 0 10 10 10 10 
0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
10 0 10 10 10 10 10 
) )) 10 J 71 10 10 3.33 4 16 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
0 0 0 0 10 10 0 
s 7.S 7.S 7S s s 7j 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
s s 10 s s s s 
0 7S 7S 0 s 0 7S 
0 0 s s 0 0 s 
s 6 67 667 10 6 67 667 10 
s 6 67 6 67 10 6 67 667 10 
' 
7S 7J 1 s 
' 
15 10 
s 10 10 10 10 s 10 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 875 10 
1)33 1701 16-' 6 liS Ill) 167Y 179 2 
23 23 23 23 13 23 23 
s 191 7428 7 ISS a 043 7 971 7l01 11-J 
l. lt\f~ on &be 1ernw o( lhe d.rec:IOf1' sen·ice coruraa or a stlll01Vnt swina lhaalhet-e wu no scn·iu ccnuaa. 
2. Auduo(s report on corporate aovernancc n.uen 
COMPANY• 
I~ IS 16 17 11 
10 10 10 10 10 
10 0 0 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 
10 0 10 10 10 
0 0 0 0 10 
10 10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 
10 3 81 V 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 
s 3 57 2 3S 0 0 
s 7S 7 S 7 S s 
10 15 10 10 10 
s s s s s 
s 7j 10 7S s 
0 s s 0 10 
667 667 6 67 6 67 10 
667 667 6 67 6 67 10 
s s 7S 7S 10 
10 s 10 s 10 
10 10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 
os 10 10 10 10 
177 I IS32 175 4 1758 20S 
23 23 23 23 23 
71 6662 7 616 76-'S a 913 
l tnf~jon on corporate eo\·crnance (con~hanu \\1 lh corporate IO''ernanct auidehnm or the awanneu o( the curra\1 corporlle to'cmance dc:baae) 
4 SwO'n!lll ol directors' responnbdil)' U1 rapea of !he {U\IIlCW Slalen'DMJ.. 
19 10 
10 10 
10 10 
10 10 
10 10 
10 10 
10 0 
10 10 
10 10 
10 s ss 
10 10 
0 6 67 
7.5 7.5 
10 10 
s s 
s 10 
s 10 
667 667 
667 6 67 
s s 
7S s 
10 10 
10 10 
10 10 
IU l 118 I 
23 23 
1189 1. 177 
5. 0.5clocure ot rdated pany UAnUctiON bei\\OCI'I direct on and Lhc COOl*l)' or a slatemet\1 Lh.alth«e was no rdtled pill)' transac;tiQ"' belwecn directors and Lhc ~· 
6 WororAtioo oo ohe ~of ohe dioecoon 
7. Oiro:ton' OLher diroe~on.hiplotrtca: or a alatarcnl thatthore were no other duectouhiploffica 
I Dlrcaors' date of appointrnmt or yar of acrv•ca. 
9 C01J1>01ioian olbootd of diroaou. 
10. Dirocuws'ages. 
11 Diroaon' qualification~. 
12. Ocuils ofaudio carurriuee. 
I 3 Dcuil of tcnlllllCRUOIII"""""'""an corrmuee. 
I~. Deoails of inocmal COOl tal 
IS. Dcuils of nonlinalion eomnuee. 
16. DeoaiiJ of bootd o( dirCICion n-e<III\WII«I.uoa mcohod. 
17 Deoails of diroaon' salaty/foo. 
la Deoails o( rirOCion' bonllslpotfotmlllU banUIIproliolharina 0t other SJrriw paynDU 
19. Deoails of"'""""' boneliu in l:lndlo<M frin&e bcndiu 
10 Deoails of dir<Cion pcmioo sc:hon-... 
ll. Oiteaon' ~.........;an~ 
22 Deoails o( rirOCIOI1' ""-t in Jhar• "' a , ... ..,... scaoina ohal ohe diroaon hold no shar<1 on ohe coc-. 
13. Deoaols of direaon· share oplion scl>emc. 
~ltan 
11 11 1l H IS 16 17 11 29 lO ll Jl JJ J.l 
10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 97~' 
0 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 6 176 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10001 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 IOOOC 
0 10 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 0 0 7 6-'71 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 2 0588 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Ill 10 10 10 HI 10 9 70S 
10 IU 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 4113 
333 ) 33 3 33 10 ) 33 333 10 10 10 s 10 ll3 S66 10 6 S"8 
10 10 10 10 10 SS6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 91812 
10 0 143 4 ~4 0 2.22 7 14 0 6 167 0 0 2 0 2. 1321 
7S 1.5 15 10 15 s 15 s 0 7S 15 . s , 7S 6 313S 
10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 9.3382 
s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s 2~ 1 
s s 0 0 0 0 7j s 0 10 10 0 0 10 4 6324 
0 0 0 0 10 0 s 0 0 s 0 0 s 10 1~1 
6 67 0 6 67 10 667 10 6 67 6 67 6 67 0 667 667 667 10 7 11(1(: 
0 IV 6 67 10 667 IV 0 667 nr 667 667 667 IV 10 6 9J61 
7S IV 1 5 10 1 5 7S 7S s nr 2J 
' 
s s 7S 10313 
10 s 10 10 10 10 0 nr IV s 10 0 10 s 1891)(, 
10 
' 
10 10 10 10 10 10 6 61 10 10 10 10 10 9 (.o1' 
10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 Ill 10 10 10 10 9 JJ8 
10 nr 10 l 7S 8 7S 175 s 10 nr 115 10 10 7S 10 9l7SIJ 
ISS 100 I 141 1 173.2 16S 4 1474 1713 ISJJ 134) 177 I ISO I ISI 7 144 3 175 
2l 20 23 23 23 22 23 22 19 23 l3 23 22 23 
6 7)9 s 042 64)9 7 Sl 7 192 6 698 7441 6 91 1071 77 7163 6.594 636 7 609 
N 
\0 
00 
Apptndil 14 
Modifitd dichotomous raw scores 
c ountr : c ana d a 
Dls. 
llem .. I 1 J 4 
I 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
3 10 10 10 10 
4 10 10 10 10 
5 0 0 0 0 
' 
0 10 10 0 
1 10 10 10 0 
a 0 10 0 0 
9 316 3 ss 10 4.23 
10 0 0 0 0 
11 0 I 2% 0 
Jl 75 1.5 1.5 25 
13 0 75 15 0 
14 5 5 5 5 
15 0 75 75 0 
" 
0 0 5 0 
I? 0 0 0 0 
11 IV 0 0 nt 
19 0 0 0 IV 
10 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 
13 0 IV 5 IV 
To<ol ~6 26 1905 90 ~6 )I 73 
Rtlllr:n• 22 22 23 20 
DPA 2103 4 041 3933 1.517 
IV · N04 rdevan1 (,.. appl1cable) 
• Name ol COf'11)&nics arc liJicd in appmdi."< 2 
.. Oisdosure hems 
5 
' 0 0 
0 0 
10 10 
10 10 
10 0 
10 0 
10 10 
10 10 
333 J 19 
0 10 
633 0 
75 15 
7.5 15 
5 0 
1.5 75 
10 0 
0 0 
0 nr 
0 nt 
0 0 
0 0 
5 0 
nt 7 5 
1122 KJ89 
22 21 
5 O'JI 3995 
1 • 9 10 11 11 IJ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 10 Ill 10 0 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 10 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
0 10 10 10 0 0 10 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
0 10 10 0 I) 0 0 
4 I 375 3 63 375 377 361 ))) 
0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 5 45 0 455 0 471 
5 75 1.5 7.5 10 15 15 
5 75 7 5 1.5 0 1.5 75 
5 5 5 5 5 5 0 
5 75 1.5 15 0 75 0 
5 10 0 5 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IV 0 0 0 IV IV IV 
0 0 15 0 0 nt 0 
0 IV 0 0 0 IV 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 15 0 0 5 0 0 
0 0 0 IV 375 75 r. 2S 
SI • IOH 1901 7615 52 07 (.S 61 69 l'J 
22 22 23 22 21 20 22 
2 336 4716 )87) 3466 2 361 3 4)1 3 ISO 
J. WOf"'mi1on on the aerms ollhedirec:tors' sen·icc contraa Ot a sli.IOnr:nl saalinalhallhc:re wu noJervice CONrACL 
2 AudiiO(s repon on corporal• aovemance mancn 
COMPANY 
14 15 t& I? 11 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
10 10 10 10 10 
0 10 10 10 10 
10 0 10 0 0 
10 0 10 0 0 
10 10 10 10 10 
0 0 0 10 0 
3 ss 3 66 3 66 10 3.63 
0 0 0 0 0 
4 67 0 0 0 0 
75 5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
15 5 75 75 5 
5 5 5 5 5 
75 5 75 0 5 
10 0 0 10 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
... nr nr 0 0 
nt 0 IV nt Ill 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
25 0 25 0 0 
IV 75 75 6 25 15 
1122 (,116 91 16 1625 6) 6) 
:zo 22 21 22 22 
4411 2 710 4 341 3.920 1192 
) lnfcwmation on corpc:walt JO\'crTW"Ce (con.,IW'IU \\Jih c:orpora1e ~vemanoe auaddma or the awucncs.s ollhe CWTGM awporate pemat)CC dcbete) . 
.o4 Stllemsl& of direcaors' r•ponsibiJity in respea ol the (UllllciaJ slalcnll:llll. 
J9 10 
0 0 
0 0 
10 10 
10 10 
0 0 
10 10 
10 10 
0 0 
10 3 63 
0 0 
0 3 63 
7.5 5 
75 5 
5 5 
0 0 
0 5 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
625 5 
1625 1226 
ll 23 
3 liS 3142 
5. Oisdcaure of related p&ny transactions belwecll diredors and Lhe COill>An)' or a Slllcmc:nl lhat lhcre was no rdated patty transKiion between dirooors and lhe 0011l*l)'. 
6. lnformuion on lhe'indepcndmc:e of !he direc10<1. 
1. Ouocun' Olhcr dircc:torshaploffiees or tllllcr\111\1 Lha11here \\'G"e 110 ocher darec.aorshtplollicec 
I. Direaon'dateof~O<yOIIofmvico. 
9. COIJll(llilion ofbolrd of direacn 
10. Oirocaon'qes. 
11 . Ouccscn' qu&Jificauons.. 
11. Details of audia c«M''iuoe. 
ll Dc111ll of rawncnuiorV.,.,....,.....IIi<ln conmuoe. 
14 Ocwls ofinlanol CU11rol 
I' Ocaaib of norrinacion comnnce 
16 Dtuils ofbolrd of direcaon ,_inW-bna nl<lhod. 
17. Dcwls of dirocun' salary/foe. 
U Ocwls of dueaon' bonuslpafon...,.,. bonus/prolia slwul& 0< 04h<r sun Ill' payn.,nu 
19 Dcwls of direc~on' b<ndiu in bndlother frinae b<ndiu. 
20. DtuiiJ of WttCIO<I pension sd>cm:s. 
l l. Ou-tiCion' cmolumcnl(r.........-lli<lnl 
22. Oetails o( ditetaors' anterest in shale& 01' I Jtalcmllll& stahn& lhallhe dHCICIOtl hold no lhates in the C001*l)' 
ll Dtuils of dorOCion' shale opuon sdlome. 
M tan 
11 11 lJ l4 15 1& 11 11 19 JO ll 31 33 }4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 91176 
10 ltl 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9. 1176 
0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 2 0~88 
0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 4 7059 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 7059 
10 0 0 () 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 2~12 
3 )) 10 315 393 10 333 37~ HI ) 9~ 356 ))) ) 59 372 J)) ~ 5938 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 882~ 
0 0 0 0 875 0 6 25 14) 0 0 71 0 3 01 0 0 I 8476 
10 5 5 5 10 5 25 15 75 75 75 25 7 5 5 6 6912 
1.5 5 5 5 1.5 0 0 75 15 75 15 25 2.5 5 5 51~1 
5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 ~ ssu 
75 5 5 0 15 0 0 75 0 75 u 25 2.5 0 4 1912 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 0 2 JSl'J 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 IV nt nt 0 IV 0 
"' 
nt 0 IV 0 IV 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 ,... 0 
"' 
nt 0 
"' 
0 0 nr 0 1136 
0 0 0 5 0 IV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 161 ) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SM82 
15 615 0 nt 0 nt 315 0 75 75 0 IV ,.. 75 ~~·lOO 
IOU (.6 2j 53 75 53 9) 98 75 )I)) ~I 2~ 9S 2-l 61 ·U 1n1 1583 1~ 11 76 22 SSIJ 
lJ 22 21 21 23 19 23 21 21 23 21 22 21 22 
3514 3 011 2443 2.568 4293 2 0 11 I 193 4535 2926 3.129 4 017 3 311 3.630 2 538 
Apptndil IS 
Modifitd dichotomous raw scorts 
Coun ·N~•h•rlonA• 
.. ::. 3 ~ 
• 
s 10 0 I 
6 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
9 )) 10 10 
10 10 10 0 
0 0 0 0 
11 I S 2 0 
Jl !l IS IS l 
•• 0 .I l 0 
IS ' .I 0 2.1 l 
16 .I JU 10 
0 0 
18 0 nt 0 0 
19 nt IV 0 0 
10 0 u 0 
l l l 
l2 0 0 0 0 
1l 7l l 0 6 2l 
Total SI: .175 6.1 l6 2.1 
Rd. I!""' 21 23 2) 
DP~ ' 6.1 1 _1)8 '126 L•-16 
ov • Noo rde>ano (nOI apploc:oble) 
• Name of COI'J1)IIUCS arcluud m appendix 2 
-Oi.sdoswe hen.. 
s 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
10 
10 10 
0 
1S '.I 
'l 'l 
l 0 
' .I .I 
l l 
0 0 
nt 0 
nr 0 
0 0 
.I 
0 0 
'l l 
IS lO IJ 
21 2) 
3.171 210 
7 9 10 13 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
119 )) 10 33 
10 0 0 10 
0 0 0 0 0 
7 . .1 0 2 0 0 !.I 
'l 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1S 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 s 0 s 10 0 
0 6 6~ 0 0 0 0 0 
IV nt 0 nt 
"' "' 
nt 
nr IV 0 IV 0 IV nt 
0 0 0 rv u 0 0 
l l l l l l 
0 0 :.l ' l 0 0 
62l rv 7l nr 62.1 
"' 
nt 
.176.1 1.1 32011 lOll .16 2.1 lOll 11 
21 20 2) 19 l2 20 10 
269 2.10 39.1 0 ..170 2 102 042 091< 
I WOfl1'aiJon on me acrnw. ollhe dnCCion' serv1ce C:Olllld 01 • stalO'nelll statinl &hatlhcre ~.., no scnia cam act 
2 Audllor"s report Cl\ corporate aovcmancc n.uers. 
•• 15 16 17 11 
0 0 
0 -0 
)) 1]) lo 
• 0 
0 0 
1 .I 0 
7:1 -0 -~ 0 0 
l 0 .I 0 0 
•s 0 0 0 0 
10 0 l 10 l 
-0 0 0 -0 0 
nt ftl ow 
"' 
.. 
nr nt nt nr 0 
0 nt 0 0 0 
-.~ T 
T 1:1 0 0 0 
0 
"' 
7.1 ' l 
71 ,.,., .u.oo lll< 
' 11 19 1 1 11 
T•30 O'JG l~i -&:i ~ 21s9 
] (nfomia.UC11 0'1 CIOfpGfllt ~CWemance (CCfTl>hlllOt \\ilh COfporllt JOVe:rnanc.e iUICfaincs 01 the IW1U'cnc5J o( the CUI'fcnt eotpOIJJC IO'o'emancc debate), 
4 Stalem:nt o( dirocaon' rasponsibiliay in respcc1 ol Lhe flnanaiJ saatc:menta. 
19 
0 
0 
"' nr 
0 
T 
0 
0 
30 1&: 
11 
i•:i9 o• 
S. Disclosure ofret11cd pany uannctions between directors and the con..,_,ty or a Sl&lem:nt lhallhetc was no rd.a1ed pany lransaclion between diroclors and the con..,aoy 
6. lnfomauon on ~ .. ~of lhe dii<Cion 
7 Duocton' other duoacnhiploiJica ot a lLIIemEnllhll there wae no 01her dlrraon.tuploffices 
&. Direcaon· dlle of appoinuMnl or year of service. 
9 c~uion ofbootd of diuaon 
10 o .. ector(aacs. 
11 Oinlaors' qualirouuons. 
12 Oeuils of audio carrmnoe. 
I) Deu.il o( rem.neratkwl/C:OUlJe'lSIIIOO ccmnnee. 
1.1 Odalls of inumal conuol. 
IS Dcta~ls ofnorrinluon cocrmuoe. 
16. 0..11ls cl bootd cl dotectars .-insfworlina rndhoo1 
17 Oeuils cldirocoon' 1&111)'/reo. 
11. O..lils cl diroclon' banuslperrormance banuslprolio shatins or oohcr sirrilar poym:nu. 
19. O..lils cl directors' bonellos In l:indloohcr rrinp bonelhs. 
20 Odalls of directars ....,ion 1chcrla. 
21. Oiret1ors' ernolumma.(rCITU'd'alion). 
12. Daails cl dirot1ars' ""'""' 1ft shat5 or a swerrousoaolna ohao oho duectars hold no shara '"oha con..,.ny 
23. o....Js cl diroaars' shale option ld1ane. 
MHn 
21 13 14 15 u 17 
I o 29.< 
I o oooc 
I .Ill! 
IO oooc 
0 ; oooc 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
) 33 33 3)) 10 10 10 IU 10 33 
0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 11 0 () 0 IUOOC 
0 0 :.I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .I .... I 
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 () 0 0 0 0 -170<! 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I OKRl 
0 0 I .I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.100 
0 10 10_ 10 IQ 10 10 10 l 10 10 10 10 176l 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.196: 
nt nt 0 
"' 
nt N nr 0 nt N nr 0 nr nr 1()00( 
IV nt 0 nt nr nt nt 0 nt nr nr nr nt nr IUOOC 
0 u I! Q I! 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
l l s s l 2 . .I s 1.1 .I l l l I Rll 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,.,., 
37.1 0 61.1 rv 62.1 7.1 nt 7.1 
"' 
•7.1 0 0 700: 
101 11. 39.11 21 Jl)) 101 3.1 20 I! 31 
"" 
317.1 Jl 11 
_H ~3 10 21 20 11 10 22 21 11 
· 0.1 1 0 173 3~9 19 1: 0.11 196.1 l22 042 IUl 2000 761 1_82.1 0.17 
l;.J 
0 
0 
Appendix 16 
Modified dichotomous raw scores 
C F ountr : ranee 
Du. 
hem•• I 2 l ~ s 
I 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
l 0 0 10 0 0 
~ 10 10 0 10 10 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 10 0 0 0 
7 10 10 10 10 10 
• 10 10 10 0 0 9 39-1 l 33 ] .71 319 10 
10 0 0 067 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 
u 0 7S 7S 0 10 
ll 7.1 7S 7 5 11 7S 
14 0 0 0 0 0 
IS 7.5 7S 7S 0 7 5 
16 0 s s 0 0 
17 ).)) ) )J 0 0 667 
11 0 0 0 nr 0 
19 nr 0 0 nr 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
11 2.1 
' 
2S 2 s s 
22 0 s 0 2.1 0 
2l 6 2.1 7.1 s nr 371 
Tooal 61 02 9 1 ()(1 69 4.1 28 89 7042 
Rd. lltms 22 2J 2) 20 21 
DPA 277< 3 98.1 3.020 I 44.1 ] 062 
nr • Noo rdevllll (noo awhcablc) 
• Name o( con~a arc hstcd 111 ap~~ 2. 
••DiKlolure Ilea&. 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
0 
0 
11 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
nr 
nr 
IV 
10 
0 
"' ]0 
19 
I .179 
7 • 9 10 11 ll ll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 10 0 10 0 10 10 
0 0 0 0 10 0 10 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 10 0 10 0 10 10 
10 0 0 10 10 0 0 
10 0 0 10 10 0 0 
06 314 3 77 4 07 372 10 10 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 2.5 0 1.5 0 0 1,5 
7S 25 () 7S 0 25 0 
0 0 0 s 0 s 0 
7S 0 0 7 5 0 0 0 
I 10 0 10 0 10 10 
33) 0 0 3.33 ) 33 0 0 
"' 
0 0 0 0 0 IV 
nr IV 0 nr IV 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
s s s 0 0 
' 
25 
2.1 0 0 2 . .1 0 2.1 0 
7 . .1 0 nr s 1.1 7 .1 0 
80.19 4) 8·1 877 9H J9.SS 62 s 60 
21 22 22 22 22 23 22 
3.838 1.99] 0.399 4 200 I 798 2 717 2727 
1 Wonnu.1an en &he lcrn5 of &he duecaors• sc:rnce canaract or a Jl.llcmcnl stllina 1ha.i lherc wu no so-nu contract. 
:Z. Audllo(s rq>en on -llt)O\·......-.ce rmnen. 
COMPANY• 
14 15 16 17 18 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 10 0 
0 0 10 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 10 0 
10 0 10 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 
7~ 314 3 33 10 319 
6 ~7 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 15 
2.5 0 s 0 7S 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 s 0 0 
10 0 s 0 0 
0 0 )33 0 333 
0 0 0 nr 0 
nr 0 lW nt 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 2.1 2.1 0 2.1 
0 0 0 0 0 
nr nr 7S 7.1 2.1 
.1661 6 )4 SI lo6 )15 27 22 
21 22 22 21 21 
26% 0 288 2348 1716 I 183 
l . lnl'an:riuian an c:cwporau p ·emance (COflllliance \\llh corporate aonmance auidclmes or \he awarmeu ollhe c:urrCill c:orporalc pcnwce debr.le) 
'*· Statcmenl of directors' rctpawH~~t.Juy 111 respect oflbe fananc:talllAicma\I.S 
19 20 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
10 0 
0 0 
10 388 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
"' '" 
'" 
IV 
0 25 
0 0 
nr nr 
20 6 38 
20 20 
I 0011 0 3 19 
S Dtsdc.ure of rd.ated pany tranuctlons bct\\'Cel diractors and lhe CC1f11*1Y or a stalenDlllhal &hert was no rdatcd part)' U'lns&Ction between directors and the C!OtT1*1)' 
w..,.tion on lho ~ o( lho dirOC1on. 
Directors' other dirodorlhtp'officcs 01 1 sl.ltt:mcrM that there wert no other di reaorshiploffic:a 
a. Directors' dl.le of appoi.nlnau Of year o( service. 
~- C0fl1'0lilion o( board o( diroe1or1 
10 Otreaon'oaa. 
11 Oirecton' quaJifiw.ions. 
I :Z. D<uils o( ...ti1 c:omnnet. 
13. D<uil olr.......ucnt-uon corrmnoe. 
14 Dcuils oiinlanal c:onlrol. 
I I. Dcuils oi nominalion ccmnnee. 
16 D<uib o(boord olclirCIOn ...... ...,""'Dna rrcsbod 
11 D<uils oi dueaon' u!M)'Ifoe. 
11 D<uils o{ direaars' borulp«forrroonce bonuslprolil .nann, or oolocr sirnlar paymrnu. 
19 D<uils o( direaon· bcndiiJ on J..iniVOiha" fringe bcndiiJ 
20. Osai.ls of directors pmsion sdw:mes. 
21. Direc1on' ernolumaol(um•>tration~ 
22. D<uils o( direaon' inlcra1 in sl>ara or a Slllemtnl SllllnJ lhlllhe direc1ors t.>l~ no s~~ar .. in lho company 
ll. Douib o( direaon• share opuon ocheme. 
Mun 
21 ll ll 24 25 26 27 ll 19 lO Jl 32 Jl ).j 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 2.9~ 12 
0 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 3 2JS3 
0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5882 
0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 ossa 
10 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 0 0 s 0000 
0 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 10 10 0 10 1123.1 
319 333 3 7S 411 436 ~16 ) 33 333 61~ ~ 28 511 lll BS 
' 
5 2559 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. lOO 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000 
7S 0 7.5 0 0 0 0 0 s s 0 0 0 
' 
2.5135 
7S 25 7 1 0 0 0 7 • .1 0 0 .I 2 . .1 0 0 5 3.01~7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29~ 1 
0 2.5 0 0 0 0 7.S 0 s s 0 0 0 0 2 0188 
0 0 s 0 0 0 
' 
0 I 0 0 0 0 10 2 79-1 1 
) 33 )33 )33 667 3 )) 0 0 0 0 0 ) 33 0 0 0 11618 
0 0 0 0 IV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 nr 00000 
nt 
"' 
IV IV nr IV IV 
'" 
0 0 0 nr nr 
"' 
00000 
0 
'" 
0 0 21 0 0 
"' 
0 0 0 0 0 0 00162 
25 0 25 0 2.1 0 25 0 2.1 0 2.1 
' 
25 5 2 S7JS 
25 0 0 0 0 0 s 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.1 0.7).1) 
s 0 3.71 ] 7.1 0 ] 7.1 
' 
nr nr 
' ' 
0 0 2.1 3 8.100 
42 22 21 (o6 lo) ]) lP 3269 17 91 6S Kl 333 ~ ]~ H 28 ~8 ~~ 28HI I OS ~s 
22 21 22 22 21 22 22 20 22 23 23 22 22 21 
1 919 I 03 1 2879 0668 1.5.17 01 14 2 ')92 0 167 2.·" 0 I 490 2 106 1.310 0 366 2 143 
\.;.) 
0 
Appcndix17 
Modified dichotomous raw scores 
C G ounlr : ermany 
DU. 
ht~m,.,. I 1 l ~ 
I 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 
l 0 0 0 0 
~ 0 0 0 0 
s 10 0 0 10 
6 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 
a 0 0 0 0 
9 11 10 4 10 
10 0 0 0 0 
11 u 0 3 0 
ll 0 0 0 0 
I) 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 
16 10 0 5 5 
17 0 0 0 0 
18 0 IV nr 0 
19 0 0 IV 0 
10 2.5 25 5 25 
11 5 2.5 5 5 
21 0 0 0 0 
ll nr nr IV u 
Toh-' 275 15 21 325 
Rc:L llrtul 22 21 211 23 
DPA 1250 0.714 1.100 1.413 
rv · N01 rdrvll\l (not applicable) 
• NIIT'Ie of~· are lis1ed in appcwwt;x 2 
••Oi.Jclmure hC~~"m: 
5 6 7 8 9 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 u 0 0 0 
10 10 0 0 10 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
·116 3.33 333 3.33 4 07 
0 0 0 (I 0 
5 0 0 0 8 89 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 
10 10 10 5 10 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 nr 0 0 
IV lV 0 0 0 
25 5 25 2.5 25 
2.5 5 2.5 1.5 5 
0 0 0 0 0 
nr 
"' 
rv nr IV 
41 6/i 33 33 18 33 13 )J 40 46 
21 21 21 12 22 
19114 I 5K7 11873 0.(.o6 1.839 
COMPANY• 
10 11 12 1l 14 IS 16 17 18 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 IU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 ~ 16 ~. 16 K33 8.25 4.66 416 333 833 
0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 3.75 I 25 5 U9 0 0 10 0 
0 0 0 0 0 2. 5 u 0 7 5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 10 5 10 10 5 5 10 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 IV IV 0 () 0 0 nr 0 
0 IV IV 0 0 nr 0 0 0 
25 25 5 25 25 2.5 25 25 2.5 
25 2.5 5 25 25 25 25 25 25 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IV IV nr nr IV nr IV IV nr 
35 -42 91 l H I 33 J) 4214 11.16 14 16 23 33 3083 
22 20 20 22 22 21 12 21 22 
I S'Jl 2 14(, I 771 1.515 I 915 I 055 (1644 1111 I 4111 
1. lnfonnazion on the ICI"ml of lhc direaOfS' scrv1cc c:otUrad or a staterneru stallllj tha1lhere w.s no sen·iu conlnd 
2 Audltot's rqxwt on corporal& jo,·emance manen 
l . Wor~ton on corporate ao~·tma~lCC (eon~iance ,,;lh c:orpc:w11e p ·cmancc lWdchnes ot the awareness of the c:urrcn& corporate J'O''COW'lCC debate) 
.a Sl.alcmcnl o[ direcun' rcsponsibit.ily in rcspec1 of Lhe (Ullflcial statetl"'D"'ll. 
19 20 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
10 0 
10 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
444 3 33 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
10 10 
0 0 
0 IV 
0 nr 
2.5 25 
25 2.5 
0 0 
nr nr 
39 4-' 18 33 
22 20 
I 793 0917 
5. Oisc.IO&ure of rdllcq patty trantiCiions between direaou and the COfJ1)Ill)' or a Jtller:JU\1 lh.at lhere was no rdatcd pany transtetion bdwoen duecacws and the c::on.,any. 
Wonnuion on lhe indepcr.d<nce of lhe diroc:ron. 
1, Direcacws' Olher dirccaorshi~omces ora saa&emc:ntlhltlhcro were no ot.hcr directOI'S.hiplofTtca. 
a Directors' date of appoinunall or year of senice. 
9. con..,.llion of board of diroc:un. 
10. Diror:ron·-· 
11. Diroc:ton' qualifocaricns. 
12. Dcuils of audio ..,.,.,.;uoc. 
13. Dsail of um.&IWir&Jion/COft1XflS&.Iion c:cxminee. 
14 Daails of inrrrnal coorrol. 
15. o.:uils ofnoninaaion c:onwriuee. 
16 Details of board of dor0<1on ..-i"i/\\ukina n ... hod. 
17. Daails of dirr:aon' ulary/foe. 
1 a. Ocuols of dir0<1on' boous/perfonnanu bonuslproli1 sharina or Ollrer sirrilu paynrcuu. 
19. Daails of dirr:aon' bcndiu in l.:ind/OIIrer frUl)IO bcndiu. 
20 Delails of dire®n ponsion sch<mcs 
21 . Oirec10rt' cm>IUI!WJit(r......,....oon) 
12. Oclaila of directors' i.nacrest in stwec 01 a statement sutina lhat lhc directors hold no stwa Ul the~· 
23. Details of directors' share op1ioo scheme. 
Mun 
11 12 ll z. 15 26 17 28 29 30 31 32 33 ,l.l 
0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000<10 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OOilOO 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 029-11 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2941 
0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 ~I 17(, 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ol](lOO 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29~ 1 
5 6 62 8 33 10 3.33 3.33 8 33 3 33 333 333 333 55 8.33 4 66 5 3565 
0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5881 
0 10 0 10 0 10 0 0 15 0 11 0 10 4 2 8612 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2941 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 2941 
10 10 10 5 10 JO 10 ((I 10 5 10 5 10 10 808!2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 () 0 0 0 0 () 0 0 OIXIQU 
nr 0 0 
"' 
0 nr 0 0 nr 0 0 0 0 (l O.LOl(M 
nr 0 0 0 nr nr 0 0 IV nr 11 0 0 0 00000 
2 5 25 25 25 25 1 5 5 25 25 0 25 25 l 25 27941 
2. 5 2.5 25 25 25 2.5 5 2l 2 5 25 ll 25 l 2.5 3 0882 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
nr nr nr nr nr IV IV nr nr nr nr IV nr nr 0.01100 
20 31.62 4))) 40 18 )J 28 33 28 33 18 )J 28 33 10 83 1133 255 38 33 33 66 
20 22 22 21 21 20 22 22 20 21 22 22 22 22 
1.000 I 437 1.970 I 905 0 873 1.417 I 288 0 833 I 417 0.516 0 833 1. 159 1.7~2 1.530 
\...) 
0 
N 
Appendix 18 
Modified dichotomous r1w scores 
c s d OUOif) : we en 
Db. 
hem•• I 2 J ~ 5 6 7 I 9 10 11 12 ll 
I 0 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
a 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
9 10 J89 3 9~ 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
ID 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 ID 
11 0 10 0 0 lll 0 357 3 57 2 I. 0 67 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 7 5 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 
ll 7 5 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I~ 5 0 0 l 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
IS 5 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 l 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 J89 0 051 022 7 I 71 4 7 I. 7 I . 0 • • 10 6 67 717 
11 0 ) 61 0 0.11 0 22 688 6 67 0 69 022 lll 69 0 
19 
"' 
n 2 5 2 5 2 67 0 0 0 nr 2 . .1 2.1 2 l 0 
20 l 0 21 0 0 J8 0 0 0 l 0 18 0 0 0 0 
21 l l 7 . .17 .I 25 5 .IS4 .136 l .1 17 7.1 7 5 .Ill 
l2 5 .I 10 5 l l 5 l 5 l l 5 l 
2J 
"' 
5 
"' 
nr nr nr I 25 nr nr 
"' 
0 6 25 
"' Total 775 86 6 64 01 88 9 51 94 61 91 89 17 91 S7 76 J6 ~ 61 81 1412 6755 
Rei. Items 21 21 22 22 22 22 2l 22 21 22 2l 2l 22 
DPA l69 J76l 2 91 0 ~ 041 2 4.12 2 901 J 817 O ll ) 6) 6 2 909 2 992 3618 J 070 
nt • NOt relevant (not apploclble) 
• Name of compa111es are listed in appendix 2 
• • OlSdosw-e hems. 
I. lnforma1ion on &he 1emu of lhe d•reclors' scrvu:t conua.c.1 or a Sll lc.nent statma lha1 lhere was no serv~ce conuac1 
2 AudlkN"s rcpof1 on corponro aovenianc:e mauers 
COMPANY• 
I~ 15 16 17 11 
10 0 10 0 10 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 10 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 10 10 10 
10 0 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 
10 0 10 10 10 
I •3 0 0 10 0 
0 0 0 7 5 0 
5 0 0 75 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 7 .1 0 
10 0 0 10 0 
10 l~ 7 22 Jll 1 os 
)57 727 
"' 
69 021 
2 l 0 nr nr 0 
.1.36 0 0 l 0 
7 5 .145 .142 7 5 5 ll 
l 0 5 5 l 
"' 
0 
"' "' 
I 2.1 
11 0 ~ 2666 67~ 120 7 611.1 
22 2l 20 21 23 
l 016 1.1.19 J JB2 .17~1 2 99J 
Womw110n Ofl corporate JOwntanCC (comphancc: With corpotale tfOvt:m&I KC &uideJtneS Of' lhc I WIIe.nesS of the CWICOI corpoiiiO lf)Yemance debale ) 
Sl.&CemaU of ducclon.' respons~liry in rcspcc.a o{ &he ruw~ ltllcmcnll. 
., 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
10 
10 
10 
1.54 
0 
2 5 
0 
0 
0 
l • l 
6 29 
2 • .1 
0 
6lS 
l 
1.25 
8318 
21 
)~7 
20 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
10 
l ll 
10 
on 
0 
5 
0 
.I 
10 
7.17 
6 92 
0 
0 
538 
l 
nr 
88 .17 
22 
~ 026 
Di.sdosutt o( rela1ed pany Jransac:t~ between dJrec.IOrS and the company Ot 1 statement d'\1.1 thete was no rdaled party rran.sacuon between dJredOrs and &he compAt'ly. 
WormaOon on die independeou of lhe direaon 
1. DtrKIOII' ochet d&tcciOf'Shaploffic:cs or a statemau thallhcre 'W'CIC no ocher duec.tonhiploffices 
I OltectOB' dice of appolnlmen1 01 yeat of service 
9 Composition ofboord of d~tectors. 
I o Dorecoor(aaes 
11 Directors' quali6c:aoon&. 
12 Oet&lls of audit oomminee. 
I J Dcuil of remuntBtionlcompei\Sallon comminee. 
I~ Detoils of internal control 
ll Details of nomination comminee 
16. Details of boord of directors mutins/WO<kina method 
17 Details of diree10rs' salary/f ... 
11 Dcuils of dirOCIOR' bonus/perfonnanco bonus/profit shari"ll or Other simolar payments. 
19. Details of dirocton' bonelits in kincVocher frinao bencfliL 
20. Details of directon pension sdlemes. 
21 Directors' cmolwnenl(rem..,.,ation~ . 
22 Details of direclOn' Uueresl in shares or a swen~l SIICln& lh11 che d.rec&Of'l hold no sfwes in the company 
21 Details of directors" share option scheme. 
Mnn 
21 22 13 2~ 25 26 27 28 29 JO 31 J2 33 ~ 
10 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 6 7~7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 . .1882 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 1765 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2941 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 7059 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 7059 
10 725 10 10 10 10 ~ ~ 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 307~ 
10 10 10 ID 10 10 10 10 10 ID 10 10 10 10 9 7059 
10 0 0 0 0 0 5 29 0 0 10 076 lJJ 0 . ~· 2.08l5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5147 
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n 0 0 0 0 1.1765 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4412 
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 I 0294 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 I 4706 
708 Jn 117 )56 ) ll Ol 61.1 0 21 10 6 61 0 0 0 l l Ol7 44.179 
0 616 0 69 0 0 02 0 0 
"' 
nr 7 01 0 nr 29290 
0 0 2.1 0 0 0 25 0 25 0 
"' 
0 2.1 2.1 I 2128 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6215 
l6l l l l l 6 28l l • l .Ill H2 7.1 7.1 .138 ll6 l2 l l 5.l 429 
l 5 l l l 5 10 l l l 5 l 5 5 51471 
"' 
nr 
"' 
I 2l nr nr nr nr 
"' 
2 .1 
"' 
l nr 2S 2.18~ 
1027 67 8l ~ 27 no1 lilt .10 7.1 78 Ol 60 7 6.1 101 7 61 I~ 7592 ll 08 6911 
22 22 22 2l 22 22 22 22 22 22 20 21 22 22 
4 669 lOU 2 921 3 Ill 2 )).I 2.307 ) .147 2 7.19 2.9ll 4 621 J 0.17 l.lOI 2 413 ) .173 
w 
0 
w 
Appendix 19 
Wtigbltd OicholomollS Disclosure Scores 
C U . td K ' d ountn: nit me.c om 
Dk A•alyru' COMPANY• 
11cm•• "t:il~l I 1 J I 5 6 1 I 
' 
10 11 ll IJ 11 15 16 11 11 
" I ) ) ) l ) ) ) ) ) ) ) l ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 
1 ) l l l ) l l 0 0 0 ) l l 0 ) 0 0 l ) l 
l l ) l ) ) ) l l l l l l ) l ) l l l l l 
I l l l l l l l l l 2 l l 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
5 I I I I • • I 0 • 0 I • • • I 0 • • • • 
' 
l u l 0 u 0 l 0 l 0 0 0 0 u 0 u 0 0 l ) 
1 l l l l l l 0 l l l l l l l l l l l l l 
I l l l l l l 0 l 0 l l 2 2 l l l l l l l 
9 ) l ) l l l l l l ) ) l l l ) l l l l l 
10 l l 2 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 l 2 l l 2 
11 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 l 2 2 0 u 0 
l l l l l ) l ) ) l l l l l l l l l l l l l 
ll l l l l l l l ) l l l ) ) ) l l l ) J l 
11 ) ) ) ) ) l ) ) l l ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 
I~ 2 2 l 0 l l 2 0 l 2 0 l 0 l 2 2 2 2 2 2 
16 2 0 2 0 2 0 l 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 l 2 0 2 2 
11 ) l l l J l ) l l l l l l ) l l l l ) l 
11 I • '" • • 
I • • • • • • • • • • I • • • 
19 l ) ) ) l l l l l l l l l l ) l l l l l 
20 2 2 I l l l l l l l 2 2 2 l l 2 l 2 2 2 
21 • • • • • • I • • • • • • • • • • I • • 
ll I I I I • I • • • I • I • • • • • • I I 
ll I I • • • • I I I I • • I • • I • • I I 
To1al 66 l9 6U S1 S9 S9 sa su S1 S< S9 61 S9 SI 61 S6 60 S9 61 61 
Rd. hem• ll ll ll ll ll 23 ll ll 21 2l ll ll ll ll 21 21 2l ll ll 
OPA 0 19< 0961 0.161 0191 0 19< 0.119 0.7SI 0161 0 Ill 0 19< 0921 0191 0119 092-1 0 Ill 0909 0 19< 0910 0970 
The flliWC 1U colwnn 110 34 \loaJ the weaj)l&Od scotc{ll\\ acoro 1n appondcc 7 nudltpl) b) Lho respcclnc anaJym wc•Jhl) 
"' · No< ~<k..-ant (noo '9PI;ubk~ 
• Nan.e ol ~' 11 showu Ul append..' 2 
.. Dlsdot~MCIIC:IIC 
I lnl~ioe ou l.b;: tc:nus of &he: d.tcc&on' ICt\.cc conuact or a~taie:acn& s&a&.J.n& Lbl there " •• -a scntc:c COftllaa 
2 AudJLOt's rcpon on c:arporaiC IO\cruocc OLIUctf 
) , lnf0f'1Ulioa on corpota&o ao\'Ct'UftCC (CGD""ianc:c wtlh corpor.ac IO'"CmMCC ptdc.lwc:t cw the awwcocu of the CWTCIM cotpontc aovcmancc cKba.&o) 
• St~ of diroe&otl' rc.apon&ibilil)' ia respotl of lbc (U&anei.ll .JUtC:OaO:WJ. 
1. Oltdot.wc olttlatcd pany &rMMCtion& bctwocA cWocton Md lbc CG:UfM)' Of a taa&auent 6bat lhcfe \\'aJ no rcla&cd pelt)' ltansaaion bawocn ditodon Md &.he COWJ*I)' 
6. w..-... "" .... iadcpeodtoco oC .... dircaon. 
1. OIIOCI«<' other cl&rccaorthiploiTtet~ or 1 Jtta.cmcnt lhlllhc:rc were ao odatt ditoc&onh.tplo(r.ccs 
I . Oirec~on' dol< oC--- or )'CM oC ""'""" 
9 ~... o{ boanl oC dirocaan. 
IOOonoaon'- · 
11 Oirec~on' qoohfoeatioos 
11 Ocu.lb of Mt c.ow.iuoe 
J l Ocu•l of raau.aaatMWcocnponsaaion comn•ittoe. 
11 Dcwls o{""'=n>aa OOOir'cll. 
I J Oeu•ls ol ftCIIIIUUiioa ca.wWuee.. 
16 Otwlo oC -d ol dor.aon .-inaf•.,•luaa lllClhod. 
17 OculltoiditcciOft' ... ,.,,./fee. 
11 Dcuib o{ dUocton' ~........... boftuflprofil Uw;.,l ot other IIIIUIW paylllCIIU. 
19 Dct&~lt of dftc.&ort' bendiu "'hodlo&hcr Crinae bendilt 
lO, Owib ol diRcton _.,.l<hca..,, 
l l Dirtaon' caiOiwuent(fauw.'~Ctlliou) 
22 Ocu•lt ol datoc10n' ia&aul ia thlteJ Of a "MC:mtaN lla&ina tbllbe dltoc&ora hold no lharct ~ad~e COO!p&ll)' 
23. Octa•l• of cbtoc.ww1'1hatc opttoa iCbelue.. 
lO 11 
) ) 
) 0 
l l 
2 l 
• 0 0 0 
l l 
I 2 
l ) 
2 2 
2 2 
l l 
) ) 
) ) 
2 l 
2 0 
l ) 
• • 
l l 
2 l 
• • 
• • I • 
61 H 
ll ll 
0.9SS 0 Ill 
Rd.f Mcu 
ll lJ 11 15 l6 11 11 19 JO Jl Jl JJ )I um. 
0 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) l l )I 0 9106 
0 0 l 0 0 l ) ) l ) ) 0 0 )I 06116 
l l l l l l l l l l l l l )I I 0000 
2 l 2 l l l 2 l l l l 2 2 )I I 00011 
I • u • • • 0 I • • • 0 11 )I 0 16<7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l ) 0 0 0 0 ]I 0 lOS9 
l l l l l l 2 2 I I 2 I l H 09706 
2 2 l 2 2 2 l l l 2 l l 2 )I 09<12 
) l l l l ) l l l l l l l l< I O!MXI 
2 2 2 2 2 I 2 I 2 2 2 2 2 )I 09<12 
0 2 2 0 l 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 l< 04111 
) ) ) ) ) ) l 0 l l l l ) H 119706 
0 ) ) l ) l ) 0 l ) ) ) ) )I 09112 
) ) ) ) l ) ) l l l l l l )I I 0000 
2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 ]I 0676.1 
0 0 0 l 0 2 u 0 I 0 0 2 2 l< 0<706 
0 l l ) l l l ) 0 l l l l H 119<12 
'" • • 
I 
"' 
0 • nr • • I '" • 29 O?GSl 
'" 
l l l ) l ) 
'" 
l l l l J 12 1000\1 
l l 2 l 2 11 nr 
'" 
2 l 0 2 2 ll U9l7S 
• I • I I • I I • • I I I )I I oooo 
• 0 • I I • • I • • • • • H 097116 
'" 
I I I • • • '" • • • 
I • ll I OCNO 
16 S2 Sl lG l2 S1 Sl I] 6) S9 ss so H 
20 ll ll 21 22 lJ 22 19 ll ll 2l 22 ll 
o 6SS 0.111 0 Ill 0 Ill 0 1)9 0161 0 Ill 0 Ill 09SS 0191 0 Ill 0106 0111 
Appendix 20 
Wci~hlcd Dicholomous Disclosure Scores 
c c anada ounll'): 
01 •. Aaalyil•' COMPANY• 
ilrn••• Mtixtu I I J • 5 ' 
1 I 9 ID 11 11 
I J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 J l l l J l J J 0 J J l u 3 
• l l l l l l l I l l l I l 5 • 0 0 0 u • 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 
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Weighted Dichotomous Disclosure Scores 
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Appendix 22 
Weil(htcd Dichotomous Disclosure Jnde1 
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Appendix 23 
WeiJ:hled Oicholomous Disclosure Scores 
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about the quality of disclosure of information relating directors' behaviour 
cannot be generalised to all large companies i~ the sample countries. 
. . . 
The small number of sample companies from each country and the non-random 
selection of the companies also limit the significance differences in the disclosure 
quality to be evaluated using. non-parametric tests. only. More powerful 
·significance tests (parametric tests) might have detected more differences or 
otherwise in the results than what was actually found. 
7.2.2. Weighting of the disclosure items 
This study has employed the disclosure index to measure the quality of 
disclosure of information. The components of disclosure quality were described 
in chapter 3 to include availability, adequacy, and superiority (importance). The 
availability of the disclosure can be determined by using dichotomouS index, 
whereas the adequacy of the disclosure can be determined by using the modified 
dichotomous index. To determine the superiority of the disclosure, the 
dichotomous index and modified dichotomous index are further weighted. In this 
study the weights assigned to the disclosure items, were the median scores from 
the questionnaire survey of the United Kingdom senior investment analysts: 
However, since this study was in an international setting, the use of only the 
United Kingdom investment analysts in determining the weights for the 
disclosure items· may not seem appropriate. The use of investment analysts from 
270 
all the ·sample countries mighthave' changed the median scores assigned to the 
. . . 
disclosure items, which might resulte!i in different findings ofthis study. 
7.2.3. Construction of disclosure index 
Even though every effort was made to construct a reliable and valid disclosure. 
index, however, because of an element-of subjectivity in awarding scores to the 
disclosure items and in deciding whether an information item not disclosed was 
not relevant to the company, the results might have a different conclusion if it 
was carried out by different researcher. Thus, due to this limitation care must be 
taken in using the results of this study. 
7.2.4. Concentration on annual reports 
This study only measures the disclosure of information relating to directors' 
behaviour in the annual reports of companies. However, annual reports is not the 
only channel where companies can provide the information. Other channels such 
as, the 10-K report, proxy statements, interim reports, Internet, etc, may provide 
information relating to the directors' behaviour that is relevant to this study. 
Therefore, the concentration on annual reports only might penalise companies 
that provide the information using other channel. 
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7.2.5. The likelihood that mandatory disclosure to be picked up 
Since this study is in an international setting, both the mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure· items are considered. It is unavoidable because an item can be 
mandatory in one country, it could be voluntary in another. Thus, the disclosure 
items gathered from the relevant literatures consist of both mandatory and 
voluntary. However, there is likelihood that only the mandatory items being 
disclosed by a particular country and picked up in this study. 
7.3. Suggestions for future research 
The results of this study have identified significant differences and a low level of 
disclosure quality of information relating to directors' behaviour in the six 
developed countries. However, results based on these sample countries should 
not be naively extrapolated to all other countries even though they have been 
classified under the same group or family by other researchers. Instead, similar 
future ·studies should be conducted to include more countries, not only the 
developed but also the developing countries. A comparison can also be made to 
determine the differences between the developed and the developing countries 
disclosure practices. Future studies shOuld also include more randomly selected 
companies and using more powerful significance tests. 
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This study might ~!so be repeated by usirig. the weights assigriedb.rrnvestment 
analysts f!om .·more than one country orthe weights assigned· by diff~refil:W:Ollp 
of Users of the annual reports, such as the creditors, employees, etc: w~ 
· could also be gathered from-the practising accountants. 
This study focused on 1996 annual reports of companies from six developed 
countries. As many countries developed new corporate governance guidelines 
.·.:.)' 
and as companies gain experience with the new guidelines, it may be expected 
. _.· 
that their disclosure of information relating to directors' behaviour will change. 
Thus, follow-up studies of 1997 and later year annual reports should enrich the 
understanding of disclosure of information relating to directors' behaviour. A 
comparison between the annual reports before the corporate governance 
guidelines were introduced and after the guidelines were introduced could also 
provide interesting findings. 
Finally, this study could also be extended in the future to include a cost and 
benefit analysis of the disclosure items. 
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Appendix 1 
Partial Listing of Corporate Governance Guidelines and Codes of 
"Best Practice". 
Australia 
• Working Group representing Australian Institute for Company Directors, 
Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants, Business Council of 
Australia, Law Council of Australia, The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia and The Securities Institute of Australia, Corporate Practices and 
Conduct (Bosch Report) (3'd ed., 1995). 
• Australian Investment Managers Association, A Guide for Investment Managers 
and A Statement of Recommended Corporate Practice (June 1995). 
Belgium 
• Report of the Belgian Commission on Corporate Governance (Brussels Stock 
Exchange) (Cardon Report) (1998). 
• Federation of Belgian Companies, Corporate Governance Principles (1998). 
Brazil 
• Brazilian Institute of Corporate Directors, Brazilian Code of Best Practices 
(Preliminary Proposal, April 1997). 
Canada 
• Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada, 
"Where Were the Directors?" Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in 
Canada (Dey Report) (December 1994). 
France 
• Conseil National du Patronat Francais (CNPF) and· Association Francaise des 
Entreprises Privees (AFEP), The Boards of Directors of Listed Companies in 
France (Vienot Report) (10 July 1995). 
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Hong Kong 
• The Stock Excha~ge of Hong Kong, Code of Best Practice (December 1989; 
revised June 1996). 
India 
• Confederation of Indian Industry, Desirable Corporate Governance in India-A 
Code (Draft, 19 April 1997). 
Ireland 
• Irish Association of Investment Managers, Statement of Best Practice on the Role 
and Responsibilities of Directors of Public Limited Companies (1991; revised 
1993). 
Japan 
• Japan Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), Urgent 
Recommendations Concerning Corporate Governance (Provisional Draft, 16 
September 1997). 
• Corporate Governance ForuriJ. of Japan, Corporate Governance Principles-A 
Japanese View (Interim Report, 30 October 1997). 
Kyrgyz Republic 
• Working Group on Corporate Governance, Handbook on Best Practice Corporate 
Governance in the Kyrgy Republic· (Draft, June 1997). 
Netherlands 
• Committee on Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance in the Netherlands-
Forty Recommendations (Peters Report) (25 June 1997). 
South Africa 
• The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, The King Report on Corporate 
Governance (King Report) (29 November 1994). 
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United Kingdom 
• Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(Cadbury Report) ( 1 December 19.92). 
• Comrriittee on Corporate Governance Final Report (Hampel Report) (January 
1998). 
United States 
• The American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations ( 1992). 
• American Bar Association Section of Business Law, Corporate Directors 
Guidebook (1978; revised 1994). 
• General Motors Board of Directors, GM Board of Directors Corporate 
Governance Guidelines on Significant Corporate Governance Issues (January 
1994; revised August 1995; revised June 1997). 
• National Association of Corporate Directors, Report of the NACD Commission 
on Director Professionalism (November 1996). 
• Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund 
(TIAA-CREF), TIAA-CREF on Corporate Governance (1996). 
• California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), Corporate 
Governance Coret Principles & Guidelines (Draft, March 1998). 
• The Business Roundtable, Statement on Corporate governance (September 1997). 
(Source: OEDC , A Report to the OECD by the Business Sector Advisory Group on 
Corporate Governance, Paris, OECD 1998). 
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Appendix 2 
List ofsample companies 
United Kingdom Capital Employed (£'000) 
l. Barclays 
2. BG 
3. Lloyds TSB Group 
4. B.A.T Industries 
5. Imperial Chemical Industries 
6. Bass 
7. The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
8. Marks and Spencer 
9. The General Electric Company 
I 0. Standard Chartered 
11. Severn Trent 
12. The British Land Company 
13. PowerGen 
14. Anglian Water 
15. Enterprise Oil 
16. Tate & Lyle 
17. Reckitt and Colman 
18. Arjo Wiggins Appleton 
19. Mirror Group 
20. BICC 
21. Brixton Estate 
22. Govett Oriental Investment Trust 
23. Signet Group 
24. Vaux Group 
25. Caledonia Investments 
26. London Merchant Securities 
27. The Rugby Group 
28. Bardon Group 
29. The Scottish American Investment Company 
30. Delta 
31. Meyer International 
32. The Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries 
33. Monument Oil and Gas 
34. Smiths Industries 
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14,034,000 
12,778,000 
10,094,000 
9,293,000 
6,512,000 
4,950,000 
4,885,000 
4,299,900 
4,121,000 
3,898,000 
3,164,500 
2,771,300 
2,404,000 
2,308,900 
2,105,600 
2,060,700 
1,807,700 
1,773,400 
961,600 
894,000 
883,915 
741,728 
693,216 
574,979 
556,000 
536,175 
532,300 
523,200 
516,431 
487,000 
452,400 
435,227 
386,713 
334,300 
Canada. 
L Seagram Company 
2 .. Bell Canada 
3. Scotiabank 
4. The Thomson Corporation 
5. Royal Bank of Canada 
6. Alcan Aluminium 
7. Nortel 
8 .. CT Financial Services 
9. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
10. Esso (Imperial Oil) 
11. Petro Canada 
12. Laidlaw Incorporation 
· 13. Power Corporation of Canada 
14. Rogers Communications Incorporation 
15. IPL Energy Incorporation 
16. Pancanadian Petroleum 
17.BCTel 
18. Placer Dome 
19. Cambridge Shopping Centres 
20. Abitibi-Price 
21. Stelco 
22. Cameco Corporation 
23. Sears Canada 
24. Canfor Corporation 
25. Maritime Telegraph & Telephone 
26. Fairfax 
27. Canadian Airlines 
28 .. Extendicare 
29. Cambior 
30. Inco 
31. Inrnet Mining Corporation 
32. Southam 
33. Investors Group 
· 34. Kinross Gold Corporation 
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Capital Employed (£'000) 
10,789;071 
7,670,120 
7,145,057 
6,865,367 
6,136,936 
5,108,903 
4,542,096. 
4,205,638 
4,111,360 
3,803,323 
2,989,825 
2,835,498 
2,546,664 
2,318,751. 
2,219,733 
2,075,655 
1,868,104 
1,725,894 
955,482 
945,113 
897,040 
790,889 
776,253 
766,282 
676,387 
652,538 
514,188 
490,817 
474,249 
446,310 
443,597 
420,516 
~75,670 
324,264 
·Netherlands 
10 · Ing Groep · 
20 Philips Electronics 
30 ABN AMRO Holding 
40 KPN 
50 Aegon. 
60 KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 
70 Akzo·Nobel 
80 Rodamco 
90 De Nationale Investeringsbank 
100 Robeco 
11. DSM 
120 Heineken Holding 
130 Koninklijke Hoogovens 
140 KNP BT 
150 Rolinco 
160 Fortis Amev 
170 ASR Anno 1720 
180 Ahold 
19 0 Oce-V an der Grin ten 
200 Wereldhave 
21. VIB 
220Pakhoed 
23 0 Hagermeyer 
240 Bols Wessanen 
250 Gist-Brocades 
260 VNU 
270 Van Ommeren 
280 KBB 
290 CSM 
·· 300 Stork 
• r ~ • • • ' •' I • ' _'<• -, • 
31. Hollandsche Seton Groep 
320 Nitrica 
330 NPM 
340 Wolter Kluwer 
.. ·-:.-
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Capital Employed (£'000) 
14,713,516 
12,755,545 
11,905,737 
9,073,047 
7,011,411 
4,933,783 
4,911,202 
4,160,761 
4,082,442 
3,969,785 
3,171,006 
2,778,716 
2,406,542 
2,352,942 
2,190,212 
2,012,774 
1,884,441 
1 ,796, 109 
953,255 
891,795 
883,840 
740,525 
688,159 
578,778 
562,845 
539,611 
531,530 
526,722 
514,815 
486,270 
455,398 
432,819 
386,288 
338,717 
.France 
i. Eaux 
2. Suez 
3. Renm.ilt 
4. UAP 
5. LyonnaiseDes Eimx 
6. Michelin 
7. Lafrage 
8. L'oreal 
9. Eridania Beghin-Say 
.10. CCF 
11. Pinault Printemps-Redoute 
12. Gan Groupe 
13. Lagardere Groupe 
14. Bouygues 
15. Ciments Francias 
16. Havas 
17. Euro Disney 
18. Promodes 
19. EMC Groupe 
20. Dassault Aviation 
21. Club Mediterranee 
22. Sagem Groupe 
23. Seita 
24. Sommer Allibert 
25. Essilor International 
26. Colas 
27. Simco 
28. Vallourec 
29. Machine Bull 
30. Schneider 
31. Bertrand Faure 
32. Primagaz 
33. Castorama 
34. DMC 
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Capital Employed (£'000) 
13,974,571 
13,131,323 
11,888,850 
9,152,968 
7,324,458 
5,544,709 
4,773,786 
3,945,207 
3,924,958 
3,898,954 
3,238,833 
3,091,570 
2,949,802 
2,638,548 
2,488,178 
1,988,099 
1,711,554 
1,589,420 
1,042,609 
903,103 
846,407 
723,413 
680,020 
580,271 
566,296 
536,113 
532,620 
522,541 
507,740 
482,965 
468,733 
447,908 
414,389 
378,919 
Germany 
1. BASF 
2. Viag 
3. BMW 
4. Commerzbank 
5. Mannesmann 
6. Bayerische Hypotheken-und Wechel-Bank 
7. Preussag 
8. Vereinigte Elektrizitatswerke Westfalen 
9.·MAN 
10. Berliner Kraft-und Licht 
11. Audi 
12. Linde 
13. Degussa 
14. ASEA Brown Boveri 
15. Metallgesellschaft 
16. Continental 
17. Hochtief 
18. AGIV 
19. IKB Deutsche Indusriebank 
20. Klockner-Werke 
21. PWA 
22. FAG Kugelfischer Georg Schafer 
23. Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz 
24. Dyckerhoff & Widmann 
25. AVA 
26. Strabag 
27. Douglas Holding 
28. Fresenius 
29. Varta 
30. Brau lind Brunnen 
31. Herlitz 
32. Kolbenschmidt 
33. KSB 
34. Felten & Guilleaume Energietechnik 
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Capital Employed (£'000) 
15,420,349 
14,433,456 
11,444,965 
9,270,994 
7,920,980 
5,051,896 
4,975,428 
4;313,385 
4,238,952 
3,777)28 
2,973,198 
2,780,040· 
2,411,743 
2,282,083 
2,126,347 
2,010,530 
2,005,339 
1,597,400 
1,275,822 
888,803 
877,581 
737,775 
684,365 
586,846 
564,278 
564,275 
561,324 
507,174 
502,036 
484,098 
467,090 
387,724 
381,558 
332,569 
Sweden 
I. Svenska Handelsbanken 
2. Volvo 
3. Stadshypotek 
4. Svenska Cellulosa 
5. Erricsson 
6. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags 
7. Astra 
8. Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 
9 .. Skanska 
10. Sandvik 
11. SKF 
12. Incentive 
13. Mo och Domsjo 
14. Nordbanken 
1 5. Ki.nnevik 
16. AGA 
17. Skandia Insurance Company 
18. Trellegorg 
19. NCC 
20. Scancerm 
21. Industrivarden 
22. Marieberg 
23. Avesta Sheffield 
24. Stena Line 
25. Celsius 
26. Gullspangs Kraft 
27. Perstorp 
28. Siab 
29. Bilspedition Transport & Logistics 
30. Custos 
31. Graningeverkens 
32. Ratos 
33. Esselte 
34. At1e 
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Capital Employed (£'000) 
9,271,968 
7,671,001 
6,989,232 
4,835,267 
4,666,453 
4,661,788 
3,407;390 
2,573,133 
2,454,274 
2,283,126 
2,221,704 
2,186,036 
1,982,915 
1,909,927 
1,571,229 
1,550,819 
1,468,502 
1,388,031 
1,102,689 
889,935 
723,468 
719,479 
703,079 
664,859 
625,790 
612,333 
601, lOO 
544,736 
497,891 
471,597 
458,919 
436,566 
386,903 
341,277 
Appendix 3 
List of persons who commented on the selection of disclosure items. 
1. Martyn E. Jones of Deloitte and Touche. 
2. Professor R.S.O. Wallace of Middlesex University 
3. Keith Russell of AEA Technology PLC 
4. Peter Holgate of Cooper and Lybrand 
5. C E Duddridge of The Equitable Life Assurance Society 
6. Professor Chris Mallin of Nottingham Trent University 
7. G H R Musker of Zeneca Group PLC 
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